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Labor’s Share in Hungary
J. Michael Orszag – Peter R. Orszag  
This paper examines labor’s share of income in Hungary.  We find that the trend 
in labor’s share is substantially influenced by the treatment of self-employment; 
self-employment has declined significantly because of both shifts across sectors 
and reductions within sectors. Hungary’s labor share has been roughly constant 
when labor compensation excludes the self-employed.  The labor share with an 
imputation for the self-employed has declined, but data quality concerns and 
ambiguities surrounding the appropriate imputation make it difficult to reach 
definitive quantitative conclusions about the extent of the decline.  Policymakers 
and researchers should be cautious in interpreting the apparent shifts in Hungary’s 
labor share.    
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classification: E01, E25, J30
Keywords: national income accounting, factor income, income distribution, 
employees
1. introduction
The first of Kaldor’s stylized facts of economic growth is that the shares of income 
attributable to labor and capital are roughly constant over time (Kaldor 1961). That 
stylized fact, however, has come under increased scrutiny over the past decade 
or so, with debate over whether and why the capital share has risen and the 
labor share declined. Professor Kaldor was born (with the name Kaldor Miklós) in 
Budapest, and the share of income attributable to different factors has important 
macroeconomic consequences, so it seems particularly appropriate to examine 
labor’s share in Hungary in a publication associated with the nation’s central bank.
The OECD (2012) has recently noted that labor’s share has declined in Hungary, 
with a larger fall in the overall labor share in Hungary than in the United States and 
the decline in Hungary’s business-sector labor share exceeding every other of the 
26 countries examined except Finland. As we discuss, however, the extent of any 
decline in the labor share is not entirely clear, because of ambiguities regarding how 
the self-employed should be treated as well as uncertainties in the underlying data. 
J. Michael Orszag, Ph.D., is the head of research at Towers Watson. E-mail: mikeorszag@gmail.com.
Peter R. Orszag, Ph.D., is vice chairman of corporate and investment banking at Citigroup, Inc.  
E-mail: orszagp@gmail.com.
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At the same time, a decline in labor’s share in Hungary would not be particularly 
surprising: labor share has been declining in some of the fastest growing economies 
in the world over the past decade. 
As a capsule summary of the self-employment issue, Figure 1 shows the labor share 
of gross value added in Hungary under two extreme assumptions: that the labor 
share among the self-employed is either zero (mixed income is attributed entirely 
to capital) or 100 percent (mixed income is attributed entirely to labor). Under 
the former assumption, there is a 1.5 percentage point decline in the overall labor 
share; under the latter, the share declines by a sizeable 10.5 percentage points. 
Conclusions about whether the overall share is roughly steady or falling sharply 
thus depend sensitively on what intermediate assumption is used to attribute the 
share of self-employment income that represents labor compensation.
In this article, we discuss the broader international literature about labor’s share, 
examine trends within Hungary while assessing issues of both data quality and 
mixed income, and analyze the role of changes within and across sectors of the 
Hungarian economy. Our conclusions are:
(a)  labor’s share measured only using employees and not the self-employed has 
remained roughly constant over time;
(b)  labor’s share including the self-employed has indeed likely declined, but 
sufficient concern surrounds data quality and the self-employment imputation 
that the quantitative extent of any such decline is unclear;
Figure 1.











1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Zero labor share in self-employment
100% labor share in self-employment
Source: Statistical Office of European Communities, Haver Analytics
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(c)  self-employment has declined markedly, both because of shifts across sectors 
and reductions in self-employment rates within each sector; 
(d) labor’s share in industry has declined noticeably;
(e)  net capital income has risen as a share of national income; for gross capital 
income, the share excluding real estate has increased notably. 
2. Background on labor’s share 
In 1995, Professor Larry Katz of Harvard, a leading labor economist, summarized the 
view at the time that, “It is remarkable how constant labor’s share has been over 
the last 150 years. This is one of the strongest regularities of advanced economies” 
(Bradsher 1995). This view, reflected in Kaldor’s first stylized fact, was also the basis 
on which the Cobb-Douglas production function was introduced (Cobb–Douglas 
1928). 
However it has become increasingly clear that labor’s share in recent decades has 
deviated from this pattern, leading to much discussion and debate. According to 
OECD data, the median labor share in member countries fell from approximately 
70 percent in 1980 to roughly 64 percent in 2012. During that period the measured 
labor share in the United States fell by 5.9 percentage points, in Germany by 7.3 
percentage points, and in France by 11.1 percentage points. 
2.1. causes of decline in measured labor share
An IMF paper (Jaumotte–Tytell 2007) found that labor globalization and 
technological change were about equally responsible for the decline in labor shares 
in Anglo-Saxon countries (U.S., U.K., Canada, and Australia), but that technology 
was the more important factor in continental Europe and Japan. Other contributing 
factors include the weakening of labor unions and privatization.
The OECD (2012:110) estimated that total factor productivity growth and capital 
deepening may be responsible for “as much as 80% of the average within-industry 
decline of the labour share in OECD countries between 1990 and 2007.” Advances 
in technology have promoted automation and thus greater substitution between 
capital and labor. Globalization is estimated to account for another 10 percent of 
the fall. 
In his book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty (2014) sparked 
a debate about outsized returns on capital, an issue tightly linked to labor share. 
This debate has involved questions ranging from whether the decline in labor share 
is temporary or permanent; whether it reflects a broader pattern associated with 
technological change; and whether it reflects growing elite power and rent-seeking 
behavior. 
8 Studies
J. Michael Orszag – Peter R. Orszag
It could well be that the decline in labor share which has been witnessed is 
a transient phenomenon connected with the adjustment mechanism to new 
technology associated with the internet revolution and the fact it facilitates 
globalization; the effective global labor supply has expanded more dramatically than 
the effective global capital supply over the past two decades. At least conceptually 
the Marxist concepts that arose during the industrial revolution were based on 
observations about the low returns to labor, something which itself may have been 
a transient adjustment phenomenon connected with the rapid speed of change at 
that time. We simply do not have enough data or experience yet with the recent 
labor share declines to know whether or when the share will recover. Nor can we 
be clear precisely how the next major technological wave of robotics will affect 
factor shares.
It is also noteworthy that while a declining labor share has been highlighted in many 
circles as a problem, international experience suggests it may also be a symptom of 
necessary investment and changes in economic activity. Nothing illustrates these 
points better than the case of China. The decline in labor’s share in China has been 
particularly significant since the 1990s amid one of the fastest growth rates in 
observed economic history. Labor’s share in China is now under 40 percent, much 
lower than Hungary. Some of the change in China involves sectoral composition. 
Manufacturing has a much lower labor share than agriculture, and a movement 
of workers into manufacturing has thus driven labor’s share lower. In addition, 
increasing investment and capitalization of production has reduced labor’s share. 
The basic point is that although developed economies will have higher labor shares 
than developing countries, the process of growth requires investment and sectoral 
reallocation, which leads to a decline in labor share for some time. Guerriero (2012) 
also notes that low labor shares are seen in economies with high dependence 
on natural resources. The process of investment in natural resource extraction is 
beneficial for economic growth yet it can result in a decline in labor share because 
of the investment required. 
2.2. Measurement issues: role of housing and depreciation
In addition, several methodological issues arise when interpreting changes in labor’s 
share. For example, a paper by Benjamin Bridgman (2014) finds that although 
gross labor share in the United States has fallen to an historical low, the net labor 
share (excluding depreciation and taxes on production) has remained within its 
historical range. Specifically, gross labor share fell by 9 percent between 1975 and 
2011 while net labor share fell by 6 percent. Depreciation is primarily responsible 
for this difference. 
The role of housing and land raises other issues. A recent Brookings paper by 
Matthew Rognlie (2015) of MIT raises an important issue regarding the conventional 
9
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wisdom that capital’s share has increased at the expense of labor. Rognlie finds that 
the long-term increase in the net capital share in large advanced economies stems 
entirely from housing. For sectors other than housing in G7 countries, the capital 
share fell from 1948 until the 1970s and has only partially recovered since. The role 
of housing has increased dramatically over this period, contributing 10 percentage 
points to net capital income today compared to 3 percentage points in 1950. 
2.3. data quality
The quality of data required to compute labor’s share is a significant issue in 
many countries. These data issues led Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) to focus 
assessment only on corporate income, as it is more reliable than measures that 
include self-employment income. In addition to the issue of appropriate imputation 
of capital income to the self-employed, the actual level of self-employment income 
itself is notoriously unreliable in most countries due to under-reporting of income. 
In Hungary, Benedek and Lelkes (2011) find particularly low reporting of income of 
the self-employed, creating a high degree of uncertainty over what has happened 
to the self-employed income at the heart of many of the issues we are examining.
More fundamentally, the OECD and Eurostat data on labor’s share that is the subject 
of much analysis and policy debate is quite unusual when looked at the granular 
level. When we looked at the relevant data for Eastern European countries at the 
sectoral level, there were some significant puzzles. In Slovenia for instance, the 
sectoral labor share of agriculture, forestry and fishing was not just over 100 percent 
every year since 1995, but exceeded 200 percent in most years, with a peak of 269.9 
percent in 2009. Not to be outdone, in Romania this measure of labor share reached 
a peak of 660 percent in agriculture in 2010. These figures may have economic 
explanations in some cases (such as large subsidies for agriculture), but the use of 
unreliable survey data also plays a role.
Noise in the data is also reflected in dramatic changes over time. In Bulgaria, labor’s 
share in agriculture, forestry and fishing rose from a reasonable-sounding 70.8 
percent in 2000 to 167.6 percent in 2014. And there are dramatic shifts in some 
cases from one year to another. In Lithuania, the labor share in the same sector fell 
in one year from 106.2 percent to 73.2 percent. In Romania in one year (from 2008 
to 2009) the labor share of manufacturing went from 57.4 percent to 36.7 percent. 
In addition, when one looks at similar sectors across Eastern European countries, 
there is more variation in labor’s share in economies that one would think are 
more similar. In Hungary, for instance, manufacturing in 2010 had a labor share of 
48.3 percent. In Romania it was just 33.5 percent and Slovenia it was 67.9 percent. 
Manufacturing is just the beginning of the puzzles. Construction in Romania in 2010 
had a labor share of 33.5 percent, yet in Hungary it was 65.3 percent. Our intuition 
is that the fundamental division of income should not be that different across these 
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sectors in these different countries. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014, Figure 6) 
report that a lot of the movement in labor’s share in Eastern European countries is 
within sectors relative to other countries, further reinforcing the point that sectoral 
data quality is potentially a big issue.
Given the degree to which these data irregularities are pervasive in the published 
OECD/EUKLEMS data it would be helpful to put much stronger caveats into 
reports and claims on the decline in labor’s share. The apparently smooth and 
reasonable movements in labor’s share at a country level that are reported have 
substantial compositional issues beneath the surface that could well invalidate the 
aggregate conclusions or at a very minimum add a high degree of uncertainty to 
any conclusions reached.
3. Trends in Hungarian labor share
With the caveats above in mind, we begin to examine the labor share in Hungary 
by presenting the data on gross value added in four categories: compensation 
to employees, mixed income, net capital income, and depreciation. In these 
calculations, gross value added and compensation to employees is based on data 
from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office and consistent with OECD and Eurostat 
data. Depreciation is measured as the consumption of fixed capital in the national 
income and product accounts, and mixed income is taken from the Hungarian 
Central Statistical Office series on mixed income in the household sector. Net capital 
income is then computed as the residual.
As Figure 2 shows, the shares of gross value added attributable to compensation 
of employees and to depreciation have remained roughly constant since 1995. 
The share attributable to mixed income (that is, self-employment) has declined 
significantly, and the share attributable to net capital income has risen noticeably.
The pronounced decline in mixed income as a share of gross value added, and the lack 
of any trend in employee compensation by itself, highlights the issue described in the 
introduction. In particular, mixed income declined from 18 percent of gross valued 
added in 1995 to 9 percent by 2013. How such self-employment income is treated can 
therefore substantially affect conclusions about the trend in the overall labor share.
3.1. Self-employment and mixed income
In its calculations, the OECD assumes that mean hourly compensation among 
the self-employed is equal to mean hourly compensation among employees, and 
therefore scales the data on employee compensation by the ratio of total hours to 
employees’ hours to arrive at an overall labor compensation figure, which is then 
compared to gross value added. We update the OECD data using this methodology 
in Figure 3, with the modification that we assume mean annual (instead of hourly) 
11
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compensation is the same for the employed and self-employed. The results 
show a noticeable decline in labor’s share given the assumption regarding self-
employment. The fundamental reason, as shown in Figure 4, is that the share of the 
self-employed in total employment has fallen roughly in half since the mid-1990s.
Figure 2. 













1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Source: Statistical Office of European Communities, Haver Analytics; Hungarian Central Statistical Office
Figure 3. 
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Labor Share Under OECD Self-Employment Assumption
Source: Statistical Office of European Communities, Haver Analytics
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This decline in the self-employment rate appears to be caused partially by a decline 
in agriculture’s share of total employment and a rise in professional and related 
employment over that period of time. Appendix Table 1 shows the employment 
shares by sector by year, and Table 2 shows the self-employment rate within each 
sector by year. As the table shows, the share of total employment in agriculture 
fell from 15 percent in 1995 to 7 percent in 2014. This sector, as shown in Appendix 
Table 2, has a disproportionately high rate of self-employment, in excess of 50 
percent. By contrast, employment in the professional, science, technology, and 
administration sector rose from 3 percent in 1995 to 9 percent in 2014. 
There have also been declines within sectors. The self-employment rate fell from 
19 percent in trade, travel, and food services to 8 percent; it fell from 14 percent 
to 8 percent in professional, science, technology, and administration, and from 17 
percent to 12 percent in construction. It rose in some other sectors, such as financial 
insurance. In general, however, self-employment has become less prominent within 
most sectors.
The shift across sectors (and in particular away from agriculture and towards 
professional and related services) and the reduction within sectors can each explain 
about half of the decline in self-employment for Hungary as a whole. For example, 
weighting the 1995 self-employment rates by 2014 employment shares by sector 
yields an overall self-employment rate of 13.5 percent; conversely weighting the 
Figure 4. 













1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Per cent
Self-Employment as a Share of Total Employment
Note: Figure shows the difference between total employed and number of employees, as share of total 
employed
Source: Statistical Office of European Communities, Haver Analytics
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2014 self-employment rates by 1995 employment shares yields an overall rate of 
13.6 percent. In other words, the shifts of employment between sectors can explain 
about half of the decline in the self-employment rate for the nation as a whole, 
and a reduction in self-employment rates within sectors explains the other half.
A paper in Hungarian by Hárs (2012) has analyzed in detail the decline in self-
employment in Hungary. The paper finds that two factors played an important role 
in the movement of self-employment over the period since the mid-1990s. The first 
was the decline in cooperatives primarily in agriculture that accounted for roughly 
4 percent of total employment. As members of the self-employed cooperatives 
aged and retired, this form of self-employment declined. The second is the share 
of entrepreneurs and partnerships in total employment in Hungary, which declined 
slightly.
Taxation is also a potentially important issue as tax regimes have a uniquely 
powerful effect on the supply of self-employed labor. And in the period under 
question tax rates changed every year and in two cases within the year. Over the 
relevant period, the income taxes and social security contributions of the self-
employed were stable as a share of GDP. Because the proportion of self-employed 
shrunk over the period, the implication is an implicit rise in the tax burden on the 
self-employed. So increases in taxation of the self-employed could well have been 
driving at least part of the movement away from self-employment in Hungary. 
As noted earlier, the sensitivity of the results to how self-employment income is 
treated is not unique to Hungary. Gollin (2002) emphasizes the crucial role played 
by self-employment income in international analyses of income shares. Marta 
Guerriero (2012) looked at labor share in a panel of 89 countries since the 1970s 
and found that treatment of self-employment income had a material effect on 
measurements. Guerriero calculated six different measurements of labor share, 
each with a different approach to self-employed income. In the case of Hungary, 
these figures ranged from 58 percent to 76 percent.
In the United States the official BLS figures assume, as do the OECD figures for 
Hungary, that average wages of the self-employed and payroll employees are the 
same. A recent Brookings paper, however, shows that this assumption implies 
that the capital share of the self-employed would be negative in the 1980s. Two 
alternative measures (an “asset basis” measure which assumes that “returns 
to capital, as captured by its user cost, are the same for the capital used by the 
payroll-employed and that used by the self-employed”, and an “economy-wide 
basis” measure that “assumes that the labor share in entrepreneurial income is the 
same as that for the overall economy”) suggest that the BLS measure overstates 
the decline in labor share by one-third (Elsby 2013:12).
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Figure 5 shows that for Hungary, the implicit capital share attributed to the self-
employed by the OECD procedure appears much more reasonable than the 
Brookings results for the United States. In particular, Figure 5 shows the residual 
between total mixed income and the implicit labor compensation attributed to 
the self-employed, divided by mixed income. This capital share varies between 
25 and 40 percent, which is a more constrained range than for the United States. 
Figure 5 might be seen as attenuating concerns about how the self-employed are 
treated in the OECD calculations, but ultimately it does not answer the fundamental 
challenge: we do not know with certainty how to split income for the self-employed; 
self-employed income has fallen markedly in Hungary; and substantial potential 
therefore exists for misinterpretation of aggregate income shares depending on how 
self-employment income is treated. As we have noted above, for many countries 
in the world, the various ways of handling the self-employed do not substantially 
affect the trend, whereas for Hungary it is crucial.
This concern is only underscored by examining the traditional methodology for 
the self-employed at the detailed sectoral level. Figure 6 shows a scatter plot of 
sectoral total hours worked and the attributed labor share in that sector for 2007. 
As the figure shows, several sectors (such as telecommunications equipment and 
air transport) have labor shares in excess of 100 percent, many others have labor 
shares close to 100 percent, and several sectors (such as real estate activities) have 
labor shares below 30 percent. These patterns do not seem plausible, highlighting 
Figure 5. 
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Implicit Capital Income Share for Self-Employed
Source: Statistical Office of European Communities, Haver Analytics
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concerns about both the underlying data and the methodology used to construct 
the labor share.
The bottom line is that the treatment of self-employment income affects the 
level, but not necessarily the trend, in the labor share if self-employment itself 
were relatively stable. Indeed, in most analyses of declining labor share such as 
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), the treatment of self-employment seems to 
affect the level of the share, but it does not noticeably impact the trend. Hungary, 
though, is considerably different. 
3.2. Role of housing
Hungary has one of the highest rates of home ownership in the world (Wikipedia 
2015). And the FHB housing index for Hungary (a measure of residential real estate 
prices developed by FHB Bank) rose by roughly a factor of four between 1999 and 
2008, which for comparison is more than double the rate of increase in house 
prices in the overheated U.S. market during that period. However, some aspects of 
the Hungarian housing stock – such as expenditures as a percentage of disposable 
income – are below EU averages.
We lack complete data on net housing capital income in Hungary, and must 
therefore rely on approximations involving gross rather than net housing capital 
income. That is, we do not have data on the allocation of depreciation between 
Figure 6. 
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housing and non-housing capital, so we examine gross capital income rather 
than net capital income across these two components. One could potentially 
approximate depreciation on housing by imposing an assumption that all housing 
is owned by households and that households own no other fixed capital, and then 
proxying depreciation of the housing stock by the consumption of fixed capital by 
households. We prefer simply to examine gross capital shares here, however.
We separate gross capital income into two components: real estate and non-real 
estate. For real estate gross capital income, we subtract employee compensation 
from gross value added in real estate. Figure 7 shows that, unlike for the United 
States and other industrialized economies, the capital share excluding real estate 
for Hungary appears to have risen significantly, and real estate capital income as 
a share of gross value added has risen modestly. This is somewhat puzzling given 
the relatively high rental yields on Hungarian property at the moment and the rapid 
rise in Hungarian property prices (Global Property Guide 2015). But yields in the 
late 1990s in Hungary were yet higher, at over 10 percent. 
As another perspective on the role of housing, Figure 8 plots real estate value 
added (including employee compensation) as a share of total gross value added. 
As it shows, this ratio has not risen markedly, providing an additional though still 
Figure 7. 
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Capital excluding real estate
Real estate capital
Source: Statistical Office of European Communities, Haver Analytics, Hungarian Central Statistical Office
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imperfect check on the conclusion that housing has not played as dominant a role 
in income shares in Hungary as in many advanced economies, including the United 
States.
3.3. Trends in Labor’s Share by Sector
Comparable data at the major sectoral level is unavailable for both self-employment 
and value added. One could proxy self-employment by using household income data 
by economic activity, but rather than adopting that approach, in this section we 
examine sectoral shifts in the ratio of employee compensation (that is, with no self-
employment imputation) to value added. Appendix Table 3 shows the share of gross 
value added attributable to each major sector, and Appendix Table 4 shows trends 
within each sector in labor’s share, measured only using employee compensation. 
As Appendix Table 3 shows, the shares of value added by sector have been relatively 
stable. The share attributable to agriculture has declined, from 8 percent of total 
value added to 4 percent, and the share attributable to professional, scientific, and 
technical activities has risen from 6 percent to 9 percent. These shifts mirror those 
of the employment shares by sector. Other than those changes, the distribution of 
value added across sectors has remained roughly the same since the mid-1990s.
Appendix Table 4 shows the ratio of employee compensation to gross value added 
by sector. This has fallen substantially in industry, from 59 percent to 46 percent, 
and somewhat less dramatically in construction, from 55 percent to 48 percent. It 
Figure 8. 
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has risen substantially in professional, scientific, and technical services, and also in 
information and communications and in financial insurance. 
The between-sector and within-sector shifts, overall, have produced a ratio of 
employee compensation to gross value added that has not changed much over 
time. Applying the 2014 compensation ratios to 1995 value-added weights yields 
an aggregate share of 52 percent, for example, not that different from the observed 
ratio of 54 percent in 1995.
4. conclusions
In this article, we reviewed the broader international literature about labor’s share, 
examined trends within Hungary while assessing issues of both data quality and 
mixed income, and analyzed the role of changes within and across sectors of the 
Hungarian economy. Our conclusions are:
(a)  labor’s share measured only using employees and not the self-employed has 
remained relatively constant over time;
(b)  labor’s share including the self-employed has indeed likely declined, but 
sufficient concern surrounds data quality and the self-employment imputation 
that the quantitative extent of any such decline is unclear;
(c)  self-employment has declined markedly, both because of shifts across sectors 
and reductions in self-employment rates within each sector; 
(d)  labor’s share in industry has declined noticeably;
(e)  net capital income has risen as a share of national income; for gross capital 
income, the share excluding real estate has increased notably. 
(f)  The dependence of results on the self-employed is problematic because of the 
myriad ways of classifying their labor income, the changes in tax regimes over 
the period as well as the deficiencies in underlying data. Other aspects of the 
data including details of the sectoral movements and the capital imputation 
raise further questions. 
At the same time, any decline in labor’s share in Hungary is not that remarkable 
when looked at in the context of other countries during the same period. Poland’s 
decline in manufacturing labor share was more rapid for instance. Hungary’s level 
of labor share is neither the lowest among comparable countries nor has it declined 
the most rapidly, even under the potentially flawed ways in which the data are 
measured internationally. 
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Factor shares remain an important topic for analysis and policy, but care is warranted 
in interpreting the apparent shifts in Hungarian labor share. The sensitivity of the 
Hungarian results to self-employment assumptions is particularly noteworthy. 
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1995 15% 26% 5% 22% 2% 2% 3% 21% 4%
1996 15% 25% 5% 22% 2% 2% 3% 20% 4%
1997 15% 26% 5% 22% 2% 2% 3% 20% 4%
1998 14% 27% 6% 22% 2% 2% 4% 20% 4%
1999 14% 26% 6% 22% 2% 2% 4% 20% 4%
2000 12% 26% 6% 23% 2% 2% 4% 20% 4%
2001 11% 26% 6% 23% 2% 2% 5% 19% 4%
2002 11% 26% 6% 23% 2% 2% 5% 20% 4%
2003 9% 25% 7% 23% 2% 2% 5% 21% 4%
2004 9% 24% 7% 23% 2% 2% 6% 21% 4%
2005 8% 24% 7% 24% 2% 2% 6% 21% 4%
2006 8% 24% 7% 24% 2% 2% 6% 21% 4%
2007 8% 23% 7% 24% 2% 2% 6% 21% 4%
2008 7% 24% 7% 24% 2% 2% 7% 20% 4%
2009 7% 23% 7% 24% 2% 2% 7% 21% 4%
2010 7% 23% 7% 24% 2% 2% 7% 22% 4%
2011 7% 23% 7% 24% 3% 2% 7% 21% 4%
2012 7% 22% 6% 25% 3% 2% 8% 21% 4%
2013 7% 21% 6% 24% 3% 2% 9% 22% 4%
2014 7% 21% 6% 24% 3% 2% 9% 23% 4%
Source: Statistical Office of European Communities, Haver Analytics
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Table 2.


















































































































































1995 61% 5% 17% 19% 4% 4% 14% 1% 27%
1996 63% 5% 18% 19% 5% 5% 18% 1% 28%
1997 64% 5% 19% 18% 5% 6% 18% 1% 27%
1998 64% 5% 19% 17% 6% 8% 19% 1% 26%
1999 65% 5% 20% 17% 6% 11% 17% 2% 28%
2000 66% 4% 20% 15% 5% 11% 15% 2% 26%
2001 64% 4% 20% 14% 5% 10% 15% 2% 28%
2002 64% 4% 19% 14% 8% 12% 16% 1% 25%
2003 61% 4% 18% 14% 8% 13% 17% 1% 26%
2004 61% 4% 18% 14% 7% 13% 15% 2% 27%
2005 60% 4% 16% 12% 10% 14% 13% 2% 25%
2006 60% 4% 16% 12% 8% 13% 12% 2% 23%
2007 58% 3% 17% 11% 7% 13% 11% 1% 24%
2008 58% 3% 15% 11% 7% 14% 13% 2% 22%
2009 57% 3% 15% 11% 7% 15% 11% 2% 26%
2010 57% 3% 16% 10% 7% 15% 9% 2% 24%
2011 56% 3% 17% 10% 7% 16% 8% 2% 24%
2012 58% 3% 16% 10% 6% 16% 7% 2% 24%
2013 59% 3% 12% 8% 6% 15% 9% 1% 20%
2014 59% 2% 12% 8% 7% 15% 8% 1% 20%
Source: Statistical Office of European Communities, Haver Analytics
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Table 3.











































































































































































1995 8% 25% 5% 18% 3% 4% 6% 19% 4% 7%
1996 8% 25% 5% 17% 4% 5% 6% 18% 4% 8%
1997 7% 27% 5% 18% 4% 4% 6% 17% 3% 8%
1998 7% 28% 5% 18% 5% 4% 6% 17% 3% 8%
1999 6% 27% 5% 17% 5% 3% 7% 17% 3% 8%
2000 6% 27% 5% 18% 5% 4% 7% 17% 3% 9%
2001 6% 26% 5% 18% 5% 4% 7% 17% 3% 9%
2002 5% 25% 6% 18% 5% 4% 8% 18% 3% 8%
2003 5% 25% 5% 17% 5% 4% 8% 19% 3% 8%
2004 5% 26% 5% 17% 5% 4% 8% 19% 3% 8%
2005 4% 26% 5% 17% 5% 5% 8% 19% 3% 8%
2006 4% 26% 5% 18% 5% 5% 8% 18% 3% 8%
2007 4% 26% 5% 19% 5% 4% 8% 18% 3% 8%
2008 4% 25% 5% 19% 5% 4% 8% 18% 3% 8%
2009 4% 25% 5% 18% 6% 5% 9% 18% 3% 9%
2010 4% 26% 4% 18% 5% 5% 9% 18% 3% 9%
2011 5% 26% 4% 18% 5% 5% 9% 17% 3% 9%
2012 5% 27% 4% 18% 5% 4% 9% 17% 3% 9%
2013 4% 26% 4% 19% 5% 4% 9% 17% 3% 9%
2014 4% 26% 4% 18% 5% 4% 9% 18% 3% 8%
Source: Statistical Office of European Communities, Haver Analytics
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Table 4.











































































































































































1995 28% 59% 55% 60% 45% 47% 50% 69% 57% 16%
1996 26% 58% 55% 62% 39% 41% 49% 68% 59% 16%
1997 29% 53% 47% 61% 40% 52% 49% 69% 56% 15%
1998 28% 50% 49% 60% 36% 52% 52% 70% 61% 17%
1999 28% 50% 44% 60% 34% 60% 47% 70% 54% 14%
2000 29% 53% 46% 62% 41% 51% 49% 71% 54% 15%
2001 29% 52% 44% 60% 48% 50% 47% 73% 53% 14%
2002 31% 52% 41% 59% 43% 48% 44% 76% 57% 13%
2003 30% 50% 45% 63% 42% 46% 49% 78% 60% 12%
2004 25% 49% 47% 66% 41% 46% 52% 78% 64% 12%
2005 28% 48% 48% 65% 43% 44% 55% 78% 61% 12%
2006 28% 46% 52% 63% 42% 46% 52% 78% 62% 12%
2007 29% 48% 54% 63% 44% 54% 57% 77% 62% 13%
2008 29% 49% 51% 63% 43% 57% 55% 76% 58% 13%
2009 33% 48% 52% 67% 44% 51% 56% 74% 60% 12%
2010 32% 46% 55% 66% 45% 51% 58% 73% 59% 12%
2011 26% 47% 56% 65% 46% 48% 58% 72% 60% 12%
2012 29% 47% 59% 66% 47% 52% 60% 71% 60% 11%
2013 30% 47% 54% 62% 48% 57% 58% 72% 58% 10%
2014 29% 46% 48% 61% 53% 55% 60% 73% 56% 11%
Source: Statistical Office of European Communities, Haver Analytics
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Show me how you pay and i will tell you who 
you are – Socio-demographic determinants of 
payment habits
Tamás Ilyés – Lóránt Varga
This study is intended to assist in understanding the current payment habits of 
Hungarian households and examine the extent to which these habits are affected by 
age, education, activity, income or residence. Our research analysed a representative 
household survey with a sample of 1,000 respondents using various statistical 
tools. The percentage of households holding bank accounts and bank cards is high 
and has not changed since 2010, while households’ use of cash has moderately 
declined in recent years. The socio-demographic variables under review have 
a limited impact on the use of cash-based payment methods. Accordingly, in terms 
of both number and value, a similar proportion of households pay their bills via 
postal cash payments, irrespective of age and income. The preference for the use 
of electronic payment methods is largely driven by education level. While the use 
of electronic payment methods generally increases in line with income, cash usage 
is still strongly over-represented among one fourth of households with higher-than-
average income levels. Age, activity and residence also exert a significant impact 
on the adoption of electronic payment methods, but the payment habits of users 
of different electronic payment instruments do not generally show differences on 
the basis of these features.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classification: C38, D12, D14, E42
Keywords: retail payments, payment habits, household behaviour, electronic 
payment methods, financial integration
1. introduction
International and Hungarian literature have unanimously found that the increased 
use of electronic payment methods benefits the functioning of the economy. In 
particular, it supports economic growth and may save significant social costs (Turján 
et al. 2011). It is far less clear, however, what it is that determines the rate at 
which electronic payment methods are used in an economy and hence, it is difficult 
Financial and Economic Review, Vol. 14 Issue 2., June 2015, pp. 25–61.
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to decide how to encourage the use of non-cash payment methods. The latter 
question is particularly pressing in the case of households, given that this sector is 
typically characterised by a high rate of cash usage. Therefore, in order to identify 
possible policy measures for improving the efficiency of payment transactions, it is 
important to grasp and properly understand households’ payment habits and their 
determinants. This study is meant to contribute to shedding light on and gaining 
an insight into this topic.
In laying the groundwork for our research, we conducted a broad-based 
representative survey among Hungarian households. The detailed analysis of the 
survey results in this article is intended to answer the following questions: To what 
extent do Hungarian households use electronic payment methods? What are the 
characteristics of households with no bank accounts or bank cards? How does the 
use of certain payment methods correlate to specific socio-demographic features 
of households? How do these factors influence the choice of a specific payment 
method in a payment situation? How can we divide Hungarian households into 
segments based on payment habits?
In recent years, a number of analyses and surveys in Hungary have focused on the 
payment habits of households. The most recent studies reflect data pertaining to 
2011–2012 (Takács 2011; Turján et al. 2011; Divéki–Listár 2012); however, several 
significant changes have since been adopted in regulations affecting payment 
transactions and the costs of payment services (for instance, the introduction 
of the financial transaction duty and the option of free cash withdrawal twice 
a month). Moreover, numerous news items have been published in the media 
recently envisaging a possible change in households’ payments habits based 
on certain shifts in the data of official payment statistics1 (for example, changes 
in the number of bank accounts or payment cards). However, official payment 
statistics do not necessarily provide a suitable basis for drawing such conclusions. 
For example, they do not contain data about whether the cancellation of certain 
bank accounts affected the primary payment accounts of the household concerned 
(in which case the cancellation eliminated the household’s access to electronic 
payment transactions altogether), or the decline in the number of bank accounts 
mostly affected special or supplementary accounts that had been scarcely – or 
never – used for the execution of payment transactions. The results of our survey, 
by comparing them to similar data collections from the past, enable us to answer 
these questions as well. Consequently, our analysis may offer some conclusions 
about how households’ payment habits have changed – if at all – since the adoption 




Show me how you pay and I will tell you who you are
Our article is structured as follows: In the second chapter we present the survey 
underlying the research. In the third chapter we describe the current payment 
habits of Hungarian households, while the fourth chapter is dedicated to a detailed 
analysis of the motives behind the observed payment habits, and the socio-
demographic reasons and other correlations identified. At the end of the article 
we sum up the most important findings of our research.
2. Research methodology
This analysis is based on data gained from an anonymous questionnaire-based 
survey covering a sample of 1,000 persons. The questionnaire-based survey on 
payment habits is a generally accepted methodology in the international literature. 
Several recent publications rely on questionnaire-based surveys to analyse payment 
habits (Cruijsen–Plooij 2015; Goczek–Witkowski 2015).
The Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) conducted its own questionnaire-based survey in 
the summer of 2014. The survey covers ages above 18 of the Hungarian population, 
including representative samples by gender, age group, region, settlement type 
and education. The questionnaire was designed to gather both quantitative and 
qualitative information. Each questionnaire provides data on the basic socio-
demographic characteristics of respondents (age, education, labour market status, 
income, residence), their access to the electronic payment infrastructure (number 
of bank accounts and payment cards), number and value of daily and monthly 
payment transactions by main transaction type (cash withdrawal, cash payment, 
card payment, credit transfer, direct debit, bill payment with postal cheques (yellow 
and white cheques),2 payment with vouchers and other instruments). Where 
appropriate, respondents were also asked about the reasons for not having a bank 
account or payment card.
The number and value of payment transactions are based on self-assessment; 
however, we verified the reliability of monthly transaction data – the core 
information serving as a basis for our analysis – with various methods. We compared 
the aggregate monthly transaction data of the questionnaire to the comprehensive, 
national payment data collected by the MNB on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, to the transaction data of the respondents on the specific day (i.e. the day 
on which the questionnaire was completed). Same-day data are also based on 
self-assessment; yet, we can assume that respondents recalled the number and 
value of the payment transactions they performed on the day of the questionnaire 
with a reasonable degree of certainty. The deviations in numbers or proportions 
2  For the sake of simplicity, in this study the two most frequently used cash- and paper-based postal bill 
payment instruments – postal inpayment money orders (commonly known in Hungary as “yellow cheques”) 
and postal deposit payment orders (commonly known in Hungary as “white cheques”) – are both referred 
to as postal cheques.
28 Studies
Tamás Ilyés – Lóránt Varga
identified on the basis of the comparisons were not significant; thus we may agree 
with the assumption that the monthly payment transaction data reported by the 
respondents are sufficiently accurate.
In order to obtain answers to the research questions listed in the introduction, we 
examined monthly payment transaction data in various breakdowns (aggregated, 
broken down by groups derived from socio-demographic characteristics, based 
on indicators measuring the choices between different payment methods) and 
using different statistical methods (comparison of group means, estimation of linear 
regressions and cluster analysis).
3. descriptive statistics of household payment habits
First, by presenting the consolidated data from the replies to the questionnaire, 
we provide a view of the general payment habits of the entire sector of Hungarian 
households. Comparing this information to the similar results of previous studies 
we can also determine whether the payment habits of households have changed in 
recent years, and more specifically, since the adoption of new regulations affecting 
payment transactions and the pricing of payment services, such as the introduction 
of the payment transaction duty in 2013 or the bimonthly free cash withdrawals 
in 2014.
According to our survey, 75.7% of Hungarian adults hold at least one bank account, 
and 71.7% of the adult population own at least one payment card. The percentage 
of those having a bank account without owning a payment card is 4.3%, while the 
proportion of cardholders without a bank account (e.g. owners of partner cards 
linked to another person’s bank account) is negligible (0.3%). The percentage of 
respondents having more than one bank accounts or payment cards is 5% and 
40%, respectively. The percentage of bank account and payment card ownership 
is even higher at the level of households. 82.7% of Hungarian households have at 
least one bank account, and 80.1% of them own at least one payment card. The 
ratio of households with a bank account, but no payment card is also lower, at 2.9%.
These ratios have not changed compared to the results of previous survey results. 
Calculated for the corresponding age groups, for instance, households’ access to 
the electronic payment infrastructures has not changed at all since 2010 compared 
to data shown in Takács (2011).3 This suggests that the negligible decline4 observed 
in the number of household bank accounts and payment cards in recent years 
is primarily linked to the elimination of some of the presumably less frequently 
3  Although the age distribution of the survey used by Takács (2011) is somewhat different from our sample, 
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used second or third accounts and cards, i.e. the rationalisation of household bank 
relationships, and as such, it is not detrimental to the electronic payment options 
of Hungarian households.
Respondents without a bank account or a payment card were also asked about 
the subjective reasons for not having such instruments. The distribution of the 
answers was nearly identical in both cases. Of the reasons cited, one stood out: 
nearly 90% of residents without a bank account or payment card did not think 
these instruments were necessary. A smaller, but still relatively high percentage of 
respondents – 25% in relation to bank accounts and 19% in relation to payment 
cards – explained their reasons with the high maintenance costs. On a positive 
note, only a relatively small number of respondents indicated a lack of confidence 
in banks (10–11%) or perceived security risks (3–4%) as a reason. Although due to 
the different methodologies applied these values are not fully comparable with 
those of Divéki–Listár (2012), the distribution of the responses is extremely close. 
Costs and a lack of need for bank accounts or payment cards were cited by slightly 
more respondents compared to 2012, while the lack of confidence in banks was 
mentioned slightly less often.
In summarising the responses to the questions pertaining to monthly payment 
transactions, we identified four payment categories: cash, electronic payment, 
payment by postal cheques, and other payment methods (Figure 1). Among 
electronic payment methods, we took into account card payments (debit and credit 
cards), credit transfers and direct debits, while the category of “other” included 
Figure 1. 













Source: MNB Survey 2014 edited
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payments by pre-paid vouchers (SZÉP card, Erzsébet voucher, etc.) and loyalty cards, 
where the points earned go towards future purchases.
The data reveal that, based on the number of households’ monthly payment 
transactions, cash payment accounts for a significant part of the transactions: 
78% of the respondents chose this option, compared to 14% opting for electronic 
payment methods. The share of payments by postal cheque is nearly 7%. As regards 
the value of payment transactions, however, the preference for cash is far less 
pronounced: 46% of households’ payments were executed in cash, while electronic 
payment methods and postal cheques represented 26% and 27%, respectively. Since 
postal payment methods always involved cash at the time of the survey, we can 
conclude overall that cash-based payments account for 85% of the total monthly 
payment transactions of Hungarian households by number, and 73% in terms of 
value. Comparison of the distribution of transaction numbers and values reveals 
that Hungarian households use cash payments more often than any other payment 
method; at the same time, they tend to pay smaller amounts in cash on average. By 
contrast, they initiate electronic transactions (or use postal cheques) less frequently, 
but these transactions involve larger amounts on average.
Table 1. 











Cash withdrawal 0.81 1.6 67 365 50 001
(conf. int. 95%) (0.78 – 0.84) (1.5 – 1.7) (63 687 – 71 043) (46 632 – 53 369)
Cash payment 0.99 27.2 50 375 2 457
(conf. int. 95%) (0.98 – 0.99) (25.8 – 28.5) (47 136 – 53 615) (2 264 – 2 651)
Debit and credit 
card payment 0.58 8.3 34 947 6 223
(conf. int. 95%) (0.55 – 0.61) (7.5 – 9) (32 036 – 37 858) (5 494 – 6 952)
Credit transfer 0.24 2.6 33 083 17 700
(conf. int. 95%) (0.22 – 0.27) (2.3 – 3) (29 111 – 37 055) (14 777 – 20 622)
Direct debit 0.27 3.1 38 207 16 131
(conf. int. 95%) (0.24 – 0.3) (2.8 – 3.4) (33 575 – 42 838) (12 658 – 19 605)
Postal cheques 0.69 3.1 38 451 14 249
(conf. int. 95%) (0.66 – 0.72) (3 – 3.2) (36 274 – 40 628) (13 229 – 15 268)
Source: MNB Survey 2014 edited
We compared the data above with the results of Takács (2011). We found that the 
distribution of payment methods by number and value has not changed significantly 
since 2010, but a slight decline can be observed in cash usage. This is extremely 
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apparent in the case of payment values: since 2010, the ratio of cash usage has dropped 
to 46% from 50%. By number, electronic payments rose from 12% to 14%, while based 
on the amounts paid, they increased to 26% from 20%. Meanwhile, the gap between 
the number and value of cash payments widened further; in other words, the average 
value of a single cash transaction continued to decline. These shifts indicate that the 
payment habits of households did not change substantially in response to the adoption 
of the regulations affecting payments and the pricing of payment services after 2010, 
and the proportion of cash-based payments did not increase. This reconfirms the 
analysis performed by Ilyés et al. (2014) on the 2013 data.
Looking at the average characteristics of households’ individual payment 
transactions in more detail, we find that practically all households (99% of users) use 
cash payments (Table 1). In this context, a high percentage of the adult population 
used cash withdrawals, but at around 80%, their share is far lower than that of those 
paying in cash. Incomes received in cash may account for some of this difference, 
while another part of it may be attributed to cash withdrawals by a family member 
other than the respondent. A relatively high ratio, 70% of the adult population, 
pay with postal cheques on a regular basis. Of all electronic payment options, card 
purchases are the most frequently used form of payment; nearly 60% of cardholders 
regularly make payments with their payment cards. By comparison, the share of 
credit transfer (24%) and direct debit (27%) in electronic payments is far lower.
In addition to the usage ratio, Table 1 also indicates the average number of 
transactions initiated by the users of individual payment transactions, as well as 
the average monthly amount paid by using the specific payment method, and 
the average value of individual transactions.5 It is clear that the average monthly 
number of cash payments far exceeds the average monthly number of any other 
payment methods, while cash payments involve the smallest average value in 
a single transaction. This is followed by card payments: households pay with cards 
8 times per month on average, in the average amount of slightly more than HUF 
6,000 per transaction. Households pay via credit transfer, direct debit and postal 
cheques less often, but these transactions involve higher average values.
4. Socio-demographic factors influencing payment habits
In this chapter we classify households into groups on the basis of various aspects, 
in particular the socio-demographic characteristics surveyed in the questionnaire. 
We then proceed to examine the differences observed – and verified by statistical 
methods – in the monthly payment transactions of individual groups to draw 
5  The latter value does not necessarily equal the quotient of the monthly average transaction value and the 
monthly average transaction number shown in the table, because our calculation of the average value per 
transaction reflect only those responses where respondents provided data both for the number and for the 
value of the transactions made via the specific payment method.
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conclusions about the factors influencing the payment habits of households and 
their impact. First of all, we examine access to the electronic payment infrastructure; 
in other words, the reasons for having a bank account or a payment card. We 
analyse the factors influencing the use of individual payment methods, with special 
regard to electronic payment transactions. We also examine the rationale behind 
the selection of a particular payment method in specific payment situations, and 
explore whether households can be divided into segments based on their payment 
habits and the characteristics of their transactions.
4.1. Access to the electronic payment infrastructure
For the purposes of the further analyses, we divide households into groups based 
on five socio-demographic characteristics. These characteristics are the following: 
age, education, labour market status, per capita monthly household income, and 
residence. First, we examine bank account and payment card ownership within 
each group. In this context, our goal was to determine whether the household 
had at least one bank account or bank card; the exact number of the accounts and 
cards was irrelevant, since a household can be connected to the electronic flow of 
payments with a single account and a single card.
It is clear that account and card ownership is closely correlated with age. Coverage 
ratios are extremely high, around 90%, until age 50 in all age categories; they are 
slightly lower between the ages of 50 and 60, fluctuating between 80% and 90%, 
while a steep decline is observed above age 60 (Figure 2). It is also evident that the 
Figure 2. 




















































































Source: MNB Survey 2014 edited
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ratio of bank account and payment card ownership move together closely below 
age 55, whereas payment card coverage lags behind bank account coverage in the 
higher age categories. Consequently, bank account holders who do not own a card 
are typically older than 55. In relation to the latter segment we can also establish 
that respondents tend to withdraw the income credited to their accounts practically 
in full, while this ratio is below 50% among those who have both a bank account 
and a card. This means that members of this segment hold an account for the sole 
purpose of receiving their income and exchanging it into cash, practically without 
performing any electronic payment transactions.
Since there is a discernible causal relationship between age and bank account and 
payment card ownership, we can assume that the bank account and the payment 
card coverage of higher age groups may increase in line with the gradual ageing of 
currently active age groups with higher penetration. Assuming that the currently 
employed account holders and cardholders will keep and use their accounts and 
cards above age 60 as well, while the coverage of new, young age groups will remain 
equally high, the penetration of the household sector will increase over time. 
According to our estimate prepared on the basis of the population statistics released 
by the CSO, as a result of this process and assuming that no other factor will change 
Hungarian households’ willingness to own a bank account and a payment card, the 
ratio of bank account coverage to the total population may reach 80% by 2030 and 
82% by 2040, compared to the current ratio of 76%.
Figure 3. 
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Whether a person has a bank account or a payment card is strongly influenced by 
the person’s level of education as well: we measured higher and higher levels of 
average coverage among those with higher education levels (Figure 3). As regards 
access to the electronic payment infrastructure, the marginalisation of the segment 
with primary school education or less is extremely significant, and even those with 
vocational education fall behind the national averages of 76% and 72%. These 
two groups include a relatively high number of respondents who have a bank 
account, but do not own a card. As we mentioned above, this segment is hard to 
involve in electronic payments, despite the existence of a bank account. Among 
respondents with high school education the ratios exceeded the national average 
by 10 percentage points, while those with university degrees exhibit nearly full 
coverage. Indeed, practically everyone in the latter group who has a bank account 
also has a payment card.
We also calculated the ratio of bank account and bank card ownership according 
to labour market status, per capita monthly household income and residence. The 
results are shown in the figures of Point 1 of the Annex. The ratio of account and 
card ownership in higher per capita income groups is unmistakably higher; in other 
words, access to the electronic payment infrastructure improves in line with the 
increase in income. While this result was highly predictable, it is noteworthy that 
the level of the positive correlation is not extremely high. Although coverage is 
particularly high (nearly 90% or above) in the per capita income categories above 
HUF 100,000, the ratio of bank account and bank card ownership is only slightly 
below the estimated national average even in the lowest per capita income category 
(below HUF 50,000). It is also evident that the coverage of respondents living in 
settlements is clearly lower than that of their urban peers, with the highest values 
measured in Budapest and at county seats. With respect to labour market status, 
as expected, active employees have the highest coverage. While it is a positive 
result that the average of students slightly exceeds the national average, the values 
of pensioners and the unemployed are far worse than that. The ratio of account 
and card ownership barely reaches 50% in the latter groups. Based on the results, 
besides the group of persons with the lowest education level, pensioners living in 
settlements are overrepresented among those who have a bank account, but do 
not own a card.
These results, however, are likely to be interrelated, or attributable to the same 
reasons. For example, the effect of age and education may conceal the indirect 
effect of income (the average income of pensioners is lower than that of the 
active age groups, and higher education levels are associated with higher average 
incomes), or vice versa. Similarly, differences by labour market status are clearly 
related to the differences observed in relation to age or education, while age may 
also play a role in the effect of residence (the average age of settlement dwellers 
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is higher), and so on. In order to identify the most influential factors of those 
examined on bank account and payment card coverage and the exact magnitude of 
the effects, we estimated logistic regressions. The value of the dependent variable of 
the regressions is 1 or 0 depending on whether the respondent has a bank account 
or a bank card or not. The explanatory variables of the regressions are the dummy 
variables of the categories defined according to per capita net monthly income, age, 
education, labour market status and residence. We also set up groups based on the 
age of respondents because, as Figure 2 demonstrates, the relationship between 
age and coverage is not linear: in fact, there is an apparent break in the highest age 
groups, which can be best captured by a dummy variable.
Table 2.
Estimated coefficients of the regressions explaining bank account and payment card 
coverage






Per capita income  
(in 10 thousand HuF)
1.04* 1.05
School qualification  
(8 elementary classes or less)
Vocational school 2.02* 2.12*
High school 5.00* 5.60*
University 12.05* 14.04*






Type of settlement (capital)
County towns 0.72 1.10






* Significant odds ratios with a 95% confidence interval
Source: MNB Survey 2014 edited
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According to the results of the regression estimate, similar reasons as those seen 
above account for the difference in coverage observed between bank accounts 
and payment cards, given the negligible number of respondents who own only 
one of these two instruments. In the logistic regression the estimated odds ratio 
parameters quantify how strongly the presence of the given property increases – 
in the case of a multiplier above 1 – or reduces the odds ratio of card or account 
ownership compared to the benchmark group.6 Based on the estimated coefficients 
of the logistic regression, each of the main variable groups has a significant impact 
on coverage and has an additional explanatory power besides covariance (Table 2). 
The group of pensioners has significantly less coverage compared to the other age 
groups, while according to labour market status, the category of the unemployed 
shows significantly lower values. Based on settlement type, the ratio of bank account 
owners is far lower among respondents residing in other towns and settlements 
than among their peers living in Budapest, at county seats and in towns with county 
rank. The latter result may suggest that access to the payment infrastructure may 
also depend on the quality of the financial infrastructure located at the place of 
residence (e.g. number and accessibility of branches, number of merchants with 
POS terminals). Although we are unable to clearly determine the direction of the 
causal relationship from these results, this assumption is supported by the fact 
that smaller settlements have a demonstrably negative impact on bank account 
coverage, even beyond the effects of income, age, education and labour market 
status. Having said that, education level has the strongest explanatory power: even 
a high school diploma improves the odds ratio of coverage significantly, while the 
effect of a degree is exceptionally strong.
4.2. use of payment methods
The next step is to examine the payment transactions of households to identify 
the effect of the aforementioned socio-demographic characteristics on the use of 
specific payment methods. To that end, based on the data from the questionnaire-
based survey, we calculated the average usage ratio of six different payment 
transaction types, and the average monthly number and value of the transactions 
executed by the users of the given transaction type, calculated separately for 23 
groups into which respondents were classified based on age, education, labour 
market status, per capita net monthly income and residence. The six payment 
transaction types comprise cash withdrawals from the account holder’s bank 
account on the one hand, and the following five payment methods: cash payment, 
card payment, credit transfer, direct debit and payment by postal cheque.
6  As regards the bank account coverage, the odds ratio is 0.8:1 for those with a primary school education 
compared to 21.6:1 for graduates, as the ratio of bank account owners in these two groups is 44.16 per 
cent and 95.58 per cent, respectively. Thus, without the exclusion of other variables, the effect would be 
27-fold between these two education levels, while, filtering the effect for the cross-correlation based on 
the regression, yields a result of 12.05.
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The result of our calculations is shown in the tables included in Point 2 of the Annex. 
Under each value presented in the tables we indicated the confidence interval 
associated with the given estimated average, which is helpful in determining 
whether there is a statistically significant difference between the mean of a group 
and the mean of another group. For the sake of clarity, the means highlighted in 
bold in the individual rows of the tables mark the means, the deviation of which 
from another mean or more means in the same row holds the greatest significance 
for the purposes of our analysis.
Based on the results pertaining to the effect of age, we found that members of 
the youngest age group (ages 18–29) tend to withdraw cash in smaller amounts 
than the rest of the age groups; however, the value of their cash purchases is 
not demonstrably different from the values of other age groups. Members of 
this age group use their cards for purchases in the same proportions (60–70%) 
as any other age groups, but respondents in this group tend to use their bank 
cards less frequently (5–8 times a month) and spend less money compared to 
the other groups, which might be indicative of their smaller disposable income. 
They are less inclined to use direct debit: only 10–20% of the age group used 
direct debit, compared to approximately 30% recorded for the other groups. Only 
about 40% of the age group above 60 use payment cards for purchases, which is 
below the average. Those using payment cards tend to use them somewhat less 
frequently, but the value of their purchases does not significantly deviate from the 
average. In this age group, the ratio of respondents using credit transfer is below 
the average, amounting to merely 10–20% of account holders, compared to the 
average values of 20–30%. It is an interesting development that, while up until ages 
40–49 respondents pay via postal cheques in larger and larger ratios, above this age 
the usage ratio does not increase demonstrably, and average monthly transaction 
numbers and values show no difference between the age groups. By contrast, older 
generations pay by direct debit in similar proportions as the rest of the age groups 
(except the youngest group, which lags behind in this regard), and the transactions 
performed correspond both in number and value. It is another important result 
that the statistics of cash payments show no difference whatsoever among the 
different age groups.
Although the average number of monthly cash withdrawals increases somewhat 
in line with education levels, the value of the transactions remains the same, and 
there is also no difference between the monthly values of cash purchases either. 
That notwithstanding, higher education levels have a clearly positive effect on 
the use of electronic payment methods. As regards card purchases and direct 
debit transactions, both the usage ratio and the average monthly transaction 
number and value show a high correlation with education levels, while in the 
case of credit transfers the usage ratio and the monthly number of transactions 
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increase significantly in accordance with higher education levels. While only 30% 
of the respondents with primary school education use their cards for purchases 
on 2–3 occasions per month on average, at a value of around HUF 20,000, the 
corresponding values for those with a high school degree are close to 70%, 7–8 
occasions and HUF 33,000, and for those with a university degree are 80%, 10–15 
occasions and nearly HUF 50,000. As the education level increases, the percentage 
of those paying via postal cheques declines continuously. Nevertheless, nearly one 
half of those with a university degree use this payment method, and the average 
monthly amount paid by the users does not differ significantly on the basis of 
education level.
As regards labour market status, the average monthly value of cash withdrawals 
and cash purchases by the unemployed and students is lower than that of active 
workers and pensioners (the values of the latter two do not differ from each other). 
Presumably, this is not mainly indicative of the lower ratio of cash usage in these 
groups, but rather reflects their lower level of disposable income. Average bank card 
usage ratios are clearly more favourable for active workers than for the other groups 
(a usage ratio of 70% and 8–10 purchases per month at a value of HUF 40,000). The 
same is true for the ratio of those paying via credit transfer and direct debit (both 
30%). As regards average monthly values, pensioners use credit transfers about as 
intensively as active workers (more than HUF 30,000) and, in line with our previous 
results, the group of account holder pensioners does not lag behind in respect 
of the usage ratio of direct debit either. It is noteworthy that students practically 
do not use direct debit at all. This may be related to the fact that this group does 
not typically pay regular monthly bills, as reflected by their very low use of postal 
cheques (12%) compared to the other groups.
Looking at the groups defined based on per capita net monthly income, the 
differences found resemble those seen in relation to education level. In this case, 
the monthly value of both cash withdrawals and cash purchases increases in line 
with income, which is a predictable result. The increase in income correlates 
positively with card use: both the usage ratio and the number and value of monthly 
payments are higher in the group of higher-income respondents. While 40–50% of 
those belonging to groups where per capita net monthly income is less than HUF 
100,000 (these groups have the highest number of elements) use their bank cards 
for purchases on 6 occasions per month on average, at a value ranging between 
HUF 15,000 and HUF 25,000, the corresponding values in the groups with per capita 
net monthly income above HUF 150,000 are 70–85%, 10–16 occasions and HUF 
50,000–65,000, respectively. The percentage of respondents paying with credit 
transfer, the value of credit transfers, and the percentage of those using direct debit 
all increase with higher income levels. Among those using direct debit and postal 
cheques, however, only respondents in the highest income category paid higher-
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than-average monthly amounts. It is also interesting that the statistics of postal 
cheque payments do not increase with income either in respect of user ratios or 
number of monthly payments.
In examining the payment statistics of groups created on the basis of residence, 
we only found a number of values significantly different from the average among 
residents living in Budapest. However, according to these values, Budapest residents 
use both cash-related and electronic transactions more intensively than the national 
average. The capital city has the highest percentage of residents withdrawing cash 
(90%), the highest average number of monthly cash purchases (34), and the highest 
average monthly value paid via postal cheque (HUF 46,000). In addition, the ratio 
of respondents making purchases with payment cards (73%), the average number 
of monthly card purchases (10) and the average monthly number (4) and value 
(HUF 52,000) of direct debit are also extremely high in Budapest. Regarding the 
rest of the values, there is no perceivable difference between the settlement types 
under review.
Based on the results described above, we found overall that the socio-demographic 
factors under review have a limited impact on cash-related payment transactions, 
i.e. cash withdrawals, cash purchases and the use of postal cheque payments, 
and a stronger impact on the use of electronic payment methods. Practically 
everyone pays with cash; thus the ratio of respondents using cash withdrawals is 
relatively stable in the groups under review, and the average monthly value of cash 
withdrawals and cash purchases only increases in line with an increase in income. 
The rest of the socio-demographic characteristics have no significant impact on 
the average monthly value of cash payments, which remains stable at around HUF 
50,000 in the vast majority of the groups reviewed. The average number and value 
of postal cheque payments are even more stable at 3 monthly transactions and 
a value of HUF 35,000–45,000, irrespective of any increases in income.
By contrast, the diversity of the statistics measuring the intensity of the use of 
electronic payment methods is far more significant as a function of the socio-
demographic characteristics under review: the difference between the means of 
the lowest and highest groups, in many cases, is three or four-fold. Education and 
per capita net monthly income have the largest degree of positive impact on the 
use of payment card purchases, credit transfers, and direct debit. Based on labour 
market status, clear deviations can be observed primarily to the benefit of active 
workers. By contrast, age and residence appear to have a smaller impact, restricted 
to certain areas or groups at most. Ages above 60 with bank accounts or payment 
cards tend to pay via credit transfer and payment card to a smaller degree compared 
to the average, but they are extremely active users of direct debit. By contrast, the 
payment habits of those using card purchases and credit transfers do not differ 
significantly from the average values of the other age groups either in terms of 
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the monthly number or the monthly value of the transactions. It is also evident 
that, for the most part, there is a clear positive correlation between the uses of 
different electronic payment methods; in other words, if a group defined on the 
basis of socio-demographic characteristics has higher statistics measuring the use 
of card payments, then the average usage ratios of credit transfer or direct debit 
will be typically higher as well.
Table 3.
Estimated coefficients of the regressions explaining the use of payment card purchases 
and direct debit










(30-39) 0.41* –0.37 1.50 –0.06
(40-49) 0.60 1.95 1.87* 0.33
(50-59) 0.38* 0.75 2.37* 0.05
(60-) 0.19* –0.02 3.07* 0.48
Per capita income  
(in 10 thousand HuF)
1.05* 0.3680* 1.03* 0.00995
School qualification  
(8 elementary classes or less)
Vocational school 1.81* 3.91* 1.84 0.19
High school 3.99* 3.78* 3.08* –0.01
University 6.26* 7.91* 5.04* 1.24
Labour market activity 
(Employee)
Pensioner 0.88 –1.87 0.89 0.29
Unemployed 0.64 –0.44 0.47 0.44
Student 0.37* 0.93 0.00 0.44
Other 0.68 –0.33 0.90 –0.54
Type of settlement (capital)
County towns 0.54* –1.63 2.59* –0.04
Other towns 0.52* –1.80 1.57 –0.04
Villages 0.83 1.13 2.42* –0.04
Constant 1.26 –0.34 0.03* 0.00*
N 782 466 811 210
R2 0.1356 0.2164 0.1097 0.2224
AUC 0.7382 0.7189
* Significant odds ratios and coefficients with a 95% confidence interval
Source: MNB Survey 2014 edited
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However, there may also be correlations between some of our results relating 
to the different socio-demographic factors that influence the use of payment 
methods, or they may have the same underlying reasons, as was the case with 
the results shown in the previous chapter in relation to bank account or payment 
card ownership. Therefore, in this case also, we estimated regressions in order to 
identify the factors which have the most significant effect on the extent to which 
households use electronic payment methods, and the exact magnitude of their 
effect. We estimated logistic regressions for the explanation of the usage ratio of 
the six payment transaction types under review, where the dependent variable may 
be 1 or 0 depending on whether the respondent uses the specific transaction type 
or not. We estimated linear regressions to explain average monthly transaction 
numbers and values. The explanatory variables of the regressions are the dummy 
variables of the categories defined according to per capita net monthly income, 
age, education, labour market status, and residence.
In Table 3 we present the estimates for the coefficients of the regression explaining 
the usage ratio and monthly number of card purchases and direct debits because, 
based on the results detailed above, the usage of these electronic payment methods 
is relatively significantly influenced by the socio-demographic characteristics under 
review. However, we also estimated the above regressions for the rest of the 
payment transactions and monthly values (the estimated values of the coefficients 
are presented in Point 3 of the Annex), and, where relevant, we briefly touched 
upon their results. The use of cards for payment transactions is also affected by 
the combination of several variables; in addition, these variables have a significant 
explanatory power for monthly transaction numbers. Higher age categories reduce 
the odds ratio of usage, but not the monthly transaction numbers. This confirms 
our previous finding. The same is true for the student category. By contrast, 
education level and per capita income increases both the odds ratio of usage and 
the frequency of usage. A high school education, for example, almost doubles the 
average monthly number of card purchases (increases it by four), while the number 
of transactions executed by respondents with a university degree exceeds the 
average by four transactions. A HUF 25,000–30,000 increase in per capita income 
raises the monthly number of card purchases by one on average.
As regards the payment transactions considered as relevant alternatives to card 
payments, in the case of cash withdrawals we found that the odds ratio of usage 
tends to be worsened by certain labour market positions (typically those associated 
with a lack of independent income) – unemployed, student – and slightly improved 
by education, while none of the listed variables accounts for the unique differences 
in the extremely high ratios of cash payments. Owing to its nominal nature, income 
always has a strong explanatory power in respect of transaction numbers and values, 
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while categories related to employment – working age person in employment – 
tend to explain the differences in value, but not the intensity of monthly frequency.
The characteristics of direct debit were different from those of card usage. While age 
and education still have a strong explanatory power, education plays a role only in 
the odds ratio of usage, without having an effect on monthly intensity (similar to age, 
which exhibited the same behaviour in the case of card purchases as well). Again, we 
can draw the conclusion that higher education levels increase the odds of usage, while 
younger age decreases the odds of usage. Even so, once someone uses the service, 
these variables will not capture any further differences. The only significant relationship 
we observed was between per capita income and the monthly value of direct debits 
(see Point 3 of the Annex), which can be clearly perceived even on an intuitive basis. 
We found similar results in the case of payments via postal cheques. The odds ratio of 
usage decreases among members of the younger generation, and it is reduced even 
further by higher education levels. Pensioner status, however, increases the odds 
significantly. In this case, the nominal effect of per capita income is even stronger. 
Interestingly, in the case of postal cheques, less frequent monthly usage continues to 
characterise smaller settlement types; in other words, although respondents do not 
pay less with postal cheques, they pay with cheques less frequently.
4.3. choice between payment methods
In the foregoing we analysed the factors influencing the use of individual payment 
methods separately. However, in several cases (e.g. within the groups of different 
per capita incomes) we found that the use of electronic payment methods and 
cash usage exhibit a kind of co-movement (increase or decrease in tandem) in the 
payments of households. Consequently, based on the results so far, sometimes we 
cannot determine with certainty the impact of the socio-demographic characteristics 
under review on households’ choices between the available cash-based and electronic 
payment options. In order to decide this question, we derived a number of ratios 
from the responses to the questionnaire that can capture the strength of the choices 
between the available electronic payment methods in certain payment situations.
Table 4.
Ratios measuring the choices of electronic payment methods
Index calculation
Proportion of electronic 
payments
(Monthly value of card payments + credit transfers + direct debits) / 
monthly value of all payment transactions
Proportion of card payments Monthly value of card payments / (monthly value of card payments + 
cash payments)
Proportion of credit transfers Monthly value of credit transfers / monthly value  of all payment 
transactions
Proportion of direct debits Monthly value of direct debits / (monthly value of direct debits + postal 
cheques)
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Of the ratios presented in Table 4, the first one captures, in general terms, the 
portion of an individual’s monthly payment transactions that is executed via 
electronic means. The rest of the ratios, in a sense, break down this value according 
to different payment situations. The ratio of card purchases primarily measures the 
ratio of electronic transactions in such commercial, service provider, hospitality 
industry, etc. payment situations, where card payment is an alternative to cash 
payment. The ratio of credit transfers measures the share of credit transfers in total 
monthly payment transactions, while the ratio of direct debit primarily measures 
the share of direct debits in the payment of permanent, regularly charged (monthly, 
quarterly, etc.) bills (utility, telecommunications, insurance, etc.). We calculated 
the mean of the ratios thus defined for the groups created on the basis of the 
aforementioned socio-demographic characteristics.
Table 5.
Ratios measuring the choices of electronic payment methods by per capita net 
monthly income (HuF)




0.14 0.16 0.27 0.39 0.49
(conf. int. 95%) (0.09 – 0.18) (0.14 – 0.19) (0.24 – 0.31) (0.32 – 0.45) (0.38 – 0.6)
Proportion of 
card payments 0.12 0.20 0.28 0.38 0.40
(conf. int. 95%) (0.07 – 0.16) (0.17 – 0.23) (0.24 – 0.32) (0.32 – 0.44) (0.3 – 0.49)
Proportion of 
credit transfers 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.17
(conf. int. 95%) (0.01 – 0.04) (0.03 – 0.05) (0.04 – 0.06) (0.04 – 0.09) (0.11 – 0.23)
Proportion of 
direct debits 0.22 0.19 0.27 0.35 0.52
(conf. int. 95%) (0.12 – 0.32) (0.14 – 0.23) (0.21 – 0.33) (0.25 – 0.45) (0.35 – 0.7)
Source: MNB Survey 2014 edited
According to our results, as households’ incomes increase they tend to increase 
their use of electronic payment methods in different payment situations to ever 
larger degrees (Table 5). In all cases – whether it is the share of card purchases, 
credit transfers or direct debit – the means of the highest income categories are 
significantly higher than the means of lower income categories. Accordingly, 
although we previously found that an increase in income will raise the monthly 
average value of both cash-based and electronic payment transactions, we can 
establish that the effect on electronic payment transactions is stronger.
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Table 6.
Ratios measuring the choices of electronic payment methods by education level




0.05 0.16 0.28 0.49
(conf. int. 95%) (0.03 – 0.08) (0.13 – 0.19) (0.24 – 0.31) (0.44 – 0.54)
Proportion of card 
payments 0.09 0.18 0.27 0.40
(conf. int. 95%) (0.05 – 0.12) (0.15 – 0.21) (0.24 – 0.31) (0.34 – 0.45)
Proportion of 
credit transfers 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.11
(conf. int. 95%) (0.01 – 0.04) (0.02 – 0.04) (0.03 – 0.06) (0.08 – 0.14)
Proportion of 
direct debits 0.09 0.16 0.25 0.50
(conf. int. 95%) (0.04 – 0.15) (0.11 – 0.21) (0.2 – 0.3) (0.41 – 0.59)
Source: MNB Survey 2014 edited
The impact of education level on the choices between payment methods is similar, 
or perhaps, even stronger (Table 6). The group means of electronic payment 
methods, in particular, the group means of the ratios measuring the choice of card 
payments, significantly – and often considerably – exceed the mean of the category 
one level lower. It is also true for the ratios of credit transfers and direct debits 
that the means of the highest education categories exceed the means of the lower 
categories considerably and significantly. This result confirms the conclusion of our 
previous analyses; i.e. that the increase in education level has an extremely strong 
positive impact on choosing electronic payment methods.
The results for the categories defined according to age, labour market status, and 
residence are included in Point 4 of the Annex. While they do not add any important 
new information to the conclusions we have drawn so far, they confirm them in 
several cases. Typically, a higher percentage of active workers choose electronic 
payment methods compared to the average, while a significantly lower percentage 
of unemployed persons tend to opt for this choice. In the case of ages above 60 (in 
a different breakdown: pensioners), the ratio of card purchases and credit transfers 
lags behind the values of other age groups, while the ratio of direct debits does not. 
Based on residence, Budapest stands out somewhat in terms of choosing electronic 
payment methods, but the differences observed here are not pronounced, and are 
seldom significant from a statistical perspective. Similar to Budapest, county seats 
and towns with county rank show high values in respect of the share of electronic 
payments and direct debits. However, there is no perceivable difference between 
the residents of other towns and settlements.
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We found that the ratio in which electronic payment methods are chosen is 
influenced, to a greater or lesser extent, by several socio-demographic factors. 
As was the case in the previous chapters, we estimated regressions in order to 
see which of these factors have the strongest influence and to identify the exact 
magnitude of their effect. The dependent variables of the linear regressions 
estimated here are the ratios explained above, while the explanatory variables, 
once again, are the dummy variables of the categories defined according to per 
capita net monthly income, age, education, labour market status, and residence.
Table 7. 








(30-39) –0.05 –0.02 0 0.06
(40-49) –0.03 0.01 –0.01 0.06
(50-59) –0.03 –0.02 –0.02 0.05
(60-) –0.10* –0.10* –0.04* 0.08
Per capita income  
(in 10 thousand HuF)
0.00825* 0.00999* 0.00325* 0.00772*
School qualification  
(8 elementary classes or less)
Vocational school 0.05* 0.06 0 0.03
High school 0.16* 0.14* 0.01 0.12*
University 0.35* 0.23* 0.07* 0.34*
Labour market activity 
(Employee)
Pensioner –0.03 –0.03 0.01 –0.01
Unemployed –0.10* –0.09 0 –0.07
Student –0.08 –0.07 –0.02 –0.17
Other –0.05 –0.07* 0.02 –0.05
Type of settlement (capital)
County towns 0.01 –0.03 0 0.09
Other towns –0.03 –0.06* 0.01 –0.01
Villages 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
Constant 0.09* 0.09* 0 –0.02
N 862 703 701 601
R2 0.3033 0.2033 0.1221 0.144
* Significant coefficients with a 95% confidence interval
Source: MNB Survey 2014 edited
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The estimated coefficients of the linear regressions confirm our previous finding, 
according to which high retirement-age values of the age parameter’s dummy 
variable significantly reduce the ratios under review (by 4–10 percentage points). 
The only exception is the ratio of direct debits, which does not show a significant 
difference between the age groups (Table 7). That notwithstanding, we can also 
conclude that the non-linear negative effect of age on the choice of electronic 
payment methods (which is only observed in the highest categories) is also present 
at most variables under review, even when the effect of the rest of the variables is 
excluded. Per capita income has a clear positive effect. Projected to a net monthly 
amount of HUF 10,000, the value of the estimated coefficient may appear low, but 
in case of the roughly HUF 50,000 difference between the means of the per capita 
income categories, it can improve the ratios explained by as much as 3–5 percentage 
points. It is important to stress that education level remains a strong, significant 
variable for all four ratios (the ratios of people with university degrees is 7–35 
percentage point higher than the ratio of people with primary school education 
or less), while the results of the regression also confirm that residence and labour 
market status do not exert a significant impact.
4.4. Segmentation of Hungarian households based on payment habits
In the previous chapters we demonstrated that socio-demographic characteristics 
often have a strong impact on the use of payment methods, on their intensity, 
and on the choices between payment methods. We must also add, however, 
that the variables under review were mainly suitable for explaining covariance, 
whereas a significant part of the deviation does not depend on them primarily. For 
example, higher income calls for higher electronic payment turnover on average, 
but nevertheless a non-negligible percentage of high-income households still only 
execute a limited number of electronic payment transactions.
For this reason, in this chapter we reversed the course of our analysis: we created 
clusters based on the payment habits of the households observed and examined 
the characteristics of these clusters on the basis of the available socio-demographic 
variables. We performed the cluster analysis using K-centre clustering on the 
standardised versions of turnover and usage variables. We performed the analysis 
for 4–7 clusters, and found that the optimal cluster number is 5. We present the 
results of this analysis below. The substance of our results does not change for 
higher cluster numbers; only the edges of the groups shift or groups are divided 
into two.
Built on five clusters, the K-centre cluster analysis divides the group of the 802 
households observed – each with a full set of data – into five stable and clearly 
distinguishable clusters. In addition to two clusters each comprising 100 persons 
and two clusters of more than 270 persons, there is a clearly separable, unique, 
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extremely stable group composed of 30 persons. This group becomes separate even 
with a smaller number of clusters.
The small, unique cluster (5) is approximately average from a demographic 
perspective, and while retired, low educated persons are partly overrepresented, 
they are not the sole components of the group. The main characteristic of the 
small group is that its members perform their finances nearly exclusively by cash 
transactions, and spend more than 95% of their income through cash purchases. 
Accordingly, the use and intensity of the rest of the payment methods is extremely 
low among them.
Table 8.
characteristics of household clusters defined on the basis of payment habits
Serial number of 
cluster
number of items Per capita income 
(HuF)
Monthly value of 
cash payments 
(HuF)
Monthly value of 
card payments 
(HuF)
1 120 96 897 66 274 7 910
2 104 126 506 68 503 16 774
3 279 77 793 26 457 6 108
4 271 119 104 39 714 28 585
5 28 101 238 231 592 9 943
Source: MNB Survey 2014 edited
The four remaining groups are distinguished from one another mainly on the basis 
of income, consisting of a below-average (3), an average (1), and two above-average 
(2, 4) groups (Table 8).
Cluster 3, which includes below-average earners, is composed mainly of students, 
unemployed persons and a part of the pensioners. The majority of its members do 
not live in Budapest and have a lower education level. From a payment perspective, 
they are characterised by low turnover and low value in respect of all payment 
methods. It should be noted, however, that their electronically processed payments 
represent nearly the same percentage of their total turnover, as is the case in the 
high-income, intensive group.
The average group (1) is average even from a demographic perspective and does 
not have a clearly discernible character. Low-income non-urban members are 
slightly overrepresented in this cluster as well. As regards their payment habits, 
their payment transactions typically involve small amounts. Their payment card 
and credit transfer usage is low, but their postal cheque payments are frequent 
and involve large amounts.
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The two groups comprising members with above-average income are clearly 
separated along the lines of their payments, which proves that income explains 
intensive use only with substantial dispersion. Controlled with other socio-
demographic variables, they tend to move extremely similarly. Still, the positive 
impact of education is apparent in this case as well, and indeed, nearly all persons 
with a university degree belong to the group that is characterised by intensive use 
of electronic payment transactions. It is a favourable result, that in terms of size 
the proportion of the two groups benefits intensive users of electronic payment 
methods at a ratio of nearly 1 to 3. Importantly, however, cash-based payment 
methods are still strongly overrepresented in the payment transactions of one 
fourth of the households with above-average income.
The two high-income groups are mirror images of each other from the perspective 
of payments: in the smaller group (2) the value of cash withdrawals is nearly double, 
while the frequency of card purchases is nearly one half of the corresponding values 
recorded for the group composed of more intensive users of electronic payment 
methods. The use of direct debit is negligible, but postal cheques are extremely 
popular in group (2). By contrast, the larger group (4) is intensive in card-based 
and other electronic transactions, and its use of postal cheques is as limited as in 
the low-income group.
Based on the clustering exercise, we concluded that although demographic 
characteristics are good indicators of households’ electronic payment habits, they 
fail to explain numerous factors and the substantial dispersion we found. This is 
particularly true for the per capita income of households, while education, even on 
the basis of the cluster analysis, can be considered a good indicator and a robust 
explanatory variable. In respect of all other variables under review, we found 
that Hungarian households could be divided into clusters that have similar socio-
demographic characteristics, but different payment habits.
4.5. international comparison of our findings
Two international surveys have recently been performed on households’ payment 
habits with results comparable to ours. The comparison is all the more interesting, 
as one of the international analyses is based on Polish data, while the other one 
relies on Dutch data. Therefore, we can simultaneously compare our results to 
another Central and Eastern European country and to a Western European country 
with an extremely advanced electronic payment system. Similar to our own survey, 
the surveys of both Goczek–Witkowski (2015) and Cruijsen–Plooij (2015) are 
questionnaire-based surveys, and the dates of their data recording (2013 and 2014) 
are very close to our own date. Although the questions posed by the two studies 
are somewhat different from ours – in examining the choice between payment 
card and cash, they primarily focus on retail payments – they analyse the impact 
of several socio-demographic factors used by us.
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In the framework of a logistic regression similar to the one presented in this study, 
Goczek–Witkowski (2015) examines the determinants of payment card ownership 
and the magnitude of their effect. Consistent with our findings, the authors found 
a positive correlation between card ownership and education level, income and 
size of residence. Although the impact of education is not as striking as in our 
case, it can still be considered strong. An important difference between the two 
surveys is the fact that, based on the Polish data, the odds ratio of card ownership 
for younger generations (ages 18–29) is significantly lower than that of the middle-
aged population, while the odds do not decline perceivably above age 60. In this 
regard, however, we must bear in mind that, as the Polish authors pointed out, the 
card possession ratio of the entire Polish population is 59%; i.e. far lower than the 
corresponding value of Hungary.
Although practically everyone owns a card in the Netherlands, by using Dutch data, 
Cruijsen–Plooij (2015) successfully demonstrated the negative effect of an increase 
in age and the positive effect of an increase in education level on payment card 
ownership. Debit card ownership declines slightly above age 45 and decreases a bit 
further above age 55, while a high degree of education moderately increases the 
odds of card ownership. As regards the determinants of the intensity of debit card 
payments, the authors found that the negative impact on card payments increases 
in line with the advancement of age, which is consistent with our findings. As 
opposed to our results, education, income and the size of residence do not affect 
the use of debit cards in the Netherlands, but the intensity of cash payments 
declines slightly in the highest categories. It appears therefore, that the socio-
demographic variables reviewed by us have a less marked impact on card usage in 
the Netherlands. This, however, can be probably attributed to the high usage ratio 
of card payments in general, and in this regard the groups defined on the basis 
of socio-demographic characteristics do not differ significantly from one another.
4. conclusions
Our study was intended to gain an insight into and improve the understanding 
of the payment habits of Hungarian households. Our research was based on 
a representative household survey, in the framework of which we collected a broad 
range of socio-demographic information in addition to detailed payment transaction 
data.
A high percentage of Hungarian households have a bank account (83%) and 
a payment card (80%), and these ratios have not changed since 2010. This suggests 
that the small decline observed in the number of household bank accounts and 
payment cards in recent years is primarily linked to the elimination of some of 
the presumably less frequently used second or third accounts and cards, i.e. the 
rationalisation of household bank relationships, and as such, it is not detrimental 
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to the electronic payment options of Hungarian households. A low degree 
of education, higher age and the lack of a regular income constitute the most 
important explanations in the case of those who do not hold a bank account or 
a payment card. Account ownership also lags behind in smaller settlements, which 
generally have a less developed financial infrastructure (accessibility of branches, 
availability of POS terminals).
The distribution of payment methods by number and value has not changed 
significantly since 2010 either, but a slight decline can be observed in cash usage. 
This is mainly apparent in the case of payment values: since 2010, the ratio of cash 
usage has dropped to 46% from 50%. By number, electronic payments rose from 
12% to 14%, while based on the amounts paid, they increased to 26% from 20%. 
Meanwhile, the gap between the number and value of cash payments widened 
further; in other words, the average value of a single cash transaction continued to 
decline. These shifts indicate that the payment habits of households did not change 
substantially in response to the adoption of the regulations affecting payments and 
the pricing of payment services after 2010 (financial transaction duty, the option 
of bimonthly free cash withdrawals), and the proportion of cash-based payments 
did not increase.
The socio-demographic factors under review have a limited impact on cash-related 
payment transactions – i.e. cash withdrawals, cash purchases and the use of 
postal cheque payments – and a stronger impact on the use of electronic payment 
methods. Practically everyone pays with cash. Accordingly, the ratio of respondents 
using cash withdrawals is relatively stable in the groups under review, and the 
average monthly value of cash withdrawals and cash purchases only increases in 
line with an increase in income. The rest of the socio-demographic characteristics 
have no significant impact on the average monthly value of cash payments, which 
remains stable at around HUF 50,000 in the vast majority of the groups reviewed. 
The average number and value of postal cheque payments are even more stable 
at 3 monthly transactions and a value of HUF 35,000–45,000, and they are not 
influenced significantly by any other factor, even an increase in income. Whether 
it is habits or some other reasons that are behind this apparent stability, this result 
suggests that a more broad-based electronisation of regular bill payments can be 
only achieved over the short or the medium term if the electronic payment of postal 
cheques becomes widely available.
By contrast, the diversity of the statistics measuring the intensity of the use of 
electronic payment methods is far more significant as a function of the socio-
demographic characteristics under review: the difference between the means of 
the lowest and highest groups, in many cases, is three or four-fold. Education has 
the largest degree of positive impact on the use of payment card purchases, credit 
transfers, and direct debit, and the use of these instruments is also influenced 
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positively by higher per capita net monthly incomes. Based on labour market status, 
clear deviations can be observed primarily to the benefit of active workers. By 
contrast, age and residence appear to have a smaller impact, restricted to certain 
areas or groups at most. People older than 60 with bank accounts or payment cards 
tend to pay via credit transfer and payment card to a smaller degree compared 
to the average, but they are active users of direct debit. In contrast to this, the 
payment habits of those using card purchases and credit transfers do not differ 
significantly from the average values of the other age groups either in terms of the 
monthly number, or the monthly value of the transactions. Most frequently, there 
is a clear positive correlation between the uses of different electronic payment 
methods; in other words, if a group defined on the basis of socio-demographic 
characteristics has higher statistics measuring the use of card payments, then the 
average usage ratios of credit transfer or direct debit will be typically higher as well.
Similarly, in examining the choices between payment methods in certain payment 
situations (e.g. retail purchases, payment of monthly or quarterly bills, etc.), we 
found that the odds of choosing electronic payment options increase with education 
primarily, but they are positively influenced by income as well.
On the whole, we can conclude that demographic characteristics are good indicators 
of households’ electronic payment habits, but we found that, in their own right, 
they fail to explain all determinants and a substantial part of the variation. As the 
cluster analysis of Hungarian households based on payment habits demonstrated, 
this is particularly true for the per capita income of households: even among people 
in high income categories there is a non-negligible group that relies heavily on 
cash usage. At the same time, the cluster analysis confirmed that education is 
a good indicator and a robust explanatory variable from the perspective of payment 
transactions.
In accordance with the above, we can conclude that it is the payer’s level 
of education that is most positively correlated with the intensity of the use of 
electronic payment transactions and the odds ratio of electronic payment choices 
in different payment situations. In addition, there is an extremely large difference 
between those with a low degree of education and those with a higher degree of 
education, and the values measured improve significantly at each level compared to 
the previous level. In view of the results of financial literacy surveys, this relationship 
is probably even more relevant in the area of financial knowledge and education, 
the measurement of which was beyond the scope of this study.7 This result clearly 
demonstrates that the enhancement of financial literacy could strongly facilitate 
the widespread use of electronic payment instruments. And in order to reduce 
7  In this regard, see for example the summary article of Kovács (2015), and the research conducted by Kovács 
(2014) and Németh et al. (2013) referenced in the article.
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the current gap between different education categories as much as possible, the 
training of practical financial skills should be started at school as early as possible.
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Annex
1. Bank account and payment card ownership by groups defined on the basis of 
socio-demographic characteristics
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2. Statistics of monthly payment transactions by groups defined on the basis of 
socio-demographic characteristics8
1. By age (years)








proportion of users 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.82
(conf. int. 95%) (0.74–0.86) (0.75–0.87) (0.73–0.86) (0.76–0.88) (0.76–0.88)
average number of 
transactions per month 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5
(conf. int. 95%) (1.4–1.7) (1.5–1.8) (1.5–1.8) (1.5–1.9) (1.4–1.6)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 49 943 73 730 77 201 65 804 70 711








proportion of users 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98
(conf. int. 95%) (0.99–1.01) (0.97–1) (0.97–1) (0.96–1) (0.97–1)
average number of 
transactions per month 29.8 29.0 27.5 27.6 23.8
(conf. int. 95%) (25.8–33.9) (25.9–32.1) (24.2–30.8) (24.2–31) (21.7–25.9)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 43 575 52 460 53 547 55 767 47 953








proportion of users 0.67 0.63 0.64 0.58 0.38
(conf. int. 95%) (0.6–0.74) (0.56–0.71) (0.56–0.72) (0.5–0.66) (0.31–0.46)
average number of 
transactions per month 6.6 8.8 10.0 8.9 6.6
(conf. int. 95%) (5.4–7.8) (7.1–10.6) (8–12) (7.1–10.7) (5.2–7.9)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 24 541 39 682 43 259 37 054 29 783








proportion of users 0.21 0.34 0.29 0.24 0.14
(conf. int. 95%) (0.15–0.28) (0.27–0.41) (0.22–0.37) (0.17–0.31) (0.09–0.19)
average number of 
transactions per month 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.5 3.0
(conf. int. 95%) (1.7–2.9) (1.8–3.5) (2.2–3.3) (1.7–3.3) (1.8–4.2)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 25 210 35 687 36 954 30 604 34 825







proportion of users 0.13 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.35
(conf. int. 95%) (0.08–0.18) (0.21–0.35) (0.23–0.37) (0.24–0.38) (0.28–0.42)
average number of 
transactions per month 2.6 3.0 3.2 2.5 3.6
(conf. int. 95%) (1.8–3.4) (2.4–3.6) (2.6–3.8) (1.9–3.1) (2.9–4.3)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 31 987 41 735 41 459 38 290 34 606







proportion of users 0.44 0.64 0.74 0.76 0.82
(conf. int. 95%) (0.37–0.51) (0.58–0.71) (0.68–0.81) (0.69–0.82) (0.77–0.86)
average number of 
transactions per month 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.0 3.2
(conf. int. 95%) (2.3–3) (2.7–3.3) (2.9–3.4) (2.7–3.3) (3–3.4)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 37 742 39 008 45 839 35 653 36 143
(conf. int. 95%) (28 941–46 543) (34 594–43 421) (40 710–50 967) (31 792–39 514) (32 215–40 072)
8  In the tables means highlighted in bold mark the means the deviation of which from another mean or more 
means in the specific row holds the greatest significance for the purposes of our analysis
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2. By education level








proportion of users 0.7 0.76 0.85 0.89
(conf. int. 95%) (0.62–0.79) (0.71–0.82) (0.81–0.89) (0.84–0.94)
average number of 
transactions per month 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9
(conf. int. 95%) (1.2–1.5) (1.4–1.6) (1.5–1.8) (1.7–2.1)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 64 160 76 330 61 823 66 314








proportion of users 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99
(conf. int. 95%) (0.97–1) (0.98–1) (0.97–1) (0.98–1.01)
average number of 
transactions per month 22.5 28.7 28.6 27.4
(conf. int. 95%) (20.5–24.6) (26.1–31.2) (25.9–31.4) (23.9–30.9)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 48 726 52 737 49 493 49 685








proportion of users 0.29 0.47 0.67 0.79
(conf. int. 95%) (0.2–0.37) (0.41–0.54) (0.62–0.72) (0.72–0.86)
average number of 
transactions per month 2.5 6.8 7.3 12.6
(conf. int. 95%) (1.8–3.2) (5.7–8) (6.4–8.1) (10.4–14.8)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 19 234 29 810 32 660 47 834








proportion of users 0.09 0.15 0.25 0.50
(conf. int. 95%) (0.03–0.14) (0.1–0.19) (0.2–0.3) (0.42–0.58)
average number of 
transactions per month 1.3 1.8 2.2 3.5
(conf. int. 95%) (1–1.7) (1.3–2.3) (1.8–2.6) (2.8–4.3)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 30 496 31 327 27 604 38 613







proportion of users 0.13 0.21 0.27 0.49
(conf. int. 95%) (0.07–0.19) (0.16–0.26) (0.22–0.32) (0.4–0.57)
average number of 
transactions per month 1.9 2.6 2.6 4.1
(conf. int. 95%) (1.2–2.6) (2–3.1) (2.2–3) (3.5–4.7)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 39 761 30 190 33 405 48 053







proportion of users 0.81 0.77 0.65 0.47
(conf. int. 95%) (0.76–0.87) (0.72–0.82) (0.61–0.7) (0.39–0.55)
average number of 
transactions per month 2.8 3.2 3.2 3.1
(conf. int. 95%) (2.6–3) (3–3.4) (3–3.4) (2.7–3.4)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 32 532 41 865 38 384 42 353
(conf. int. 95%) (28 380–36 684) (37 912–45 817) (34 952–41 817) (34 176–50 530)
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3. By labour market status








proportion of users 0.86 0.82 0.55 0.61 0.69
(conf. int. 95%) (0.83–0.89) (0.76–0.88) (0.38–0.73) (0.47–0.75) (0.59–0.8)
average number of 
transactions per month 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.4
(conf. int. 95%) (1.6–1.8) (1.3–1.6) (1.2–2.1) (1–1.8) (1.2–1.6)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 71 193 69 955 43 235 18 167 62 978








proportion of users 0.99 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.97
(conf. int. 95%) (0.98–1) (0.97–1) (0.95–1.02) – (0.93–1)
average number of 
transactions per month 29.8 23.6 24.3 21.9 26.1
(conf. int. 95%) (27.8–31.9) (21.5–25.6) (19.4–29.3) (18.4–25.4) (20.8–31.4)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 54 841 48 195 35 932 27 422 49 251








proportion of users 0.68 0.39 0.35 0.47 0.44
(conf. int. 95%) (0.64–0.72) (0.31–0.46) (0.19–0.52) (0.33–0.62) (0.33–0.56)
average number of 
transactions per month 9.1 5.8 5.2 5.8 6.0
(conf. int. 95%) (8.2–10.1) (4.4–7.1) (2.1–8.2) (3.7–7.8) (3.8–8.2)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 39 401 28 231 17 739 13 213 19 887








proportion of users 0.30 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.22
(conf. int. 95%) (0.26–0.34) (0.09–0.19) (0.01–0.25) (0.02–0.21) (0.12–0.31)
average number of 
transactions per month 2.8 2.7 1.3 1.9 1.4
(conf. int. 95%) (2.4–3.2) (1.6–3.7) (0.9–1.8) (0.5–3.3) (1–1.8)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 35 517 31 213 12 533 10 280 23 629







proportion of users 0.30 0.33 0.09 0.00 0.20
(conf. int. 95%) (0.26–0.34) (0.26–0.41) (–0.01–0.18) – (0.11–0.3)
average number of 
transactions per month 3.0 3.6 2.7 – 1.7
(conf. int. 95%) (2.7–3.3) (2.8–4.4) (–1.9–7.3) (1–2.4)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 39 196 34 928 24 090 – 42 068







proportion of users 0.66 0.83 0.58 0.12 0.79
(conf. int. 95%) (0.62–0.7) (0.79–0.88) (0.44–0.72) (0.02–0.21) (0.71–0.88)
average number of 
transactions per month 3.0 3.3 2.5 2.1 2.9
(conf. int. 95%) (2.9–3.2) (3.1–3.5) (1.8–3.2) (1.6–2.7) (2.5–3.2)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 41 204 35 912 31 680 20 376 36 226
(conf. int. 95%) (38 243–44 164) (31 775–40 049) (22 930–40 429) (6 545–34 207) (30 428–42 024)
* Childcare allowance, childcare benefit, disability pensioner, homemaker, other inactive, other depen-
dant
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4. By per capita net monthly income (HuF)








proportion of users 0.75 0.79 0.85 0.90 0.83
(conf. int. 95%) (0.67–0.84) (0.74–0.83) (0.81–0.9) (0.85–0.96) (0.71–0.94)
average number of 
transactions per month 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.1
(conf. int. 95%) (1.2–1.5) (1.4–1.6) (1.5–1.7) (1.7–2.1) (1.5–2.7)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 44 650 59 573 74 337 83 280 86 051








proportion of users 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.00
(conf. int. 95%) (0.95–1) (0.97–1) (0.99–1) (0.96–1.01) –
average number of 
transactions per month 26.3 26.4 27.6 33.3 20.5
(conf. int. 95%) (22.4–30.2) (24.3–28.5) (25–30.1) (28.3–38.3) (17–24)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 39 381 49 450 53 462 53 909 73 523








proportion of users 0.41 0.53 0.64 0.72 0.84
(conf. int. 95%) (0.31–0.51) (0.47–0.59) (0.58–0.7) (0.63–0.81) (0.73–0.96)
average number of 
transactions per month 5.9 6.0 8.6 10.4 16.3
(conf. int. 95%) (3.2–8.7) (5–7) (7.4–9.8) (8.7–12.1) (11.9–20.7)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 15 841 26 987 35 267 50 077 64 276








proportion of users 0.13 0.20 0.29 0.26 0.62
(conf. int. 95%) (0.06–0.19) (0.16–0.25) (0.24–0.35) (0.17–0.35) (0.47–0.77)
average number of 
transactions per month 2.6 2.0 2.2 3.0 5.2
(conf. int. 95%) (1.7–3.4) (1.6–2.4) (1.7–2.6) (2–4) (3.3–7)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 26 567 31 023 25 851 47 979 46 515







proportion of users 0.19 0.23 0.32 0.36 0.44
(conf. int. 95%) (0.11–0.26) (0.19–0.28) (0.26–0.37) (0.27–0.46) (0.29–0.6)
average number of 
transactions per month 4.6 2.2 3.1 3.6 3.5
(conf. int. 95%) (2.7–6.5) (1.8–2.6) (2.6–3.6) (3–4.3) (2.5–4.5)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 39 794 28 386 39 307 40 740 66 045







proportion of users 0.60 0.76 0.72 0.60 0.52
(conf. int. 95%) (0.52–0.68) (0.72–0.8) (0.66–0.77) (0.51–0.7) (0.37–0.67)
average number of 
transactions per month 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.1 3.5
(conf. int. 95%) (2.3–3) (2.9–3.2) (3–3.6) (2.7–3.5) (2.8–4.1)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 32 978 35 668 40 628 44 643 70 342
(conf. int. 95%) (27 742–38 214) (33 070–38 266) (36 546–44 711) (37 249–52 038) (38 577–102 107)
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5. By residence








proportion of users 0.89 0.81 0.79 0.78
(conf. int. 95%) (0.84–0.94) (0.75–0.87) (0.74–0.84) (0.73–0.83)
average number of 
transactions per month 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.5
(conf. int. 95%) (1.6–2) (1.5–1.7) (1.5–1.8) (1.4–1.6)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 70 611 64 727 67 176 67 205








proportion of users 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98
(conf. int. 95%) (0.99–1.01) – (0.97–1) (0.96–0.99)
average number of 
transactions per month 33.6 26.6 25.4 25.7
(conf. int. 95%) (29.6–37.5) (23.4–29.8) (23.1–27.7) (23.5–27.9)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 53 088 51 878 47 805 50 519








proportion of users 0.73 0.54 0.52 0.56
(conf. int. 95%) (0.66–0.8) (0.47–0.62) (0.46–0.59) (0.5–0.63)
average number of 
transactions per month 10.0 7.7 6.7 8.8
(conf. int. 95%) (8.4–11.6) (6.1–9.4) (5.4–7.9) (7.2–10.3)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 39 757 36 218 30 887 34 108








proportion of users 0.29 0.21 0.26 0.22
(conf. int. 95%) (0.22–0.36) (0.15–0.27) (0.21–0.31) (0.17–0.28)
average number of 
transactions per month 2.9 3.1 2.3 2.5
(conf. int. 95%) (1.7–4) (2.5–3.7) (1.7–2.9) (1.9–3.1)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 33 329 35 371 30 929 34 187







proportion of users 0.26 0.36 0.23 0.26
(conf. int. 95%) (0.19–0.33) (0.29–0.43) (0.18–0.28) (0.2–0.32)
average number of 
transactions per month 4.2 3.7 2.3 2.3
(conf. int. 95%) (3.5–4.8) (3–4.4) (1.9–2.7) (1.8–2.8)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 52 256 37 734 32 634 33 870







proportion of users 0.66 0.61 0.70 0.76
(conf. int. 95%) (0.59–0.73) (0.54–0.67) (0.65–0.75) (0.71–0.81)
average number of 
transactions per month 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.8
(conf. int. 95%) (3.2–3.8) (2.9–3.6) (2.8–3.2) (2.7–3)
average value of transactions 
per month (HUF) 46 230 39 311 38 450 34 303
(conf. int. 95%) (39 427–53 034) (34 897–43 725) (34 593–42 306) (30 972–37 634)
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3. Estimated coefficients of the regressions explaining the use of electronic payment 
methods
Card 






















(30-39) 4 911 2 511 0.37 –3.07 509 2.22* 0.31 184
(40-49) 11 047* 5 236 0.46 –4.91 2 724 2.61* 0.51* 8 035
(50-59) 3 950 4 751 0.35 –4.20 4 284 2.30* 0.31 –2 963
(60-) 118 –8 410 0.26 –6.48 –3 539 1.96 0.30 –1 052
Per capita 
income (in 10 
thousand HuF)





Vocational school 1 523 –11 183 1.02 4.04 –2 730 0.68 0.39* 4 648
High school 2 757 –9 311 0.42 3.55 –5 950 0.55* 0.42* –1 075




Pensioner –5 167 11 504 1.46 –2.17 –3 148 2.03* 0.42 –1 434
Unemployed –6 728 –7 439 0.62 –4.26 –12 609 0.57 –0.37 –926
Student –7 498 –11.95* –22 263* 0.10* –0.48 –11 882




County towns –3 173 –7 522 –6.12* 2 370 0.70 –0.25 –4 660
Other towns –4 504 –10 981 0.35 –7.74* –3 631 0.86 –0.40* –5 351
Villages 1 883 –9 786 0.25 –7.15* 548 0.98 –0.55* –7 937*
Constant 5 272 34 902* 349.44* 37.20* 46 404* 2.78* 2.62* 30 685*
N 435 203 955 942 911 984 695 661
R2 0.2578 0.1143 0.1045 0.0464 0.0325 0.1302 0.0515 0.0857
AUC 0.7961 0.7286
* Significant coefficients and odds ratios with a 95% confidence interval
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4. Ratios measuring the choices of electronic payment methods by groups 
defined on the basis of socio-demographic characteristics
1. By age (years)
18–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–
Proportion of electronic payments 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.14
(conf. int. 95%) (0.2–0.28) (0.22–0.32) (0.22–0.32) (0.21–0.3) (0.11–0.17)
Proportion of card payments 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.16
(conf. int. 95%) (0.2–0.28) (0.23–0.32) (0.24–0.34) (0.21–0.31) (0.12–0.2)
Proportion of credit transfers 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.03
(conf. int. 95%) (0.03–0.06) (0.05–0.09) (0.03–0.07) (0.03–0.07) (0.02–0.04)
Proportion of direct debits 0.17 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.28
(conf. int. 95%) (0.09–0.25) (0.19–0.33) (0.19–0.34) (0.18–0.31) (0.21–0.34)
2. By labour market status
Employee Pensioner unemployed Student Other*
Proportion of electronic payments 0.30 0.14 0.08 0.16 0.14
(conf. int. 95%) (0.27–0.33) (0.11–0.17) (0.03–0.13) (0.09–0.23) (0.09–0.19)
Proportion of card payments 0.30 0.16 0.10 0.16 0.15
(conf. int. 95%) (0.27–0.32) (0.12–0.21) (0.04–0.16) (0.09–0.24) (0.09–0.2)
Proportion of credit transfers 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05
(conf. int. 95%) (0.05–0.07) (0.02–0.05) (–0.01–0.06) (0–0.04) (0.02–0.09)
Proportion of direct debits 0.28 0.27 0.08 0.00 0.13
(conf. int. 95%) (0.23–0.32) (0.2–0.33) (–0.04–0.21) – (0.05–0.21)
* Childcare allowance, childcare benefit, disability pensioner, homemaker, other inactive, other depen-
dant
3. By residence
capital county towns Other towns Villages
Proportion of electronic payments 0.29 0.27 0.19 0.19
(conf. int. 95%) (0.24–0.34) (0.22–0.31) (0.16–0.22) (0.16–0.22)
Proportion of card payments 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.25
(conf. int. 95%) (0.25–0.34) (0.2–0.3) (0.17–0.23) (0.21–0.29)
Proportion of credit transfers 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05
(conf. int. 95%) (0.03–0.07) (0.03–0.06) (0.04–0.06) (0.03–0.07)
Proportion of direct debits 0.29 0.35 0.21 0.20
(conf. int. 95%) (0.21–0.37) (0.27–0.42) (0.16–0.26) (0.15–0.25)
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The importance of interbank rate quotations is enormous from the aspect of pricing 
loans, deposits, and financial instruments, and in general for the efficiency of 
resource allocation mechanisms in the economy. Consequently, it is crucial to ensure 
that interest rate quotations are defined in a transparent, authentic, and reliable 
way, and that they reflect true market conditions and the widest possible information 
base without any distortion. In recent years, following the manipulation experienced 
on international financial markets, the regulatory environment has been made 
stricter, and the mechanism of determining key interbank reference indicators has 
been transformed. Adjusted to international trends, the quoting practice of BUBOR 
has been reconsidered, and the control has been transformed. Apart from official 
and internal banking audits offering direct insights in the checking of interbank 
rate quotations, more emphasis has been laid in recent years on statistical analyses 
that belong to the scope of indirect analysis methods, and our article will focus on 
this new method of examination. The article reviews the methods used so far in 
international and domestic statistical examinations, and presents the Hungarian 
analysis framework compiled on the commission of the Quotation Committee of 
the Hungarian Forex Association (MFT), as well as the results of the first analysis 
regarding 2014. The article contributes to the international technical literature on 
the subject mainly by building an analytical frame based on the example of the 
Hungarian interbank reference rate, using various statistical approaches, which 
will demonstrate the key aspects of the conduct of individual panel banks and the 
development of the reference rate.
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1. introduction
In recent years, following the manipulation experienced on international financial 
markets, the regulatory environment has been made stricter, and the mechanism of 
determining key interbank reference indicators has been transformed. In addition 
to the United States, reference rates were reviewed in the United Kingdom, the 
euro area, Canada, Denmark, Sweden and Japan, as a number of deficiencies 
were discovered in relation to the global financial crisis. In parallel with the 
audits conducted by national supervisory bodies, international institutions have 
also formulated some guidelines for the definition, checking, and supervision of 
reference rates. For instance, the “Wheatley Review” produced in the wake of the 
manipulation of LIBOR (Wheatley Review 2012) included several relevant proposals 
for the future of interbank rate quotations. Among other things, in order to improve 
transparency, this review recommended that the audits by the supervisory bodies 
be more transparent and quotations be subject to regular statistical examinations.
Adjusted to international trends, the quoting practice of BUBOR has been 
reconsidered as well. The revision of the BUBOR quoting methodology and 
regulations, as well as the quotations themselves have been going on in parallel 
with the international re-working of the principles related to reference rates.1
The code of conduct strengthening the control process of rate quotations is 
presently being developed in Hungary and might offer some guidelines for panel 
banks on the consideration of factors potentially influencing quotations and an 
organisational structure that allows for prudent quotation activities, as well as the 
controlling and supervisory processes.
The importance of BUBOR is enormous in many respects, and therefore it is 
important that it is defined in a transparent, authentic, and reliable way. On the 
Hungarian markets, a significant portion of financial products use the 3-month 
BUBOR as reference rate, and therefore even small changes may have a significant 
impact, and the general public may also pay close attention to its development.2 
It also needs to be pointed out that the possibilities of substituting BUBOR with 
other reference rates are limited, and thus strengthening the reliability of the 
existing quoting process and BUBOR is of special importance. From the aspect of 
the financial market and financial stability monitoring activities of the central bank, 
it is also important that BUBOR reflects true market conditions and the widest 
possible information base without any distortion.
1  International experiences, the Hungarian attempts and other issues related to BUBOR are reviewed in detail 
by Erhart–Mátrai (2015) and Erhart et al. (2013).
2  In the case of corporate loan products, traditionally, it is variable interest rates adjusted to BUBOR that 
have been typical (see Walter 2014), and their weight has also recently increased in the retail segment.
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In connection with the reform of BUBOR, it is also necessary to strengthen the 
control functions and external control. This is why there is a need for regular, 
annual statistical analyses, which allow the BUBOR-related processes to be captured 
with annual frequency and reasons for possible changes to be detected. Another 
objective of examinations related to BUBOR is that possible signs of manipulation 
activities, mistypings, and in general non-market-conform price quotations can be 
identified, and, as a result, the credibility of BUBOR and the information contents 
of interbank rate quotations can improve.
It is important to note that international experience indicates that several methods 
are required to test the reliability of reference rates: official audit methods (e.g. 
checking e-mails and other communication channels), internal audits in banks 
(compliance), and statistical analysis. These audits complement one another. The 
statistical approach is suitable for the identification of certain signs of the intention 
of manipulation and for the detection of systematic behaviour patterns, but these 
can be considered as indirect instruments only, which are unable to capture all 
forms of manipulation. Official audit methods and internal bank audits provide 
a direct insight into the activities of panel banks; therefore they are also useful in 
specific evidentiary procedures, and are able to detect the intention of manipulation 
even in cases when statistical instruments are not able to do so, or when it does not 
seem to be significant. However, the main advantage of statistical examinations is 
that they are able to detect the intention of manipulation even when no specific 
proof is available. The publication of analyses has a deterring effect on such conduct 
as well, as the affected institutions would run a serious reputation risk with any 
manipulation.
In this article, we first present the international experiences and results of statistical 
analyses related to key reference rates, and then provide a brief overview of the 
features of the Hungarian unsecured interbank market. Following that, we present 
the objectives of regular analysis and the Hungarian statistical analysis framework 
developed on the commission of the Quotation Committee of the Hungarian Forex 
Association, as well as the results of the first examination regarding 2014, sorted 
by the six key analysis considerations.
2. Methods of statistical analysis used in international practice
At the end of 2012, the experts of the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) jointly analysed the EURIBOR 
quoting process,3 using the following key considerations:
3  EBA–ESMA (2013)
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•  In the course of the examination of EURIBOR quotations, they found that 
identical interest rate quotations submitted on several consecutive days were 
rather frequent. In one case, the quoting bank listed the same interest rate levels 
permanently, for 67 days, for several tenors.
•  The analysis pointed out the importance of identifying quoting banks that 
permanently divert from the average. The observation of most frequently trimmed 
panel banks on both the low and the high side may facilitate the identification of 
one-sided quoting behaviour that often differs from the average.
•  In order to identify deviating quoting behaviour, the development of interbank 
reference rates of different countries were compared. The comparison of EURIBOR 
and LIBOR quotations shows that these two rates were very close to each other 
before the crisis, but since the end of 2009, EURIBOR has been significantly higher 
than LIBOR, by approximately 10 basis points. The lower level of LIBOR may be 
explained by the fact that in the stricter interbank rate environment during the 
crisis, the banks may have felt an urge to conceal their own financing problems 
with lower quotations (stigma effect).
In addition to the retrospective examination of EURIBOR quotations, it is worth 
mentioning that EURIBOR rate quotations are also subject to preliminary checking. 
Thomson Reuters, which accepts, records and then publishes the quotations, 
conducts a preliminary check before publication, in the course of which outliers are 
reconciled with the quoting banks. In spite of the preliminary examination (“sanity 
check”), the analysis of EURIBOR identified presumably incorrect quotations which, 
in the course of trimming, were removed from quotations used for the calculation 
of the average, but if they had been filtered out during the preliminary checking 
by Thomson Reuters, the EURIBOR fixing would have had a different value. This 
highlights the need for the refinement of preliminary checking as well. 
Fouquau–Spieser (2014) examines LIBOR quotations in the period 2007–2012, 
looking for structural breaks and cartelling behaviour:
•  Identification of structural breaks: The authors used two different methods4 to 
examine the time series of LIBOR quotations, depending on whether or not there 
was a structural change in the level or dynamics of indicators. Both methods 
applied identify 9 October 2008 as the date of the significant structural break 
for the time series of LIBOR rates. Looking at the quotations of individual banks, 
most models indicated 9 October 2008 as well, but there was an exception 
(Barclays) where the behaviour changed 2–3 weeks earlier. As a result of further 
investigation and based on direct evidence (correspondence, etc.), the authorities 
defined the primary responsibility of this bank (“the organiser of the cartel”), 
4  For details see Zivot et al. (1992), and Perron (1997).
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which indicates that it might be really worthwhile to examine the time series 
from this aspect, using statistical approaches.
•  Identification of cartels: The authors carried out hierarchic cluster analysis on the 
whole sample and on the two parts of the sample determined by the structural 
break. This method allows for the grouping of banks that follow similar quotation 
strategies, and for examining the behaviour of groups one by one. The results 
suggest that in the whole time series, as well as in the sample taken before the 
structural break, Barclays bank followed a special strategy, while the rest of the 
banks belonged to two large groups. However, between the groups and inside 
the groups, only relatively loose relations were identified. In the sample taken 
after the structural break, Barclays is already part of one of the larger groups, 
and within the group, the strategies of banks were moving closer to each other, 
which means the strengthening of coordination. All in all, the results of the cluster 
analysis indicate events similar to those detected by the official investigation.
Monticini–Thornton (2013) examined whether or not LIBOR rate quotations 
distorted downwards significantly influenced the development of LIBOR. In the 
course of the examination, they tested the statement that if LIBOR quotations 
were really and deliberately diverted downwards, there had to be a statistically 
significant reduction in the difference between LIBOR and the banks’ CD rates5, as 
a result of the LIBOR manipulation. The authors were looking for the presence of 
structural breaks in the spread among the examined rates, using the Bai-Perron 
test. The econometric examination carried out on the difference between the rates 
of 1-month and 3-month LIBOR and bank deposit certificates identified structural 
breaks. The results of both tenors indicated that LIBOR quotations significantly 
diverted downwards by some banks had a significant impact on the LIBOR rate. 
In February 2013, the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority published 
a detailed study6 on the statistical analysis of portfolios related to BUBOR and 
BUBOR quotations. The results of the examination of potential problems occurring 
during the BUBOR quotation process and the methods used for the identification 
of signs of manipulation were as follows:
•  Relation between interest rate derivative positions and BUBOR quotations: The 
institution-level development of net positions originating from forint FRA, IRS and 
CIRS transactions related to 3-month and 6-month reference rates were compared 
with the BUBOR quotations. Following the examination of significant net position 
changes that occurred in the period from the beginning of 2009 to the middle of 
2012, and the development of the quotations of the given bank, it was found that 
5  The CD or Certificate of Deposit is a financial instrument which helps credit institutions collect funds.
6  Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (2013).
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there was no relation between the BUBOR-related derivative positions of banks 
and the quotations, and no signs of manipulation were detected.
•  Identification of data errors: Incorrect quotations were identified in the time series 
of O/N, 1-month, 3-month and 6-month individual BUBOR quotations of banks, 
indicating deficiencies in data quality.
•  Standard deviation of interest rate quotations: The examination of the standard 
deviation of quotations may be a suitable method for the identification of possible 
anomalies that can be observed in the quoting behaviour of banks. According 
to the supervisory examination, between the beginning of 2004 and June 2012, 
the standard deviations of quotations remained low in the tenors of 1, 3 and 6 
months, and only increased in turbulent periods.
•  Comparison of BUBOR with reference rates: BUBOR quotations primarily follow 
the course of the base rate, but are influenced by other reference rates as well, 
although this relationship changes in time, which indicates that BUBOR values 
cannot be derived from any other market benchmark rate.
•  Cluster analysis: The supervisory study carried out a cluster analysis for 3- and 
6-month BUBOR quotations in order to identify any potential systematic behaviour 
in the quoting activities of banks. Based on the cluster analysis, it can be stated 
that some institutions tend to drive BUBOR downwards, while others tend to 
drive it upwards. However, no joint distortion in the same direction was found, 
which would imply harmonised behaviour by banks.
In addition to the above methods, the literature describes a number of other 
alternative approaches. Haaker (2013) uses game theory methods to analyse the 
LIBOR manipulation case, and points out the role of punishments and long-term 
reputation risks. Bariviera et al. (2015) use information theory methods for the 
examination, also in connection with the LIBOR case. Based on the results, the 
applied information theory indicators (entropy and statistical complexity) seem 
to be useful in the examinations, because they point out “suspicious” patterns 
in the conduct of panel banks. Another relevant and related research subject is 
the cooperative game theory, which can be used to model the background of 
community decisions and the formulation of interest groups (see e.g. Bachrach 
et al. 2011). In the future, these approaches may serve as a basis for the further 
improvement of the Hungarian analysis methodology described in the article.
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3. unsecured interbank market in 2014 in Hungary
From the aspect of the development of BUBOR, the market of unsecured bank 
transactions is of key significance, because in optimal cases the interest rates of 
unsecured interbank loans provide guidance for panel banks quoting the rates for 
the determination of rate quotations.
In terms of the major scenes of bank liquidity management, the unsecured 
interbank market is one of the smaller markets, as it still has a relatively moderate 
turnover, even after the restoration of the trust that was lost during the global 
financial crisis. On the other hand, it needs to be pointed out that at the beginning 
of 2014 the turnover of the unsecured interbank market exceeded the average 
volume which was typical in previous years, suggesting rising activity. In the first 
half of the year, depo market turnover followed a slightly decreasing trend and 
fell to a more significant extent in May, but historically it was still not low. In May, 
with the narrowing of interbank forint liquidity, depo market turnover temporarily 
dropped, which may have been caused by seasonal factors related to the Hungarian 
banks’ keeping their reserves and the expected negative liquidity shock. At the end 
of May, depo market activity started to increase again, and by the end of October 
it surpassed the higher level experienced at the beginning of the year. All in all, in 
view of these processes, we can say that the turnover of the unsecured interbank 
Figure 1. 
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market in the examined period was driven by factors that generally characterise the 
market, and thus the impacts of the changes in the market did not really influence 
the quotation of BUBOR. On the other hand, it is a favourable development that 
the slow and gradual increase in the annual average turnover after the crisis also 
continued in 2014 on the depo market (Figure 1.).
Another important feature of the unsecured interbank market – in addition to 
the fact that this market has the lowest turnover among the key domestic money 
markets – is that significant activity can only be observed in tenors of less than 1 
month, and most of the transactions are made by the banks in the shortest, one-
day segment.
In 2014, most of the deals were also concluded with the shortest O/N tenor by the 
market players. In the case of longer maturities, turnover was lower and gradually 
decreased with the increase in the term. While deals with overnight tenors were 
concluded on each trading day, 3-month unsecured interbank deals were only 
concluded on 47 days, for a total of 49 such transactions in 2014. All of this implies 
that in spite of the moderate increase in interbank market turnover, the frequency 
of deals with longer tenors is still low, and for lack of real market transactions, 
this makes the quoting practice of interbank reference rates difficult, as the panel 
bank involved in quoting has to consider other data sources as well, instead of 
transactions observed on the reference value market. Compared to previous years, 
the annual amount of contracts with tenors of 3 months declined slightly in 2014, 
but the frequency of transactions increased, while annual turnover with tenors of 
6 months increased significantly, just like the frequency of transactions.
All in all, we can say that similarly to previous years, activity remained low in the 
3-month and 6-month segments of the unsecured interbank market in 2014, and 
the liquidity of the 6-month tenor is still below that of the 3-month tenor, in spite 
of the increase.
4. considerations in Formulating the Analytical framework
As we already noted, the importance of BUBOR quotations is very significant from 
a number of aspects, and therefore it is important that the quotations are defined 
in a transparent, authentic, and reliable way, and reflect real market conditions 
and the widest possible information base without distortion. For this purpose, we 
considered five key considerations in the formulation of the analytical framework.
4.1. checking the adjustment of quotations to market prices
Although there are usually no transactions behind banks’ quotations, it is a key 
objective to ensure that quotations correspond to market conditions. That can 
guarantee that BUBOR is defined on the basis of the latest information base, in 
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such a manner that increases market efficiency and that financial products are 
priced in a way that is reassuring and “fair” for the general public as well. In this 
respect, it is a good idea to compare BUBOR quotations with yield levels emerging 
on other markets.
Duffie–Stein (2014) demonstrated that, as interbank reference rates gain ground, 
their use has also become widespread on a number of other markets which are 
not directly related to the costs of interbank fund placement. All of this means, for 
instance, that reference rates based on the interest rates of less liquid interbank 
market transactions also serve as a benchmark on the derivative market with much 
higher turnover. In the case of a large derivative portfolio, a slight modification of 
the reference rate may result in a significant change in cash flows related to the 
derivative portfolio, which might be an incentive to divert the reference rate.
4.2. identification of panel banks that regularly divert from the average
In respect of diversions from the average, naturally the focus may be on diversions 
that last longer and that are significant and one-way, but it is difficult to draw the 
line for the term and the extent. During the examination, this consideration should 
be used in relation to other analytical methods (e.g. examination of interest rate 
derivative positions).
There may be several reasons why individual quotations are different from the 
official BUBOR quotation. The “natural” factors include the following:
•  different rate expectations of banks;
•  difference between the risk premiums of banks;
•  if the liquidity position of the given bank is permanently unfavourable, or it can 
collect funds at a higher cost, it will probably offer funds to other banks at higher 
cost, and thus it will quote higher rates;
•  on the other hand, the stricter internal rules of the bank may also be the reason 
for its lending with yields higher than the average;
•  experience shows that the standard deviation of quotations increases in an 
uncertain money market environment.
It is important to note that the code of conduct strengthening the control process 
of rate quotations is presently being elaborated, and that may offer some guidelines 
to panel banks for the consideration of factors that influence quotations.
Therefore, quotations that permanently differ from the average may have several 
justified reasons. The objective is to separate natural reasons from intended 
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manipulation. While manipulation distorts the market, the above mentioned 
factors are natural characteristics of rate quotations and facilitate the integration 
of information.
4.3. improvement of data quality
In international practice, examples were found when quotations were submitted 
unchanged for a longer period of time.7 Quotations that get stuck indicate that the 
quoting bank does not reflect the information collected from the changes in the 
market environment in its rate quotations, which is against the objectives of the 
functions to be served by BUBOR. For the improvement of the information contents 
of interbank fixing, it is important to filter out unchanged or stuck quotations, as 
well as incorrectly submitted rate quotations.
4.4. Support for bank treasury staff involved in quotation
The production and publication of regular examinations related to BUBOR 
quotations and the strengthening of communication among the parties may 
facilitate the work of panel banks, and, in connection with the previous point, may 
encourage them to improve the quality of data submitted.
4.5. Audits should not jeopardise the existence of BuBOR
In the establishment of the regular analysis and checking of BUBOR quotations, 
one important consideration is that these activities should not punish panel 
banks and should not reduce the motivation of banks to submit quotations. If the 
range of active quoting banks is wide, the BUBOR fixing provides a wider scope of 
information on interbank lending conditions; therefore, the objective is to make sure 
that the number of panel banks does not drop after the strengthening of external 
control. This consideration is especially important for the trimmed average used 
for the establishment of fixing, as a reduction in the number of data points may 
have a negative impact on the robustness of fixing.
At the end of 2012, 16 banks were participating in the quoting of BUBOR, while 
presently only 9 are involved. The higher number of active quoting banks reduces 
the possibility of manipulating BUBOR, because the highest and lowest values are 
ignored, and extreme or “diverted” values are not included in the average. However, 
in the case of fewer quoting banks, the extent of trimming is lower as well, which 
might give a chance to consider possible manipulating quotations.
7  EBA–ESMA (2013).
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5. The Hungarian framework and the results of the examination in 2014
In the following, we describe the six key methods used in the Hungarian analysis 
framework and demonstrate their use on the example of the examination of 2014. 
In our analysis, we focus on the 3-month BUBOR only, but it is important to note 
that we also conducted analyses for the equally important 6-month maturity and 
obtained similar results.
Based on theoretical considerations and international experience, several signs 
should be checked in quotations; some of these may be related to data errors and 
others to possible manipulation. Patterns to be examined from the aspect of data 
errors include stuck or extreme quotations. In respect of manipulation, it is worth 
examining individual extreme quotes, quotations that permanently differ from the 
average, the relations between individual quotations, the time series features of 
quotations and the relations with interest rate positionings. We tried to enforce 
these considerations in formulating the framework.
5.1. identification of stuck quotations
International reference rate analyses show that the unchanged nature of quotations 
(when they get stuck) may be a problem. For the improvement of the information 
contents of interbank fixing, it is important to filter out unchanged or stuck 
quotations and to identify incorrectly submitted quotations.
In 2014, the banks quoted BUBOR on 252 days. In the first 7 months of the year, 
10 quoting banks listed BUBOR, and then for the rest of the year, the number of 
quoting banks dropped to 9. Within the 252 daily fixings, the 3-month BUBOR 
changed overnight on 57 occasions, and in other cases, a value corresponding to the 
value of the previous day became the daily BUBOR fixing, which means that in 77% 
of the cases, the 3-month BUBOR fixing was identical to the previous day’s value. 
In this respect, there seems to be a sharp difference between the first and second 
half of the year: in the first half of the year, the fixing was unchanged in 68% of the 
cases, while in the second half, this ratio climbed to 87%. The change observed 
in the development of 3-month BUBOR quotations may have been supported by 
the end of the rate-cutting cycle and expectations of rates being maintained, and 
with the unchanged nature of the base rate, these factors may have reduced the 
volatility of BUBOR quotations as well.
Based on the daily fluctuations of the 3-month BUBOR, it can be said that in 
the past 3 years, the fixing was more and more closely related to the base rate 
(Figure 2.). This implies that compared to the base rate, BUBOR has not offered 
any additional information lately. This historic trend was present in 2014 as well, 
in the development of the Hungarian reference rate: the longest period in which 
the 3-month BUBOR fixing did not change was 58 days. At that time, the emerging 
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fixing remained at 2.1%, the level of the central bank base rate from the beginning 
of October to the end of the year.
At the level of individual banks, we evaluated the volatility of bank quotations 
on the basis of three considerations. First, we examined how many times a bank 
modified its submitted quotation, and then we checked the maximum length of 
possible stuck periods. Finally, with the length of the average stuck period, we tried 
to show the average number of days for which the quotations submitted by panel 
banks remained unchanged during the year.
The results indicate that 7 among the 10 rate quoting banks submitted a quotation 
different from the previous day’s on maximum 20 occasions, which indicates low 
volatility, but this cannot be considered as general, because two banks modified 
their BUBOR quotations fairly often.
The maximum lengths of stuck periods also show different pictures in the case 
of various panel banks: the length of unchanged quotations exceeded 50 trading 
days in the case of 6 banks, but in the case of banks that frequently modified their 
Figure 2. 
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quotations, the lengths of stuck periods were effectively shorter. It is interesting to 
note that from October until the end of the year, i.e. the end of the examination, 
6 banks quoted BUBOR at unchanged levels. This resulted in the BUBOR fixing also 
remaining at 2.1% in the period from 8 October to 31 December.
Based on the average length of stuck periods, the banks moved in a wide spectrum, 
and the picture of the conduct of individual panel banks seems to be identical to 
the picture given by the other two “getting stuck” indicators (Figure 3.). At Banks I 
and E on the edge of the spread, long stuck quotations were less frequent, as they 
often modified their quotations. However, the high value of the average length of 
stuck periods at some banks indicate that long-lasting unchanged rate quotations 
happened not only on a few occasions, but are a fairly frequent phenomenon. The 
high number of quotations stuck at the same time indicates that most of the banks 
did not make any change in their quotations, and this may imply the stability of 
market conditions or the improper channelling of market information.
Although it is rather difficult to define how often BUBOR quotations should change 
on average, when the central bank base rate changes, it is usually justified to modify 
the quotations, so these cases can be examined separately.8 In the 3-month term, we 
found stuck quotations in the case of 5 banks in the rate-cutting environment. Owing 
to the calculation methodology of the BUBOR, these individual stuck quotations did 
not influence the official quotation in 2014. In the quoting of the 6-month BUBOR, 
it happened slightly more frequently that the banks did not immediately reflect 
8  In the autumn of 2013, the individual rates stuck after the base rate changes resulted in a situation that 
the 3-month BUBOR was adjusted downwards only with delays of a few days, after the interest rate cuts.
Figure 3. 
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the base rate change in their quotations, but we did not experience a significant 
difference in the conduct of the banks regarding these two terms.
In general, we can say that the reduced volatility of the BUBOR fixing, the low 
frequency of the modifications of individual bank quotations, and the length of 
stuck periods imply the fact that interbank market conditions were not reflected at 
all in the BUBOR quotations in certain periods, or only to a limited extent. Looking 
at the indicators of stuck periods together with stuck rates following the base rate 
changes, two banks acted differently from other active quoting banks: Bank H 
seldom modified its rate quotation, even compared to other banks, and submitted 
unchanged quotations already from July, while Bank I was on the other edge of the 
spectrum with its activity.
5.2. Relation to alternative market benchmarks
BUBOR quotations reflect money market information which may appear in other 
reference rates as well, and thus it may be worthwhile to review their relations 
and their changes in time, as this may also be indicative for the explanation of the 
development of BUBOR. We compared the BUBOR quotations to the development 
of 4 alternative indicators. The base rate influences interbank rates – including the 
BUBOR level reflecting costs of funds by definition – through the various channels 
of monetary transmission. The comparison of FRA yields with BUBOR is relevant 
because the parties to the agreement make a bet on the future value of the 
reference rate, i.e. the FRA yields reflect market expectations regarding rates. The 
advantage of FRA yields is that it is a liquid market, but in comparison with BUBOR, 
one disadvantage is that the capital amount does not change hands, i.e. credit risk 
is not reflected in the rates.9 The FX swap market implied HUF yield reflects the 
rate of the secured FX market transaction interest rate. Similarly to BUBOR, both 
interest rate and liquidity risk factors can be detected in the development of the 
3-month discount Treasury note, but apart from the interbank market processes, 
other impacts such as the default risk of the state are also reflected in T-bill yields.
In examining the relation with other benchmarks, the analysis of correlation data 
is also an option, but as a result of the low volatility of BUBOR (see Figure 2.), this 
method is not informative under the Hungarian conditions. Therefore, we examined 
the difference between BUBOR and alternative yield indicators.
9  It is important to add that in the pricing of FRA deals, the parties use the expected future value of BUBOR 
as a base, and therefore the FRA rates also partly include the information reflected in BUBOR, and thus it 
is not a benchmark that is independent of BUBOR. On the other hand, the comparison of BUBOR and FRA 
quotations might still be justified, considering the fact that, owing to the higher turnover, the FRA market 
offers more information on the market rate expectations than the depo market and thus renders the picture 
of the financial market rates more complex. The relation of BUBOR to rate expectations is analysed in more 
detail by e.g. Horváth et al. (2013).
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The deviation of base rates and FRA yields from BUBOR did not really change 
during the year, as it stagnated around zero (Figure 4.). It is worth noting that 
at the beginning of the year, during the emerging market turbulence, interbank 
rates effectively increased, and thus the 1X4 FRA quotations increased by 43 basis 
points, and the EUR/HUF exchange rate rose from 305 to over 313 in 4 days. In the 
meantime, the 3-month BUBOR increased by 4 basis points to the level of the base 
rate, and then steadily tracked the central bank policy rate.
In the case of the three-month T-bill, an effective decline in yields started at the 
beginning of July, which continued even after the closing of the rate-cutting cycle 
of the end of July, but this was not reflected in BUBOR quotations. The low level of 
short-term government securities market yields was remained in place, all the way 
until the end of the year. This can be explained partly by the transformation of the 
set of MNB tools and the related change in the liquidity management of the banking 
system, and partly by the reduced issues by the Government Debt Management 
Agency. In addition to a number of other seasonal and individual factors, another 
aspect which was also partly related to the change in the set of central bank tools 
was that the HUF liquidity released after the transformation of MNB bonds into 
deposits may have increased the HUF supply on the FX swap market, which may 
have contributed to a reduction in the implied HUF yield, and thus to its deviation 
from BUBOR.10
10  The development of the FX swap market implied HUF yields is influenced among other things by the position 
of foreign players and the HUF liquidity of banks. The latter is influenced by a number of factors, for example 
the end-of-quarter impact or deposits and withdrawals related to the treasury account. In 2014, the central 
bank introduced its self-financing programme, which may have further influenced implied HUF yields, in 
addition to the factors already mentioned and observed in earlier years.
Figure 4. 
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All in all, in the course of 2014, BUBOR quotations were close to the key benchmarks, 
which means that BUBOR changed in harmony with other market indicators. The 
occasionally different dynamics were explained by individual factors affecting the 
benchmarks, i.e. the reason was not a change in the dynamics of BUBOR.
5.3. Outlier quotations
From the aspect of the reliability of the BUBOR fixing, the identification and 
examination of outlier rate quotations is of special importance. A quotation that 
is effectively different from the average rate quotation may indicate a data error, 
a shock affecting the individual bank, or even deliberate manipulation.
5.3.1. No significant data quality problems originating from mistyping in 2014
The time series of individual bank quotations moved together in 2014, and 
quotations differed from the average, i.e. from the BUBOR fixing, to a small extent 
only. It is a positive phenomenon, that in the case of quotations submitted in 2014, 
no outliers suggesting data errors can be identified, which means that problems 
of data quality nature originating from mistyping did not deteriorate the reliability 
of BUBOR in the last year.
5.3.2. No outliers found in individual bank quotations
The value of the absolute difference calculated from the 3-month BUBOR of active 
quoting banks moved in a narrow band in 2014, between 1 and 6 basis points on 
an average (Figure 5. ).11 The differences compared to BUBOR were extremely high 
on two occasions, both times in connection with the drop in the central bank base 
rate, but the difference was not caused by an outlier value but by stuck quotations, 
because in the environment of the February base rate cut, one of the banks did 
not modify its quotation.
Individual quotations which are different from the official BUBOR quotation can 
be explained by several natural reasons, such as the different rate expectations of 
banks, the difference between the risk premiums of banks, the stricter internal rules 
of the banks, or their changed liquidity position. Therefore, quotations permanently 
different from the average may have several reasons, which is measured in the 
examination with the average of the absolute difference from BUBOR. A significant 
difference compared to the average may mean that other effects may have driven 
the rate quotation as well, in addition to natural factors. In the respect of 3-month 
BUBOR quotations, a difference from the average by more than 10 basis points was 
observed in the case of 3 banks last year, but outlier individual bank quotations 
were not the reason for any difference.
11  The absolute differences are the differences in absolute values between the individual quotations of 
quoting banks and the official BUBOR of the given day. Therefore, we did not consider the direction of the 
difference, only its rate. The average absolute difference refers to the average of differences experienced 
at the panel banks.
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5.3.3 Quotations to be eliminated
The effects of outlier values can be mitigated by the trimmed averages used in the 
generation of interest rate fixing, when in the case of certain quotation number 
the upper and the lower values are ignored in a certain proportion. A different rate 
quotation activity may be indicated when a bank’s rate quotations are regularly 
excluded from the trimmed average, but it is also possible that the difference can be 
explained with natural reasons. In the definition of the quotations to be eliminated, 
it may be a problem that several banks submitted the same quotations at the tails 
of the dispersion. In that case, the extreme value to be eliminated is not considered 
to be an outlier. (In the examination, we applied the rule that when more than two 
banks submitted the same value, the quotation was not included as an outlier.)
Last year, the 3-month BUBOR quotation of Bank I proved to be the lowest quotation 
in more than three quarters of the cases, which means that it did not only regularly 
deviate downwards from BUBOR, but that it also provided the smallest quotation 
among the panel banks. Bank I was often at the bottom of the range not only as 
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Figure 6. 
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the lowest value, but as the second lowest value as well. Similarly to the smallest 
quotation, the highest quotations were concentrated in the quotations of one bank. 
In more than 50% of the cases, Bank H quoted the highest BUBOR value among 
the panel banks, which can be explained with the quotations stuck at a level higher 
than the average in the second half of the year (Figure 6. ).
However, it can be stated that during the year the quotations of individual banks did 
not affect the official BUBOR fixing (Figure 7.), and when it did, it was by a maximum 
of 1 basis point, which is a negligible extent.
All in all, it can be stated that the differences of individual bank quotations from 
BUBOR are of a moderate extent, and the differences refer to stuck quotations, and 
not to outlier rate quotations. In some cases, the turbulent market environment at 
the beginning of the year and the slowdown and end of the MNB rate cycle may 
have contributed to the difference between individual bank quotations and BUBOR. 
Based on the quotations to be eliminated in the calculation of the trimmed average, 
there were banks which behaved differently from the average, but individual 
quotations had no effective impact on the official fixing. The individual differences 
should be examined together with other considerations.
Figure 7.


















Note: Based on the difference between BUBOR values calculated with the omission of daily quotations 
of panel banks and the actual value.
Source: Own calculations based on MNB data.
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5.4. identification of structural breaks
From the aspect of the examination of the quotations, it is also a relevant issue 
whether there is a turning point in the development of BUBOR quotations which 
indicates a serious change in conduct. First, we examine the official 3-month BUBOR 
quotation and then turn to the conduct of individual panel banks.
As BUBOR shows a strong relation to the base rate, we primarily examine this 
relationship, which gives us a chance to analyse the changes justified by general 
market trends. Based on the observations from the past 10 years (Figure 8.), we 
can say that the relation of the 3-month BUBOR and the base rate is effectively 
defined by the rate cycle the MNB is currently in: in increasing cycles and at times of 
unchanged base rate, the 3-month BUBOR is usually over the level of the base rate, 
and in decreasing cycles, it moves below that. The background to this phenomenon 
consists of several related factors. On the one hand, the expectation regarding the 
two-week interest rate may appear in BUBOR, which can explain the observed 
relation. On the other hand, the rate cycles are related to the changes in the risk 
premium, which may affect the BUBOR level as observed. Thirdly, the 3-month 
BUBOR may contain premium factors as well (e.g. maturity premium12), which justify 
12  See e.g. Horváth et al. (2013).
Figure 8. 
































































































































Note: The positive values mean a 3-month BUBOR level higher than the base rate.
Source: Own calculations based on MNB data.
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the fact that in calm periods and at times of an unchanged central bank rate, BUBOR 
is over the base rate level.
In 2014, at the time of the slowdown and then the end of the MNB rate-cutting 
cycle, changes corresponding to the pattern of previous years took place in the 
BUBOR-base rate differential: in the last months of the cycle, the difference started 
to increase, and then it entered the positive range that is a feature of maintaining 
periods. By the end of the year, the difference stabilised at 0 level, which can be 
partly explained by the forward guidance of the MNB in relation to leaving the level 
of the base rate unchanged. The 3-month BUBOR tied to the base rate also means 
that in the second half of 2014, BUBOR did not present any additional information 
compared to the base rate.
All in all, we can say that in 2014, the change experienced in the development of the 
3-month BUBOR corresponds to the pattern observed at the time of closing base 
rate cycles in the past, and is in harmony with the course justified by theoretical 
considerations.
Based on the statistical analysis of the official 3-month BUBOR time series, two 
major breaks can be identified in the time series in 2014 (Figure 9.): early spring and 
Figure 9. 
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end of summer. The change in the behaviour of individual quoting banks is related to 
these two dates, although there may be a difference of a few weeks. It is important 
to point out that it is possible to identify an event for both dates which may explain 
the change in the conduct of panel banks. In the case of the early spring time, the 
slowdown in the MNB rate-cutting cycle, and in the case of the end of the summer, 
the end of the rate cycle may have been important background factors, which can 
explain the change in the behaviour of the BUBOR quotations. 
Methodology description: Structural breaks
We looked for the structural breaks of time series with the so-called Bai-Perron 
test.14 Technically, the test determined the break points of the linear trend ad-
justed to the time series of the difference between individual quotations and 
BUBOR. Thus, with this method, the changes in the conduct of the panel bank 
are identified on the basis of the relation to the official BUBOR quotation. For 
the sake of more precise estimates, we carried out the test for the period of 
2013–2014, but the analysis focused on the break points of 2014 only. In the ca-
se of the official BUBOR quotation, the BUBOR-base rate differential was used.
5.5. cluster analysis
The cluster analysis can be used to examine the relation of individual quoting 
strategies, allowing us to answer the question of whether it is possible to identify 
some groups among market makers who behave in a different way. Based on the 
results (Figure 10.) we can say that there is no separate group among the BUBOR 
quoting banks whose conduct is effectively different from the others, and thus 
there is no sign of coordination between panel banks.14 Based on the dendrogram 
summarising the results of cluster analysis, the [A, J, G, D, C] group followed the 
official BUBOR quotation more closely than the others. Among the panel banks 
which followed the official quotation more loosely, Bank I was different. It is an 
important result that this structure suggests that every entity adjusted primarily to 
BUBOR, and not to another player or group of players.
13  Bai et al. (2003).
14  We obtained similar results in the case of 6-month quotations.
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Methodology description: cluster analysis
In the course of the hierarchic cluster analysis, we examined the similarities 
between the individual quotations and BUBOR time series. In the first step of 
this process, the “distance” of the time series per pair is defined, which in this 
case is interpreted as the square median of the difference of daily quotations 
(“Euclidean distance”) which can be interpreted as the daily average basis point 
difference. Then we define the two closest time series and combine them in 
one cluster. In this case, this meant the official BUBOR quotation and the time 
series of bank C, at the basis point level of 1.2. After that, we find the shortest 
distance again, but instead of the already combined two time series, we use 
the average difference from these. If the shortest difference is between two 
“intact” observations, we will create a new cluster from them, but if the diffe-
rence between an existing cluster and a new time series is the smallest, this 
cluster is extended with a new time series. This process goes on until all cons-
tituents have been put into a group. Based on the dendrogram, the sequence 
of combinations and the distance among groups can be examined. In our case, 
in each step, a new time series was added to the already existing cluster, i.e. 
the time series of each panel bank was around the BUBOR (common average), 
in a way that they effectively differed from each other in pairs.
Figure 10. 





















Note: The distance of market makers and clusters on the horizontal axis may be interpreted as daily 
average base point difference. Clusters created at a lower level indicate the closer relation of elements.
Source: Own calculations based on MNB data.
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5.6. Relation between interest rate derivative positions and BuBOR quotations
The relation between individual BUBOR quotations and the interest rate derivative 
positions (FRA, IRS and CIRS) was examined using multi-variable regression. For 
the analysis, we estimated for each bank to what extent the difference between 
individual BUBOR quotations and the official BUBOR can be justified by the 
Hungarian CDS spread, the EUR/HUF exchange rate, the base rate and the individual 
interest rate derivative position (Table 1.). In the regression, the use of the first 
three common financial variables allows that we take into consideration the fact 
that the panel bank defines its new individual BUBOR quotation related to these 
indicators. We tested the analysis with similar results on several partial samples; 
we analyse the results for the whole sample only.
According to the results, the interest rate derivative positions of Banks G, J and D 
show significant positive correlations with the BUBOR quotation. In these cases, 
we examined the development of positions and quotations in more detail as well. 
Based on the examination, two independent factors may have played a role in 
the fact that there seems to be a significant relation between the interest rate 
derivative position and BUBOR quotations. One of the factors is the end of the 
rate-cutting cycle of the MNB and the message that the rate level would be left 
unchanged, as a result of which banks submitting higher BUBOR quotations started 
to submit quotations corresponding to the base rate. The other factor is that as 
a result of the MNB CIRS tenders related to the conversion of FX loans to HUF, the 
net CIRS portfolio of banks has fallen. In the second half of the year, these two 
factors together resulted in the concurrent reduction in the interest rate derivative 
portfolio tied to the 3-month BUBOR and the BUBOR quotations. This concurrent 
move is identified by our regression as a relation of positive direction, but there is 
probably no manipulation intent behind this relation.
All in all, we can say that the BUBOR quoting practice of banks does not show any 
relation with the individual interest rate derivative positions in addition to the extent 
justified by external factors.
Table 1.
Results of regressions explaining the difference between individual quotations and 
BuBOR, by bank
B D E F G H I J
c –0.13 (–0.5) –0.57 (–3.46) –0.06 (–0.15) 1.27 (4.13) –0.05 (–0.33) –1.06 (–3.29) –1.1 (–5.61) –0.41 (–2.38)
CDS 5.52 (0.7) 19.55 (3.9) 1.17 (0.1) –34.66 (–3.97) 3.94 (0.85) 35.73 (3.65) 33.53 (5.65) 11.07 (2.1)
EURHUF –0.04 (–2.37) –0.02 (–1.58) 0.16 (5.28) 0.11 (5.69) 0.01 (1.11) 0.14 (5.55) 0.16 (10.93) 0.04 (3.46)
base rate 3.45 (1.33) –2.48 (–1.37) –11.65 (–3.16) –14.97 (–4.99) –6.66 (–4.26) –11.41 (–3.6) –14.08 (–7.83) –1.46 (–0.92)
position –0.04 (–1.04) 1.91 (6.71) 0.07 (1.19) –0.2 (–3.74) 0.25 (12) 0.03 (1.26) –0.36 (–14.11) 0.11 (5.79)
R2 0.05 0.23 0.18 0.21 0.39 0.28 0.66 0.24
Note: In brackets behind the regression coefficients: t-statistics. c: constant; CDS: 5-year Hungarian 
CDS-spread; EURHUF: euro/forint exchange rate; base rate: MNB base rate; Position: the institution’s 
daily interest rate derivative position tied to BUBOR (FRA, IRS, CIRS).
Source: Own calculations based on MNB data.
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6. conclusion
The statistical approach presented is suitable for the identification of certain signs 
of manipulation and the detection of systematic behaviour patterns, but it can be 
considered as an indirect instrument only, which has its limitations. Direct insight 
into the activities of panel banks is provided by official examination methods and 
internal bank audits only, but statistical analyses may compliment other audits, and 
may have a favourable impact on the quality of BUBOR quotations.
All in all, we can say that on the basis of the statistical analysis of BUBOR quotations 
in 2014, there is no condition that would require the further examination of the 
official BUBOR fixing or the individual bank quotations.
The reduced volatility of the BUBOR fixing, the low frequency of the modification of 
individual bank quotations, and the length of stuck periods indicate that in certain 
time periods, market conditions are not reflected in the BUBOR rate quotations, 
or only to a limited extent. On the other hand, it can be seen that in the course 
of 2014, the occasionally stuck individual quotations in the environment of the 
changes to the base rate did not really influence the BUBOR level, owing to the 
calculation methodology. In connection with the conduct of individual banks, 
several analysis methods show that Banks I and H follow a quotation strategy that 
is effectively different from the strategies of the other panel banks. However, while 
Bank I differs from other quoting banks with its activities, Bank H differs with its 
inactivity and often stuck quotations.
In the course of 2014, the BUBOR quotations were close to the key benchmarks, 
and the occasionally different dynamics can be explained with individual factors 
affecting the benchmarks. All in all, it can be stated that the differences of individual 
bank quotations from BUBOR are of a moderate extent, and tend to suggest 
stuck quotations, and not stem from outliers in rate quotations. The structural 
change observed in 2014 in the time series of individual quotations and the fixing 
corresponds to the pattern observed in the past at the time of ending rate-cutting 
cycles, and is in harmony with the dynamics justified by theoretical considerations. 
The individual quotation strategies are significantly different, and the methodology 
used found no signs of coordination. The BUBOR quoting practice of banks does not 
show any relation with the individual interest rate derivative positions in addition 
to the extent justified by external factors.
With further processing of the findings of the Hungarian analysis methodology, 
the methodology may change in the years ahead. Our findings collected so far are 
summarised in the table below.
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Table 2.
Summary table related to the Hungarian examination methodology
Method description Advantages drawbacks
Identification of "stuck" 
quotes
Identification of stuck 
quotes and other 
"obvious" errors
Strenghtening the 
information content of 
BUBOR
It is an ex post tool, it 
can not prevent errors
Analysis of benchmarks Analysis of the 
connection between 
BUBOR and other 
benchmark rates
Development of other 
benchmarks can shed 
light on the factors 
influencing  BUBOR
Noisy connection
Outlier detection Identification of the 
most frequently 
trimmed panel banks
Capable of identifying 
banks with significantly 
different strategy




Cluster analysis Identification of banks 
with similar strategy
It can indicate 
cooperation
It is quite difficult to 
define what "similar" 
means
Structural breaks Identification of 
structural breaks in the 
time series of individual 
quotes and of the fixing
Identification of 
behavioral changes 
A number of "natural" 
causes can  trigger a 
behavioral change
Analysis of derivative 
positions
Linear regression 
between the derivative 
position and the quotes
It can reveal 
manipulation 
motivations in 
connection with the 
BUBOR exposure
A number of "natural" 
causes can  be in the 
background
Source: Own compilation based on the results.
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The macroeconomic impacts of demographic 
changes in Hungary in the context of the 
European union
Emese Kreiszné Hudák – Péter Varga – Viktor Várpalotai 
The article provides a review of Hungarian and international demographic trends and 
examines the macroeconomic impacts of demographic developments in Hungary in 
comparison with the European Union. Based on available population projections, it 
is expected that ageing will also characterise Hungarian demographic processes, but 
the extent of ageing in Hungary may be more moderate than the estimated impact 
in several regional and Western European countries. According to the population 
projections and estimations found in the literature, we came to the conclusion that 
in the long run population ageing is expected to substantially change labour supply, 
consumption, and savings ratios, dampen growth prospects and potentially exert 
a disinflationary impact in the upcoming decades. Demographic processes may 
affect developments in key variables relevant for the conduct of monetary policy 
and the effectiveness of transmission channels. In addition, population ageing may 
increase budgetary expenditures through the pension and the healthcare system. 
The adverse impacts may be mitigated by economic policy measures and adjustment 
by economic agents. At the same time, demographic processes may also represent 
an economic opportunity that can be exploited through the adequate reallocation 
of resources.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classification: E21, J10, J11, H50
Keywords: economic growth, demographic trends, Hungary
1. introduction
One of the greatest challenges facing the global economy is population ageing 
caused by the declining birth rate, coupled with an expected rise in life expectancy. 
The expected rate and speed of ageing varies by geographic region and country, 
but Europe is expected to have the highest ratio of older persons in its population 
by 2050.
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Similarly to the European trend, changes in the population structure in Hungary 
are also shaped by population ageing. If current demographic trends continue, 
the old-age dependency ratio may double by 2060. This process is driven by two 
fundamental factors. On the one hand, Hungary’s fertility rate is exceptionally 
low even in a European comparison, while on the other hand, life expectancy 
is gradually increasing, albeit from a lower point and at a slower rate than the 
European average. Assuming a gradually increasing fertility rate and life expectancy 
remaining below the European Union average, the old-age dependency ratio may 
slightly exceed the average of the European Union by 2060.
One key question is how the changing age structure will impact the development 
of macroeconomic variables and how economic policy may help in preparing 
for these changes. Based on the current prognosis, population ageing is set to 
impact every facet of life, shaping the expected developments in macroeconomic 
indicators. It may have an adverse impact on growth prospects and the fiscal 
balance. In terms of the conduct of monetary policy, it may affect the degree of 
inflationary pressure, the equilibrium real interest rate and the effectiveness of 
transmission channels. Adverse impacts can be cushioned using economic policy 
tools, and negative impacts can also be mitigated through adjustments induced by 
demographic processes.
2. demographic processes in Hungary in an international context
2.1. international demographic trends
Population ageing is a trend essentially prevailing in the entire world, but at 
diverging rates and speeds. The change in the population’s age structure may 
be characterised by an increase in the proportion of older persons (aged 65 or 
older) in the coming decades (Table 1). According to the World Bank’s forecast, 
the proportion of elderly within the population may be the highest in high-income 
countries: in these countries, one out of four people will be over the age of 65 by 
2050. The speed of ageing, which can be identified as the change in the proportion 
of elderly (UN 2013b) may be the most significant in middle-income countries. In 
these countries, the ratio of persons over the age of 65 may almost triple by 2050 
compared to the level in 2000. The number of older persons may increase at a faster 
pace in less developed regions compared to developed ones, mainly due to the 
higher birth rates in earlier decades, with the result that 80% of the total older 
population may be concentrated in less developed regions (UN 2013b). This could 
create an issue, because developing countries could age before their economies 
converge with developed countries (Lee et al. 2010).
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Table 1.
Expected rate of ageing across various country groups of the world based on the 
world Bank’s forecast
country/country group1 Share of 65 years and older 
in the population
Old-age dependency ratio
2000 2050 change 2000 2050 change
High income countries 13.7 25.8 +88% 20.3 44.3 +118%
Middle income countries 5.5 15.4 +180% 8.7 24.0 +176%
Low income countries 3.5 7.3 +109% 6.3 11.5 +83%
European Union 15.7 28.9 +84% 23.4 51.4 +120%
Central Europe and Baltic countries 13.5 27.9 +107% 19.8 48.5 +145%
Hungary2 15.1 26.0 +72% 22.3 43.8 +96%
Hungary3 15.0 27.5 +84% 22.0 47.3 +115%
Note: 1. Country groups are defined based on the classification featured in the World Bank database, 
which categorises countries based on gross GDP per capita for 2013. 2. World Bank (2014). 3. Eurostat 
(2014).
Source: Eurostat (2014), World Bank (2014)
Population ageing refers to a relative rise in the proportion of older cohorts within 
the population compared to younger ones, which – ceteris paribus – could result in 
a significant rise in the burden of the economically active population. The proportion 
of older persons relative to persons of working age (old-age dependency ratio) may 
rise to the greatest extent in middle-income countries, driven by the increase in 
persons aged 65 or older, but the indicator may still fall significantly short of the 
value in high-income countries (Table 1). In terms of global regions, the old-age 
dependency ratio may be the highest in the European Union in 2050, rising from 
23% in the 2000s to 51% by 2050. This means that while in 2000 there were 23 
older persons for every 100 persons of working age, by 2050 there will be more 
than double this amount, i.e. 51 older persons. The old-age dependency ratio may 
approach 60% by 2050 in several Western European countries, including Germany 
and Portugal. Alongside European countries, the number of older persons relative 
to persons of working age may also increase significantly in Japan: by 2050 this ratio 
may reach 72% according to the World Bank’s population projection (World Bank 
2014). Hungary’s old-age dependency ratio may double by 2050, but still remain 
slightly below the estimated average for Central European countries.
Population ageing can also be captured through other population statistics 
indicators than those mentioned above (ratio of persons aged 65 and older 
within the population, old-age dependency ratio). These include the ageing index, 
calculated as the number of older persons (aged 65 or older) per hundred children 
(persons aged between 0–14) (CSO 2014a). Demographic ageing is also indicated by 
the population’s rising median age (Chawla et al. 2007). Demographic dependency 
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indicators with modified content also appear in the literature for the evaluation 
of economic and social impacts of ageing. These indicators compare the number 
of older persons or inactive persons to the number of persons actually employed 
rather than those of working age (for instance the total economy dependency ratio).
2.2. Hungarian demographic processes in a European comparison
Hungary’s fertility rate is exceptionally low even by European standards, based on 
Eurostat (2014) data. In European countries, the total fertility rate1 has declined 
gradually since the 1960s, but has exhibited a slightly increasing trend since the 
turn of the millennium, rising from 1.45 to 1.6. The fertility rate in European Union 
countries is set to fall short of the 2.1 figure necessary for a long-term reproduction,2 
in spite of the rising trend, and the European fertility rate will be the lowest among 
the world’s regions (UN 2013a). The fertility rate exhibits a significant deviation 
within the European Union: the rate stood at around 2 in Ireland and France and at 
1.3–1.4 in the Visegrad group and Southern Europe (Figure 1). The total fertility rate 
in Hungary has fluctuated between 1.25 and 1.34 since the turn of the millennium.
1  The total fertility rate is the “average number of children born alive that would be born to each woman 
during her lifetime if the prevailing age-specific fertility rates applied during her child-bearing years” (CSO 
2014b).
2  A total fertility rate of 2.1 children per women ensures broad stability of the population, on the assumptions 
of no migration flows and unchanged mortality rates (OECD 2013).
Figure 1. 
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Life expectancy has increased slightly since the turn of the millennium, but its level 
and growth rate remain low by European standards. Life expectancy at the age 
of 60 averaged 23.6 years in 2012 in the European Union, and Hungary’s value 
(20 years) is one of the lowest in the EU. Since the turn of the millennium, life 
expectancy at the age of 60 has increased by the same number of years for men 
and women in Hungary, and thus the gap in life expectancy between the genders 
has not narrowed.
The low fertility rate and the gradual increase in life expectancy result in the ageing 
of population in Hungary as well. The falling fertility rate results in smaller cohorts of 
younger age compared to older generations and also decreases the future number 
of women of childbearing age, while members of older generations are expected to 
live longer due to rising life expectancy. In Hungary, 17.5% of the total population 
is aged 65 and older (Eurostat 2014), similarly to the average in other European 
Union countries (18.6%). The old-age dependency ratio stands at 25.8% in Hungary, 
which falls slightly short of the 28% of average value of European Union countries.
2.3. Expected developments in demographic processes by 2060
In the coming decades, the ageing of the Hungarian and European population is 
expected to continue based on the population projections, and the speed of ageing 
may accelerate.3 We use the Eurostat (2014) forecast as the baseline scenario 
for presenting demographic processes, which contains data comparable at the 
European Union level. In the European Union, the proportion of persons aged 65 
and older within the total population could rise from the current 18.6% to 28.4% 
by 2060 while the overall population of the European Union may increase slightly 
by 2050. The proportion of older persons within the population may be the highest 
by 2060 in Slovakia, Portugal, and Greece, and the rate of ageing may be most 
significant in Slovakia and Poland. In these countries, the old-age dependency 
ratio may rise above 60% by 2060 (Figure 2). The old-age dependency ratio may 
reach 52% in Hungary by 2060, with ageing thus exerting a slightly higher impact 
compared to the European average (50%). The speed of ageing may also accelerate 
in the coming decades, as the proportion of older persons is expected to rise at 
a faster pace than at present. While the proportion of persons aged 65 and older 
increased by 72% between 1960 in 2010, a rate of increase of 92% is expected in 
the European Union between 2010 and 2060 (Eurostat 2014).
In Hungary, population ageing may be accompanied by a decreasing population 
in the coming decades according to available population projections. The Eurostat 
(2014) forecast assumes that the fertility rate and life expectancy may converge 
from their current low level to the higher European average (Table 2). According to 
3  The population projections of Eurostat and CSO HDRI (2013) show a very similar picture regarding the 
expected development of Hungarian population. Hungarian population projections are compared in Annex.
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the population projection, Hungary will remain a net destination country in terms 
of migration, although the rate of migration will be lower in the second half of the 
projection horizon. As a result of all these factors, the total Hungarian population 
may shrink to 9.2 million by 2060 from 9.9 million in 2014, according to Eurostat’s 
projection. The ratio of the working age group (between 15 and 64) within the 
total population could fall to 56% by 2060 from 68% in 2014; in other words, the 
cohort of persons of working age may decrease by 1.6 million over the 2014–2060 
period. The ratio of persons aged 65 and older within the total population could 
rise to close to 30% by 2060, from 18% in 2014.
Table 2. 
Hypotheses of Hungarian population projection
Indicator 2012 data 2020 2040 2060
Fertility rate 1.34 1.50 1.68 1.74
Life expectancy at birth (years), 
men
71.6 73.6 78.1 82.0
Life expectancy at birth (years), 
women
78.7 80.2 83.8 87
Net migration (thousand persons) 8.1 24.3 24.2 14.0 
Source: EC (2014).
Figure 2. 
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Population ageing results in a rise in the old-age dependency ratio. Based on 
population projections, the ratio in Hungary may double between 2014 and 2060, 
rising from 26% in 2014 to 52% in 2060 (Figure 3). This means that while in 2014 
there were 26 older persons for every 100 persons of working age, by 2060 there 
will be more than double that amount, i.e. 52 older persons to be supported. The 
total dependency ratio may increase at a lower pace, as the decline in the number 
of children can partly offset the rise in the ratio of elderly.4 The young dependency 
ratio may rise only slightly, from 21% to 26% between 2014 and 2060.5 Despite the 
shrinking proportion of children, the young dependency ratio may nevertheless rise 
as the number of persons of working age could shrink even faster than the number 
of children according to population projections. Based on the ageing index, the 
number of older persons equalled the number of children by 2006, and the index 
may rise to 240% by 2060, meaning that by this date there will be twice as many 
older persons (204) for every 100 children. As a result of population ageing, the 
median age of the Hungarian population could rise from 41 in 2014 to 48 by 2060.
4  The total dependency ratio is the proportion of older persons and children relative to the number of persons 
of working age.
5  The young dependency ratio is the proportion of children (age 0–14) the number of persons of working 
age (age 15–64).
Figure 3. 
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Total dependency ratio (left-hand scale)
Ageing index (right-hand scale)
Source: Eurostat (2014).
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The expected population ageing and the decline in the population is also reflected 
in the shifting of the population pyramid (Figure 4). The rise in the proportion of 
older persons (aged 65 and older) within the total population will be affected by 
the large age cohorts reaching age 65 during certain periods (members of the Ratkó 
generation, i.e. Hungary’s baby-boomers, and their children), which could affect 
the macroeconomic and fiscal impacts of ageing.
3. Macroeconomic impacts
The following section quantifies the impact of demographic changes on the labour 
market, the consumption and savings ratio, asset prices, economic growth, the 
budget deficit and the presumed inflationary trend. For this exercise, we use the 
estimates found in the literature alongside the Eurostat (2014) population projection 
as our baseline scenario.
The estimates presented in the reviewed literature explain developments in 
macroeconomic variables with demographic variables (amongst other things). 
Using the coefficients associated with demographic variables used in the estimates, 
and using the Eurostat’s population projection (Eurostat 2014), we calculate the 
expected impacts of demographic processes on macroeconomic variables for 
Figure 4. 
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each European Union member state. For the sake of comparability, we apply two 
additional transformations to our results. As a first step, we took the average of 
the impacts for each decade and country. Then as a second step, we deducted the 
quantified average impact for the decade of the 2000s for the macroeconomic 
variable at issue for Hungary from the decade averages each country. This renders 
the calculated impacts comparable across both time and space. For Hungary, as 
the result of demographic processes, the expected changes in the macroeconomic 
variable at issue are presented. We therefore present the change induced by 
demographic processes compared to the average of the 2000–2009 period. The 
interpretation of impacts among the other European Union countries is similar; 
the consequences of demographic processes can be assessed compared to the 
decade of 2000–2009, and the demographic processes of specific countries on the 
macroeconomic indicator under review can be compared to the degree expected in 
Hungary. For the sake of transparency, we represent the impacts relevant to Hungary 
and – interpreted as the arithmetic average of the impacts affecting individual 
member states – the European Union. We also represent the band covering the 
minimum and maximum impact estimated for European Union member states.
Before presenting the results of our calculations, we must stress the uncertainty 
of the calculations. While the estimates found in the literature are generally 
crafted using observations of several countries and/or longer periods, their future 
projectability is limited because they are usually not based on deep parameters 
derived from theory, but on the historic covariance of data. Covariance observed 
in the past may change and the measured covariance may not necessarily signify 
causality, thus the customary “ceteris paribus” analysis could be misleading.6 
Demographic processes project changes on a scale never seen before, and that 
may question the calculations based on the projection of correlations measured 
in the past. First, impacts measured in the past (typically linear) were measured 
in a model framework that was suitable for adequately measuring the impacts in 
the context of the demographic variable values prevailing at the time. Second, 
significant demographic changes may also trigger adjustment processes that did 
not exist in the past, and so their impact could not be quantified. Third, in many 
cases our calculations are based on earlier estimates that analysed the impact of 
demographic processes on a specific macroeconomic indicator. For instance, there 
are separate estimates for developments in consumption, savings and investment 
ratios in function of demography, although these do not necessarily exhibit trends 
that are numerically comparable even though these macroeconomic indicators 
6  Applying the “ceteris paribus” assumption, that is, other things being equal, to projections spanning several 
decades could be particularly contentious. The expected substantial future change in demographic processes 
may compel changes, including the macroeconomic impacts addressed in the following section or potential 
modifications to social welfare systems, which may in and of themselves shape demographic processes and 
may also generate a knock-on effect on macroeconomic developments, which may invalidate calculations 
assuming all other things being equal.
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are linked by similarities. The potential consistency issue mentioned above does 
not affect the calculations using the outcomes of the general equilibrium model.
3.1. Labour market
Demographic processes have a direct impact on the supply side of the labour market. 
The Hungarian population aged 15 to 64 may shrink gradually from 6.7 million in 
2014 to 5 million by 2060 (Figure 5) based on Eurostat’s population projection 
(Eurostat 2014). The ratio of persons of working age within the total population 
may fall to 56% by 2060 from 68% in 2014. The impact may be less pronounced 
within the European Union as a whole, where the proportion of working age may 
shrink by 11% by 2060 compared to a 23% decline in Hungary. The ratio of persons 
of working age within the total population in EU member states may decrease at 
a slower rate, from 66% in 2014 to 57% by 2060. Meanwhile, the gradual ageing of 
persons of working age is also expected in Hungary. The average age of the active 
population has gradually been rising since the 1990s, a trend that may be broken 
after 2040 due to the age composition of immigrants and the grandchildren of the 
Ratkó generation reaching the inactive age.
The labour force participation rate – the ratio of economically active persons relative 
to persons of working age – may fundamentally shape developments in labour 
supply, alongside demographic processes. In the 15–64 age cohort, the labour 
Figure 5. 
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force participation rate is low in international comparison, despite the increased 
seen in recent years. Especially the labour force participation rates of career 
starters, persons before retirement age, unskilled workers and mothers with small 
children fall short of international averages. The adverse labour market impact of 
demographic processes may be partially offset by measures boosting the labour 
force participation rate and steps aimed at raising the effective retirement age in 
line with life expectancy.
3.2. consumption
Population ageing can also affect developments in the aggregate consumption 
and savings ratios, due to changes in life expectancy and age cohort proportions. 
According to the life-cycle theory, individuals’ average and marginal propensity to 
consume and save depends on their age. The consumption rate is higher and the 
savings ratio lower at younger and older ages compared to middle age. With the 
shift in age structure, the determinants of economic growth, including aggregate 
consumption and savings may change depending on the life cycle that the largest 
number of individuals find themselves in (Bloom at al. 2010).
The empirical findings of Erlandsen and Nymoen (2004) also corroborate the 
significant impact of the population’s age structure on aggregate consumption. In 
their regression model, the authors explain developments in the consumption rate 
with the proportion of the 50–66 age cohort within the total population, alongside 
macro variables (income, real interest rate). The 50–66 age cohort is highlighted in 
the study because they are on the cusp of retirement, therefore their propensity 
to save is much higher, while their propensity to consume is much lower compared 
to younger age cohorts, while their income is higher relative to other middle-aged 
cohorts.
The impact of demographic changes on consumption can also be estimated using 
the total dependency ratio according to the findings of Masson and Tryon (1990). 
The consumption rate of dependents relative to their income is characteristically 
higher compared to actively employed persons, therefore an increase in the total 
dependency ratio boosts consumption. In their study, Masson and Tryon (1990) 
apply a regression to model the logarithm of total consumption expenditure, in 
which the logarithm for real disposable income for the previous period, propensity 
to consume, the long-term real interest rate and changes in the logarithm of net 
GDP after taxes are also included as explanatory variables alongside the total 
dependency ratio. Estimates have confirmed the positive correlation between the 
total dependency ratio and consumption: a 1% increase in the total dependency 
ratio generates a 0.1 percentage point increase in the consumption rate (Masson 
and Tryon 1990).
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According to the above methods, using the Hungarian population projection as our 
basis, Hungary’s consumption rate could rise gradually in the decades following 
2030. Over a shorter horizon, the two calculations yield opposing impacts in terms 
of their sign, the difference in absolute terms only amounts to a few percentage 
points, meaning that neither version reflects a material change in the consumption 
rate in the upcoming decade and a half. The estimates of Erlandsen and Nymoen 
(2004) reveal that all other things being equal, the consumption rate could decline 
gradually compared to 2000–2009, by 3 percentage points up until the 2030s (Figure 
6, left-hand panel). Hungary’s slightly more unfavourable population projection 
presages a more pronounced decline relative to the European Union average. 
The reason for the discrepancy is that the grandchildren of the Ratkó generation 
will reach the 60s in the 2030s, which could go hand-in-hand with their gradual 
preparation for retirement. According to the model, consumption could return 
to the level prevailing before the 2000s starting from the 2040s following a 4 
percentage point slump.
Adapting the estimate of Masson and Tryon (1990) to Hungarian data, a progressive 
rise in the consumption rate can be observed (Figure 6, right-hand panel). This 
Figure 6. 
Estimated developments in the consumption rate in Hungary and the European 
union compared to 2000–2009 according to Erlandsen and Nymoen (2004) 
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stems from the gradual increase in the total dependency ratio, resulting in a rise 
in the propensity to consume based on the life-cycle theory. The discrepancy 
between the two outcomes may be due to the fact that the proportion of persons 
aged between 50 and 66 could increase less dynamically compared to the total 
dependency ratio during the period under review.
According to our projections based on the estimates of Masson and Tyron (1990), 
demographic processes in Hungary presage a lower consumption rate compared to 
European Union standards, but the changes in the Hungarian consumption rate may 
be on par with the European Union average. Looking ahead, demographic processes 
could exert the greatest impact on the consumption rate in the Mediterranean 
countries (GR, ES, PT) and the smallest impact in Luxembourg, Denmark and 
Sweden. According to the estimates of Erlandsen and Nymoen (2004), the smallest 
impact on the consumption rate is expected in Slovakia and Hungary, while the 
greatest impact is expected in the Baltic States (LV, LT) and Ireland.
3.3. Savings
Similar driving forces are at play in the relationship between the savings ratio 
and the composition of the population as between the consumption rate and the 
composition of the population. Beyond the fact that the savings and consumption 
rate are mutually complementary, the savings ratio and demographic processes can 
also be linked through the life-cycle theory: the consumption rate is higher and the 
savings ratio lower at younger and older ages compared to middle age.
Meredith (1995) captures the impact of demographic processes on savings using 
demographic dependency ratios. After reviewing the findings in the literature, the 
author concludes that the increase in both the young and old-age dependency ratio 
lowers the savings ratio. The life-cycle theory therefore prevails: there is no available 
income to set aside during the younger age, while the savings accumulated are 
used up during the older years, and thus the rise in the total dependency ratio has 
an adverse impact on the savings ratio. Although estimates deviate across a broad 
range, it can be determined that a rise in the old-age dependency ratio lowers the 
savings ratio to greater degree.
Also partly referencing the life-cycle theory, Lindh (1999) gives an estimate of the 
impact of changes in age cohort proportions on inflation, GDP growth, the savings 
ratio, and the investment ratio. In his model, the author divides the population into 
six groups (persons aged 0–14, 15–29, 30–49, 50–64, 65–74 and 75 and over) and 
uses this classification to explain, amongst other things, developments in the savings 
ratio. According to the findings, the size of the youngest age cohort and the cohort 
of persons aged 65 and over has a significant negative impact on the savings ratio.
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Applying the models of Meredith (1995) and Lindh (1999) to Hungary, the savings 
ratio could fall significantly as a result of demographic processes (Figure 7). In the 
case of the former, a ten percentage point decline can be forecast, all other things 
being equal (Figure 7, left-hand panel), while in the case of the latter, and even 
more drastic decline is observed (Figure 7, right-hand panel). The large discrepancy 
between the findings stems from the fact that in the case of Meredith (1995), we 
use the unweighted average of earlier estimates, which cushions our estimated 
result. In relation to the findings, it should be noted that the savings ratio in Hungary 
remains above the European Union average practically throughout the entire period 
based on both projections. This is due to the fact that demographic processes are 
unfolding somewhat differently in Western European countries, where population 
ageing is not accompanied by a significant decline in the population (due to higher 
immigration and fertility rates), and the young dependency ratio is higher across 
the forecast horizon compared to the Hungarian ratio, which exerts a more adverse 
impact on the savings ratio compared to Hungary.
Although our calculations for Hungary based on the estimates of Meredith (1995) 
are higher compared to the European Union average, they exhibit the same degree 
Figure 7. 
developments in the savings ratio in Hungary and the European union compared to 

























































































































































The macroeconomic impacts of demographic changes in Hungary
of change in the savings ratio. Mediterranean countries (GR, ES, PT) may exhibit the 
lowest savings ratios, while Denmark, Belgium and Luxembourg may exhibit the 
highest ratios, even after a significant drop. Our calculations based on the estimates 
of Lindh (1999) show a similar path: the savings ratio in Hungary could exceed the 
European Union average, but may decline significantly following a parallel trajectory. 
The sharpest decline in the savings ratio could materialise in the Mediterranean 
countries (GR, ES, PT) and the Baltic states (LT, LV, EE), while the smallest decline is 
expected in Belgium, Denmark and Luxembourg, in line with the calculations based 
on the estimates of Meredith (1995).
A comparison of calculations of consumption and savings ratios shows that 
although they are in line with theoretical considerations in terms of their overall 
direction (rising consumption and falling savings ratios), their rate of change differs. 
With regard to the fact that the extent of decrease in the savings ratio linked to 
demographic processes seems excessive, we consider calculations related to 
changes in the consumption rate to be more reliable.
In the literature, the link between ageing and investments attracts less scrutiny than 
the link between ageing and savings. According to the available findings, ageing 
could potentially have a greater impact on investments than on savings. Kim (2014) 
used the data of OECD countries to determine that a rising proportion of older 
persons within the population leads to a slowing in the capital stock growth rate, 
while the capital stock growth rate correlates positively with the potential GDP 
growth rate. In addition, there is a positive link between the proportion of the 
population of working age and the investment ratio, and a negative link between 
the investment ratio and dependency ratios. According to Kim’s regression outcomes 
(2014), demographic variables are more closely correlated with the investment ratio 
than with the savings ratio in OECD countries, and thus ageing could exert a greater 
impact on investments than on savings.
3.4. impact on asset prices
According to the life-cycle theory and the asset price meltdown hypothesis, 
demographic changes impact equilibrium real asset prices (in particular property 
prices), and households completely shed (deplete) their assets during their 
economically inactive life phases as consumption and savings behaviour changes 
(Börsch-Supan 2006). However, empirical observations somewhat contradict this 
theory, as research shows that while wealth shrinks substantially, accumulated 
assets are not entirely depleted thanks to the impacts of inheritance and prudence 
(Mosolygó 2009). According to the life-cycle theory, the rising old-age dependency 
ratio and continuously declining population exert a demand-side impact on asset 
prices. According to the theory, in terms of the impact on property prices, the 
population’s age distribution is the most decisive factor, with significant differences 
in property ownership among age groups. In his study, Takáts (2012) uses a panel 
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regression (22 countries, sample between 1970 and 2009) to investigate the 
impact of demographic processes on inflation and finds that the outcomes show 
a significant negative impact of the old-age dependency ratio and the change in 
the overall population on property prices.
Figure 8 illustrates that the historical average remained in the negative range 
for the European Union; therefore, with the exception of a few individual cases, 
demographic processes lowered property prices in the majority of member states. 
This tendency is set to gain momentum between 2011 and 2060, which could exert 
significant downward pressure on property prices, particularly in South-Eastern 
Europe. This is due to the fact that in these countries, the drastic ageing of the 
population is expected to be coupled with a greater population decrease than 
in Western Europe. Hungary may witness a sharp drop in property prices in the 
upcoming decades compared to the European Union average.
Figure 8. 
Average annual impact of demographic processes on property prices in Hungary and 
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Note: AT=Austria, BE=Belgium, BG=Bulgaria, CY=Cyprus, CZ=Czech Republic, DE=Germany, DK=Den-
mark, EE=Estonia, ES=Spain, FI=Finland FR=France, GR=Greece, HR=Croatia, HU=Hungary, IE=Ireland, 
IT=Italy, LT=Lithuania, LU=Luxembourg, LV=Latvia, MT=Malta, NL=Netherlands, PL=Poland, PT=Portu-
gal, RO=Romania, SE=Sweden, SK=Slovakia, SL=Slovenia, UK=United Kingdom.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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There is no broad consensus among researchers regarding the impact of 
demographic processes on financial asset prices. According to Mosolygó (2009), the 
underlying cause of the moderate impact identified in empirical studies is mainly the 
fact that demographic processes unfold slowly, and the mechanisms of globalised 
money and capital markets may cushion their impact (flows of money and capital 
from low-yield markets to higher yield ones) and international migration flows may 
mitigate the fundamental issue.
The literature broadly examines the changes in the allocation of savings by various 
age cohorts. Empirical observations show that the preponderance of equities within 
the portfolio is characteristic of younger and economically active age cohorts, while 
the emphasis shifts to bonds and deposit-type assets among older cohorts, as 
risk appetite varies by age (Bergantino 1998). The increase in the weight of older 
generations could therefore alter the relative price of financial assets: demand for 
higher risk assets may fall while demand for safer assets may rise, which could entail 
a rise in the relative price of safer assets compared to riskier ones.
3.5. inflation
According to the life-cycle theory, net consuming cohorts (persons of non-working 
age, the elderly) may exert an inflationary impact on the economy, while net 
savers (persons of working age) may exert an opposite impact. Considering similar 
demographic processes are expected all over the developed economies, the 
above mentioned effect can occur in several countries among others in Hungary 
as well. The economically active population, besides creating assets for the entire 
population, consumes less income on the demand side due to its greater marginal 
propensity to save. By contrast, the economically inactive population is by definition 
not present on the supply side: its income originates from earlier periods or other 
transfers and it generally consumes its income, thereby creating demand and 
indirectly, inflationary pressure. In addition, the declining population may lower 
the relative price level through property prices (Anderson et al. 2014). According 
to Juselius and Takáts (2014), the inflationary impact of demographic processes 
is expressed through the equilibrium real interest rate. In their study, the authors 
establish that during periods of demographic expansion, less savings are available 
in the economy, which raises the real interest rate, and vice versa. The study of 
the causality link between demography and inflation is even less advanced than 
for growth impacts. Based on the studies by Juselius and Takáts (2014) and Lindh 
and Malmberg (1998), demographic processes may have a significant impact on 
inflationary developments. On a closer horizon, both estimates show a weaker 
inflationary impact compared to the current level. The estimate of Lindh and 
Malmberg (1998) forecasts extraordinary disinflationary pressure for the period 
following 2030, especially in Mediterranean countries (ES, PT, GR, IT). The order 
of magnitude of this disinflationary impact, however, can be called into question 
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in this case as well. Granted, the projection based on the estimates of Juselius and 
Takáts (2014) presages impacts of more plausible degree over longer horizons as 
well (Figure 9).
3.6. Economic growth
The population’s changing age composition also affects economic performance. 
Demographic change exerts an impact on both demand and supply side: the 
demand side is affected through consumption and savings as discussed above, 
as well as the fiscal channel, while the supply side affects economic performance 
through the labour market, capital accumulation, and productivity channels.
At the same time, demographic changes raise the broader issue of measuring 
economic performance. In the case of rapidly ageing populations, real GDP as an 
economic indicator is not the best gauge, and a temporal comparison of GDP growth 
could be misleading. While the impacts of ageing may be mitigated by increasing 
productivity, real GDP, GDP per capita or GDP growth calculated for economically 
active cohorts could yield a different picture. As a result, growth in GDP per capita 
Figure 9. 
Estimated impact of demographic changes on inflation in the European union and in 
Hungary based on Lindh and Malmberg (1998) (left-hand figure) and Juselius and 












































































































































The macroeconomic impacts of demographic changes in Hungary
could be a more accurate reflection of the rise in living standards, and GDP per 
working-age person could be a better indicator of sustainable development.
In the following section, we examine the impacts of demographic processes on 
economic performance using four different approaches. Firstly, we determine the 
expected impacts based on what is referred to as growth accounting. This approach 
deducts expected growth effects from the potentially available labour supply, 
i.e. developments in the size of the working age population and the number of 
dependents. The production function used as the second method follows a similar 
approach, linking growth effects to developments in labour supply and the total 
population. Thirdly, we use the findings of general equilibrium model. The advantage 
of the general equilibrium approach is that it takes into consideration the series of 
adjustments induced by demographic processes when quantifying impacts. Finally, 
we give an estimate of the expected growth impacts on the basis of earlier empirical 
work scrutinising the correlations between growth and demography.
3.6.1. Growth accounting approach
The per capita GDP growth rate can be broken down into output growth per worker 
and developments in the ratio of active workers within the population. Population 
ageing – assuming unchanged age-specific behaviour – could lower the labour 
supply and the savings ratio by decreasing the proportion of persons of working age 
within the population, thus yielding lower economic growth. Using this subdivision, 
Bloom et al. (2010) found that OECD country economies would have only grown by 
2.1% instead of 2.8% between 1960 in 2005 if demographic processes would have 
followed the trajectory estimated for the upcoming decades.
This subdivision of output implicitly assumes that value added can only be created 
through labour. Ludwig (2005) expresses output as a function of aggregate 
productivity, labour supply and capital stock, based on which a reduction in the 
size of the working age population results, ceteris paribus, in a decrease in GDP. 
Economic downturn can be avoided by increasing productivity, the employment rate 
or capital stock (Ludwig 2005). The author argues that it is warranted to examine 
per capita variables, as falling output is distributed between increasingly fewer 
individuals.
3.6.2. Production function-based approach
Demographic forecasts point to an accelerating decline in the population and 
a decreasing proportion of working age population. The increasing rate of decrease 
of the working age population – alongside an unchanged labour force participation 
rate, technological progress and capital accumulation – suggests slowing growth, 
all other things being equal. Assuming the Cobb–Douglas production function and 
the customary two-thirds work ratio, it is evident that demographic processes 
made a positive growth contribution between 1980 and 1999, while a nearly 0.5 
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percentage point slowdown in growth can be demonstrated after 2000 due to the 
declining number of persons of working age. The per capita slowdown in growth 
could be even greater (0.6–0.7 percentage points), due to the continuous rise in the 
inactivity rate. As the grandchildren of the Ratkó generation become economically 
inactive, the slowdown in growth in the 2040s could be even greater than the 
European Union average (Figure 10). The slowdown in growth is expected to exceed 
Hungary’s figure in three countries, Slovakia, Poland and Bulgaria. 
The adverse growth impacts presented above assume an unchanged labour force 
participation rate. The rise in life expectancy – alongside an unchanged activity rate 
– could mitigate the growth losses if the number of years for which an individual is 
economically active increases at the same rate. The calculations of the European 
Commission’s working group responsible for analysing population ageing (AWG- 
Ageing Working Group) attribute a growth effect of a similar degree to demographic 
processes (EC 2012). According to the AWG’s calculations, total hours worked could 
decrease each year by 0.1% between 2010-2020, by 0.2% between 2021 and2040 
and by 0.9% between 2041 and 2060. Due mainly to the lower total hours worked 
and the increasing proportion of economically inactive persons, the potential 
Figure 10. 
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growth per person could be 0.7 percentage points lower between 2041 and 2060 
than in 2021–2030 (1.3% compared to 2.0%).
The limitations of calculations based on the production function reside in their 
inability to factor in the other economic impact of restructuring among generations. 
In addition, demographic processes may also affect capital accumulation and 
productivity (technological progress). Earlier findings reveal that demographic 
processes are expected to lower the savings and the investment ratio, eroding 
the contribution of capital accumulation to growth. Population ageing may 
erode innovation potential, as this is a characteristic of younger generations and 
younger cohorts also have greater risk appetite. These factors may lower the rate 
of improvement in productivity. At the same time, the rising average age of the 
economically active population and greater accumulated professional experience 
may boost productivity until 2040.
3.6.3. Model-based approach
A more differentiated view of the growth effect of demographic processes can be 
obtained nuanced using the correct general equilibrium approach. The overlapping 
generations model (OLG) proposed by Fougere and Merette (1998) also factors 
in generational transfers. According to basic simulations performed for OECD 
countries, with the results from Japan and Italy also applicable to Hungary, based 
on their similar demographic processes, demographic processes are expected to 
lower per capita growth by 0.4 percentage points between 2010–2050. As a result, 
GDP per capita could be nearly 30% lower around 2050 than in the absence of 
population ageing. The authors also scrutinise the impact of demographic effects in 
the context of a model framework expanded to include human capital. In this case, 
due to life expectancy, increasing human capital over a longer life phase generates 
higher income, and therefore the growth sacrifice of demographic processes may 
be smaller, thanks to the improving productivity stemming from higher human 
capital, which may even fully offset the growth losses defined in the basic simulation 
(Fougere and Merette 1998).
According to the life-cycle model-based calculations of McMorrow and Roeger 
(1999) for the European Union, the USA, and Japan, population ageing may lower 
per capita growth by 0.4 percentage points between 2000 and 2050 in the European 
Union, by 0.5 percentage points in Japan and by 0.2 percentage points in the USA. 
Given that Hungarian demographic processes are expected to be similar to those 
of the EU and Japan, a 0.4–0.5 percentage point decline in per capita GDP growth 
could also hold true for Hungary.
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Börsch-Supan et al. (2014) examine the impact of ageing on growth by applying the 
overlapping generations model to three Western European countries.7 Assuming 
unchanged age-specific and gender-specific labour force participation rates, the 
authors conclude that an expected 20% decline in the proportion of active workers 
within the population could lower GDP per capita by 15% and consumption per 
capita by 10% by 2050, relative to 2005. The decline in consumption falls short of 
the decline in the proportion of economically active persons, as declining labour 
could be partially replaced by supplementary capital.
3.6.4. Regression results
In addition to the production function and model simulation-based approaches, 
growth effects can also be estimated using regression results. Bloom and Canning 
(2004) examine the data of 75 countries between 1960 and 1995 and conclude that 
demographic variables (life expectancy, proportion of working-age persons within 
the population) exert a significant and positive impact on the per capita GDP growth 
rate. Longer life expectancy is presumably coupled with better health, which could 
7  France, Germany, Italy.
Figure 11. 
Estimated change in Hungarian economic growth compared to 2000–2009, based on 
Prskawetz et al. (2007) for output per working-age person (left-hand figure) and 
output per capita (right-hand figure)





























































































































































The macroeconomic impacts of demographic changes in Hungary
boost GDP per capita through higher labour productivity. The proportion of working-
age persons within labour supply could drive potential output from the supply side.
Using the estimates of Lindh and Malmberg (2007) for Norway, which are based 
on a detailed breakdown by age group, developments in the composition of 
the Hungarian population will not significantly influence per capita growth. It is 
important to note that the estimate uses the proportion of age groups as the 
explanatory variable, rather than their absolute size. Consequently, it is unable to 
factor in the general decline in the size of age groups.
The estimates of Prskawetz et al. (2007) for India control for developments in the 
young and old-age dependency ratio and the size of the population. Based on their 
parameters, the growth rate per working-age person compared to the 2000s could 
decline by more than 1 percentage point, while per capita growth could decline by 
two percentage points in 2000–2060.
Using the estimates of Bloom et al. (2007), in the coming decades the GDP growth 
rate could gradually decline by 0.2 or 0.3 percentage points compared to 2000-
2009. No growth loss is expected at the beginning of the period until 2020, after 
Figure 12. 
Estimated change in GdP growth in the European union and in Hungary (left-hand 
figure) and per capita growth (right-hand figure) compared to 2000–2009, based on 
Bloom et al. (2007 and 2010)
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which point a gradual decline in GDP growth is expected. The estimate of Bloom 
et al. (2010) factors in the proportion of the working-age population and the 
developments in its size. Based on these findings, the per capita growth rate in 
the European Union gradually declines by approximately 0.8–1 percentage points 
compared to 2000-2009.
Based on a review of growth impacts, the majority of estimates point to deceleration 
in per capita GDP growth. The extent of the impact tends to increase over longer 
horizons. Compared to the 2000–2009 period, per capita GDP growth may 
decrease by 0.5–1 percentage point in the coming decades as a result demographic 
effects. The estimate of Bloom et al. (2010) projects a larger decline, as the model 
incorporates the impact of life expectancy. At the same time, the estimates yielding 
a stronger slowdown typically ignore the larger capital accumulation stemming from 
life expectancy and the ensuing extension in the years spent working. Accordingly, 
the expected degree of impact will probably be in the upper half of the range.
3.7. Fiscal impacts
Changes in the population’s age composition could have direct and indirect impacts 
on the fiscal balance. As a direct expenditure side impact, pension expenditures 
and healthcare expenditures in Hungary may jointly exceed their 2010 value by 
2.8% of GDP in 2060, based on the AWG forecast (EC 2012). On the revenue side, 
assuming an unchanged regulatory environment and labour force participation rate, 
the shrinking working-age population could result in declining revenues related to 
wages. A dual pressure on the social security system may emerge, as shrinking social 
contribution revenues resulting from demographic processes will have to fund social 
security benefits payable to an increasing number of beneficiaries.
3.7.1. Pension expenditures
Pension expenditures are one of the major expenditure items for Hungary’s central 
budget. In Hungary’s pay-as-you-go pension system, the current social contributions 
of economically active persons fund retirement provisions for the elderly.8 The 
rate of public pension expenditures simultaneously depends on several factors, 
including pension system parameters (retirement age, service period, replacement 
ratio of new pensions, indexation of pension benefits) and the development of 
demographic trends. In European countries featuring higher old-age dependency 
ratios, public pension expenditures relative to GDP are generally higher (Figure 13). 
This statically shows that, if no measures are taken, adverse demographic trends 
(shrinking proportion of working-age persons and growing proportion of persons 
aged 65 and older) could result in a rise in the pension budget deficit.
8  This applies to the old-age type pension benefits paid from the Pension Insurance Fund as of 2012. Early-
retirement benefits funded from the central budget are covered by the general budgetary tax revenues. 
A significant share of disability and rehabilitation benefits reclassified to the Health Insurance Fund was 
funded from central budget subsidies in 2012–2014.
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Population ageing points toward an increase in spending in the long run, based 
on the decomposition of pension expenditures. According to the forecast in the 
AWG report, pension expenditures relative to GDP could rise from 11.9% in 
2010 to 13.6% by 2060 in Hungary (EC 2012), with this increase in expenditures 
slightly exceeding the average figure estimated for European Union countries (1.2 
percentage points). The change in the old-age dependency ratio contributes the 
most to rising expenditures. The strongest demographic impact could occur in the 
2010s and 2040s as the Ratkó generations enter retirement.
The impact of ageing may be partly offset by measures affecting the pension system. 
The official retirement age will increase gradually from 62 to 65 between 2014 
and 2022. Alongside the increase in the retirement age, stricter rules for early 
retirement and disability pension benefits will also result in a rise in the effective 
retirement age. These factors could result in a decline in the ratio of recipients 
of pension and pension-like benefits to the number of people over the age of 
65 from 176% in 2010 to 122% by 2060 (EC 2012). The decreasing proportion of 
beneficiaries could reduce pension expenditures to the greatest extent in the 2010s. 
Changes in the rules of indexation also support the sustainability of the pension 
system. A purely inflation-indexed pension increase rule has been in effect since 
2012, on the basis of which at the start of the year the usual indexation of benefits 
Figure 13.
 Public pension expenditures relative to GdP and the old-age dependency ratio in 
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Note: Hungarian data on pension expenditures in 2014 as a percentage of GDP, MNB forecast.
Source: Eurostat, EC (2012), MNB.
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already determined follows the rate of inflation planned in the Budget Act. The rule 
ensures the preservation of the real value of pensions, while in case of economic 
growth, the indexation falling short of the rate of nominal GDP enables expenditure 
savings in the budget relative to GDP from one fiscal year to the next. On the whole, 
pension expenditures may have decreased by 0.6% of GDP from 2013 to 2014, as 
the joint impact of measures affecting the number of beneficiaries (for instance the 
increase in retirement age effective from 2014) and the rules of indexation (Figure 
14). According to the pension projection of AWG, GDP-proportionate pension 
expenditures can further decrease (by 2030 to 10.4 % of GDP), therefore in the 
next 20–25 years, no imbalances are expected to occur in the Hungarian pension 
system. The impact of population ageing on the pension system may accelerate 
during the 2040s in particular, as the Ratkó grandchildren enter retirement.
Figure 14. 
developments in pension and pension-type benefit expenditures between 2001 in 
2014 in Hungary









































































Pensions and pension-type expenditures
Note: The data for 2001-2011 present the pension-type benefit expenditures on the basis of the bills on 
the execution of the budget of Hungary, which do not correspond to the accounting system categories 
introduced from January 2012. Since 2012, the “old-age benefits” category includes old-age type 
benefits above the retirement age, disability benefits above the retirement age, service-dependent 
pension benefits available to women with 40 years of service time and survivors’ benefits. The data for 
2012 and 2013 present the data from the bills on budget execution for the years 2012 and 2013. The 
figures for 2014 present our current forecast. The nominal GDP time series is based on the ESA-2010 
methodology.
Source: MNB calculation, bills on the execution of the budget of Hungary.
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3.7.2. Healthcare expenditures
The rise in life expectancy and the proportion of older persons within the population 
may also entail a gradual increase in healthcare expenditures based on the age 
profile of per capita healthcare expenditure. According to the forecast in the AWG 
report, public healthcare expenditures could rise from 5% of GDP in 2010 to 6.1% 
by 2060 in Hungary (EC 2012). In the version quantifying the impact of demographic 
changes,9 a 1.5 percentage point increase in spending is expected between 2010 
and 2060, based on the AWG report. The expenditure increase in Hungary stemming 
from ageing may slightly exceed the 1.3 percentage point average increase estimated 
for the European Union member states, but the overall level of expenditures 
could remain well below the European Union average. Longer life expectancy will 
presumably increase demand for healthcare services, which are concentrated for the 
most part among the older segments of the population. Based on the age profile of 
per capita expenditures, healthcare expenditures over the age of 50 already exceed 
the unit value valid for the total Hungarian population, and per capita expenditure 
over the age of 65 is more than twice the population average (Figure 15). The level 
9  The version quantifying the impact of demographic changes assumes that rising life expectancy will not 
increase the number of years spent in good health. In the reference version of the AWG report, public 
healthcare expenditures rise by 1.1 percentage point to 6.1% of GDP, as the version assumes that the half 
of the increased life expectancy will be spent in good health.
Figure 15. 
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Note: Average expenditure per capita in 2012, as a percentage.
Source: MNB (2013).
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of public healthcare spending could be more favourable than estimated if increasing 
life expectancy coincides with a rise in the number of years spent in good health. At 
the same time, the majority of risks points towards a higher expenditure level: lower 
healthcare professional wages compared to the European average, convergence 
to the standard of care prevailing in more developed countries, and technological 
progress may require higher expenditures (EC 2012).
Several studies in the international literature10 argue that higher life expectancy and 
population ageing only contributed slightly to the rise in healthcare expenditures 
observed over the past decades, and therefore future changes in the population’s 
age composition will not entail a significant rise in healthcare costs. The past rise in 
public healthcare expenditures was driven by technological progress, higher income 
levels and the expansion of health insurance (Breyer et al. 2010; Felder 2013). As 
healthcare expenditures are characteristically concentrated over the last years of 
a person’s life, population ageing does not necessarily increase expenditures, but 
could even delay them if it coincides with an increase in the number of years spent 
in good health.
3.8. Monetary policy implications
As opposed to the customary economic shocks, demographic processes typically 
exert their impact over the longer run. Therefore demographic processes are 
primarily not shocks that need to be accommodated on the horizon of monetary 
policy. Nonetheless, demographic processes may gradually impact the value of key 
variables relevant for the conduct of monetary policy, as well as the effectiveness of 
transmission channels. For instance, they may affect the equilibrium interest rate 
by changing the consumption and savings ratio. As discussed above, demographic 
processes presumably lower both the savings and the investment ratio. At the 
same time, the sign of their effect is not straightforward, although there is a greater 
chance of a more pronounced decline in the investment ratio, resulting in a lower 
equilibrium interest rate in the longer run. We also discussed the potential impact 
of demographic processes on the degree of inflationary pressure. According to 
our calculations, disinflationary impacts may be predominant in the upcoming 
one to two decades. The lower equilibrium interest rate and the disinflationary 
pressure may erode the effectiveness of traditional interest rate policy, as monetary 
policy is more likely to meet the zero lower bound in this context. As a result, the 
value of new monetary policy instruments may increase compared to less effective 
traditional monetary policy instruments.
In terms of transmission channels, the wealth effect may increase as a result of 
demographic changes. Cohorts may accumulate greater wealth by old-age as 
a result of longer life expectancy, rendering consumption more sensitive to changes 
10  For instance Breyer et al. (2010).
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in interest rates. The role of stable inflation may gain value, especially if savings 
are channelled into long-term assets (pension savings), as inflation diverging from 
the expected rate could erode the purchasing power of savings. Preparing for 
retirement may be facilitated by a development in the securities market for long-
term savings. The monetary authority can ensure the smooth functioning of this 
market by expanding its competence, applying adequate regulation, and fulfilling 
its supervisory functions.
In light of the foregoing, it is necessary to continuously monitor the macroeconomic 
impacts of demographic processes and to assess how the induced changes shape 
monetary transmission, in order to adequately conduct monetary policy.
4. Ageing societies: challenges and opportunities
4.1. Economic policy challenges
The expected change in the population’s size and age composition will create 
significant challenges for society and economic policy. Population ageing may 
already accelerate in Hungary in the upcoming years as the Ratkó generation 
enters retirement, and thus the shrinking size of the working-age population, the 
slowing growth rate, and decreasing savings ratio may already create a challenge 
for economic policy-making in the near term. In addition, maintaining fiscal 
stability could also prove challenging as population ageing may result in a rise in 
the proportion of expenditure items sensitive to demographic change (such as 
pension expenditures, healthcare expenditures, social care).
Economic policy may spur economically active persons to remain actively employed 
throughout a longer career path through the tax and pension system, which could 
offset the adverse impact of demographic processes on labour supply and the fiscal 
balance. One possible tool for achieving this is to approach the effective and the 
statutory retirement age, or to gradually raise the statutory old-age retirement age 
in line with the increase in life expectancy, as already adopted by several western 
European countries (including Denmark and Italy).11 Another solution could be to 
introduce more flexible retirement rules, which act as an incentive for continuing 
work beyond retirement age. Longer career paths simultaneously improve both 
the sustainability and adequacy of pension systems (Schwan–Sail 2013). Measures 
aiming to increase the number of economically active years could achieve success 
if they go hand-in-hand with increased demand for those remaining on the labour 
market.
11  It should be noted that the declared objective of the second, capital coverage pillar introduced in 1998 
was to mitigate the long-term fiscal burden arising from demographic processes, but the contribution 
revenues thus removed from the pay-as-you-go state pension system were so substantial that the reform 
was undone in 2011.
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Further increasing the labour force participation rate could help mitigate the 
adverse impacts of population ageing. As a result of economic policy responses 
to demographic changes (raising the statutory retirement age, measures affecting 
the number of pension beneficiaries), the decline in the economically active 
population could fall short of the rate determined by demographic processes. At 
the same time, a further rise in the labour force participation rate, which remains 
low by international standards, could drive a further increase in the number of 
employed persons.12 Fostering labour market participation in the long run may call 
for increasing certain budgetary expenditures: for instance, increasing healthcare 
expenditures could foster the continued employment of individuals beyond 
retirement age, and spending on education could also boost the probability of 
labour market activity. The employment rate of persons with higher education 
levels is characteristically higher in older age (IMF 2014); thus, (further) education 
of unskilled workers could improve their employment. Promoting lifelong learning 
may also boost employment within older age groups. In addition, economic policy 
can also foster preparation for old-age by incentivising savings and supporting early-
start savings.
The migration trends observed in recent years could have a negative impact on the 
demographic situation, especially since emigration from Hungary is concentred 
in more educated groups aged between 20 and 45 (Bodnár–Szabó 2014; SEEMIG 
2014). Moreover, emigration may erode productivity and induce inflationary 
pressure through increasing labour market tightness. In the absence of accurate 
data on the emigrated Hungarian population, their potential return is difficult to 
forecast, and so it is important to prevent and reverse excessive migration. When 
emigrants return home, they may contribute to economic development with their 
experience acquired abroad (what is referred to as the ‘brain gain’). The various 
population projections assume that international net migration in Hungary will 
remain positive across the entire projection horizon, in other words that Hungary 
will be destination country in terms of migration.
Finally, economic policy can also foster an improvement in demographic trends by 
promoting the birth rate, albeit this can only yield a result over a horizon of several 
decades, and may thus temporarily increase the younger and the total dependency 
ratio. It is essential that as a result of economic policy measures the birth rate 
increase over the long term, instead of in the form of one-off demographic booms, 
such as the Ratkó generation, as such developments could put pressure on the 
educational and pension system.
12  The expansion of the public employment scheme contributed to the rise in the labour force participation 
rate, alongside the reform of the labour market contributions system. Over the long run, it is important 
to ensure the greatest possible opportunities for public employment scheme participants to find work on 
the primary labour market. Developing the skills and increasing the mobility of these participants may 
help in attaining this objective.
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4.2. Behavioural impacts
Besides the pivotal role of economic policy, a change in the behaviour of 
economic agents, i.e. adjustment, may also play a role in cushioning the negative 
macroeconomic impacts of ageing. The macroeconomics, fiscal and monetary 
impacts of ageing may be overstated if we do not factor in the autonomous 
response of individuals to the changed demographic environment.
Labour market
Better health and longer life expectancy could increase labour productivity and 
result in individuals working longer than earlier generations. A longer active career 
path enables higher consumption and yields a higher income level alongside the 
same savings ratio. Furthermore, the falling fertility rate could boost women’s labour 
force participation rate, which is low by international standards, and thus result in 
higher labour supply. Certain economies may respond to labour shortages stemming 
from ageing by gradually increasing their capital/labour ratio: corporations may 
invest in assets that boost labour productivity.
Savings and consumption
A behavioural impact to counter the decline in savings due to ageing may consist 
of higher savings by individuals during their economically active years to prepare 
for longer life expectancy (retirement plans) in an effort to maintain their living 
standards. Accordingly, Bloom et al. (2003) argue that the increase in life expectancy 
is usually coupled with a higher savings ratio. There is consensus that consumption 
is on the rise as a result of ageing (Erlandsen–Nymoen 2004; Masson–Tryon 1990). 
Increased productivity on the one hand and the promotion of savings on the other 
hand could help cushion the slowdown in GDP growth.
Economic growth
The change in age structure may also impact economic growth through human 
capital investment. The decline in the fertility rate observed in past decades has 
improved education levels: parents are presumably able to spend more per child 
with fewer children. According to Lee and Mason (2010), the productivity of the 
various age groups is also relevant in addition to the population’s age distribution. If 
large, less productive cohorts are replaced by fewer, but more productive workers, 
standards of living may even increase (Lee–Mason 2010).
Another aspect is that the rising proportion of older persons within the population 
does not necessarily represent a burden for the economy and society. As the 
years spent in good health increase, individuals can continue working in a more 
productive manner. In terms of the fiscal balance, if the rise in life expectancy is 
paired with a rise in the number of years spent in good health, the higher ratio of 
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elderly within the population does not necessarily incur higher expenditures for the 
healthcare system. In addition, older persons often help out around the house and 
in childcare, and also provide financial support to younger generations.
At the same time, behavioural impacts may be substantively shaped by incentives 
such as the labour market and the institutional environment (e.g. the pension 
system). These could interact with demographic changes and yield diverging results 
from one country to the next (Bloom et al. 2010).
4.3. Opportunities
Population ageing may also spur demand for certain goods and services, or create 
new demand. Areas include demand for health preservation and healing. Demand 
for health preservation can take on various forms: healthy nutrition (across the 
entire food industry fruit and vegetable production, milk and meat industry, artisan 
and organic goods), healthy lifestyle (exercise, sports, health tourism, recreation), 
healthy living environments (construction, environmental protection, green energy 
industries). Greater demand for healing services could, over and above the direct 
impacts, also spur demand for healthcare training and medical technology. Health 
preservation and healing services and goods could also create a market with export 
capacity given the fact that European demographic processes will also bolster 
external demand for them. In addition, ageing generations may also increase 
demand for in-home services (home care, maintenance and repair services) or 
even create new demand for smart homes.
Rising life expectancy also increases demand for education. During a long lifespan, 
acquiring high value added know-how is even more profitable. This could boost 
demand for higher education courses and put greater emphasis on knowledge-
intensive industries and R&D. For older persons, demand could grow for training 
courses aimed at spending time usefully or enabling activities generating 
supplementary income.
5. conclusion
Hungary’s population has been continuously shrinking since the 1990s. In addition 
to the decreasing population, the demographic processes are also characterised 
by population ageing. Declining birth rates and the gradual rise in life expectancy, 
although they fall short of the European Union average, will result in the proportion 
of persons aged 65 and older accounting for an increasingly large portion of the total 
population. In the upcoming decades, the ageing of the Hungarian and European 
population is expected to continue based on population projections, and the 
speed of ageing may accelerate. Population ageing results in a rise in the old-age 
dependency ratio, which could create a host of challenges for economic policy due 
to its fiscal impacts and its macroeconomic impacts. Population ageing may already 
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accelerate in Hungary in the coming years, mainly during the 2040s as the so-
called Ratkó's grandchildren generation enters retirement. Thus, preparing for these 
demographic changes may already create a challenge for economic policy-making 
in the near future. Further fostering the birth rate will be the other key challenge. 
The population projections capturing expected developments in demographic 
processes assume a continuously rising fertility rate. If this does not materialise, 
the demographic and partly macroeconomic impacts discussed above may follow 
a more unfavourable path.
Based on the available projections, demographic processes may significantly 
decrease labour market supply in the coming decades. The Hungarian population 
aged 15 to 64 may shrink gradually from 6.7 million in 2014 to 5 million by 2060 
based on the Eurostats’a population projection (2014). The labour supply of the 
shrinking working-age population may be boosted by the rising labour force 
participation rate, which nonetheless is relatively low in international comparison.
We quantified the impacts of demographic processes on the main macroeconomic 
variables using the estimates found in the literature. Although the estimates 
used are based on the data of decades shaped by more favourable demographic 
processes than the ones forecast for the future, the calculations do serve as 
a warning. According to our current knowledge, demographic processes are 
expected to significantly shape the development of key macroeconomic variables.
Based on these calculations, the consumption rate may rise and the savings ratio 
may decline in the coming decades, driven by the demographic processes. Per 
capita growth could gradually decline by 0.5 to 1 percentage point. Changes in the 
population’s age composition could result in lower inflationary pressure compared 
to the past decade. Changes in the population’s age composition could exert impact 
on the fiscal balance. Population ageing points towards rising pension expenditures 
and healthcare expenditures due to the higher life expectancy and the rising 
proportion of older persons within the population.
Population ageing may gradually change the value of key variables relevant 
to the conduct of monetary policy and may also influence the effectiveness of 
transmission channels. Looking forward, the equilibrium interest rate may decrease 
and inflationary pressure may become subdued. These two factors may erode the 
effectiveness of traditional interest rate policy, as monetary policy is more likely to 
meet the zero lower bound in this context. As a result, new instruments may become 
more valuable as compared to less effective traditional monetary policy instruments. 
Demographic processes may also affect the functioning of transmission channels. The 
market for long-term securities may increase as a result of higher life expectancy. The 
monetary authority can ensure the smooth functioning of this market by expanding 
its competence, applying adequate regulation and fulfilling its supervisory functions.
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The adverse economic impacts of demographic processes can be cushioned with 
economic policy measures. For instance, economic policy may spur economically 
active persons to remain actively employed throughout a longer career path through 
the tax and pension system, and raising the effective retirement age could mitigate 
the increase in pension expenditures. Preserving and increasing Hungary’s human 
capital will be an important task, which involves reversing the current unfavourable 
migration trends and attracting returning migrant workers, coupled with providing 
high standard education. Over the longer run, fostering the birth rate could also 
help improve demographic trends.
Besides the pivotal role of economic policy, adjustments in the behaviour of 
economic agents may also play a role in cushioning the macroeconomic impacts 
of ageing. Better health and longer life expectancy may increase labour productivity 
and extend the number of years spent on the labour market. Preparing for a longer 
retirement may foster higher savings, which could fuel the market for long-term 
securities. Longer life expectancy renders human capital investments even more 
profitable, which could boost productivity and innovative capacity.
Population ageing also represents economic opportunities which can be taken 
advantage of. Demand for certain goods and services may increase, and completely 
new demand might emerge. Areas include demand for health preservation and 
healing, a market with export capacity. Demand for education may also rise, 
fostering a shift in economic structure towards knowledge-intensive industries 
and R&D.
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Appendix: A comparison of Hungarian population projections
The population projections prepared by various institutions exhibit slight 
discrepancies, but presage similar demographic processes. Each projection assumes 
population ageing and thus a further rise in the old-age dependency ratio (Figure 
16). When presenting demographic processes and quantifying macroeconomic 
impacts, we consider the Eurostat (2014) population projection, comparable on 
the European Union level, as the baseline scenario. In addition, two additional 
projections are available with respect to Hungary: the projection prepared by the 
Hungarian Demographic Research Institute of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
(CSO HDRI) and the World Bank.
The CSO HDRI’s population projection presents the expected future developments in 
the size and composition of the Hungarian population. The projection baseline refers 
to the population structure prevailing at the time of preparation of the projection, 
and the future developments in the population are shaped by the assumptions on 
fertility rates, mortality rates and international net migration figures. The population 
projection presents three alternative scenarios (low, main and high variant). The 
main scenario assumes that in 2060, the fertility rate may stand at 1.6 alongside 
higher life expectancy and the net international net migration figure may stand at 
10,000 individuals. As a result, the Hungarian population could shrink to 8 million 
by 2060, which is 1 million less than the population figure presented by the Eurostat 
(2014) as the baseline. The discrepancy may stem from a combination of lower life 
expectancy (80 years for men in 2060), lower fertility and the smaller immigration 
inflows. The slower increase in the young dependency ratio may be linked to the 
lower fertility rate (Figure 16).
The World Bank’s population projection presages slightly more favourable 
demographic processes compared to the findings of the CSO HDRI (2013) and 
Eurostat (2014). The World Bank projects developments in the populations of nearly 
200 countries until 2050 for 5-year periods across the projection horizon, and uses 
2010 census data as the projection baseline. The assumptions made in the World 
Bank’s projection with respect to Hungary differ from the above to projections 
mainly in the area of net migration, as the total horizon assumes substantial net 
migration of 75,000 individuals per year. The old-age dependency ratio resulting 
from the projection is also lower compared to the other two projections.
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Figure 16. 
dependency ratio projections for Hungary
2010-2060
World Bank – Old-age dependency ratio World Bank – Young dependency ratio




































































































Eurostat – Old-age dependency ratio
KSH NKI – Old-age dependency ratio
Eurostat – Young dependency ratio
KSH NKI – Young dependency ratio
Source: Eurostat (2014), CSO HDRI (2013), World Bank (2014)
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Topology of the foreign currency/forint swap 
market
Ádám Banai – András Kollarik – András Szabó-Solticzky 
In our study, we examine the network structure of the currency swap market, the 
volume of which amounts to several times the Hungarian GDP. With this paper, we 
aim to establish a complete picture of the market by complementing the results for 
the overnight market. Additionally, we can now analyse a longer time series than in 
our 2013 study. We look at the properties of the graphs in segments representing 
various maturities. We find that the properties of the graph derived from the overall 
market and the dynamics of those properties are identical to those of the short-term 
market, while trends differ for various tenors. The longer the maturities, the less 
the graphs satisfy the small-world property. The longest markets are increasingly 
closer to random graphs. Although the effect of shocks to large actors is smaller in 
such graphs, this change also suggests that counterparties trusted each other less 
as transactions became longer. This is also reinforced by the fact that following the 
onset of the crisis, the number of connected vertices gradually decreased in the 
networks of longer markets. In other words, weakening trust is also manifested in 
the decreasing number of counterparties. This is confirmed by the development of 
average degree and average path length, and by affinity functions.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classification: G01, G15, C45
Keywords: financial networks, FX swap, financial crisis, topology, centrality indices
1. introduction and precedents in literature
The global economic crisis which erupted in 2007 hit Hungary severely, as the 
financial markets collapsed following the Lehman bankruptcy. In October 2008, 
a few weeks after the Lehman default, the key Hungarian money markets also 
froze up. The government securities market, the unsecured interbank forint market, 
and the currency swap market all came to a standstill for a few days, which hit the 
banking system severely as well. Banks are required to continuously renew their 
currency swaps, in order to close their on-balance sheet open foreign exchange 
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positions off-balance sheet. If they had not been able to renew their expiring swaps, 
to meet their liabilities they would have been forced to purchase currency on the 
spot market, which would have placed the forint exchange rate under enormous 
pressure. In dealing with the problems on the swap market, a major role was played 
by parent bank commitment, and it was also necessary for the Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank to introduce new swap instruments.
This episode of the crisis highlighted the key importance of the operation of the 
FX swap market for financial intermediation in Hungary. Hungarian banks gain 
access to foreign currency funds partly through FX swaps, which are essential for 
closing their open positions resulting from their significant portfolios of foreign 
currency loans. Foreign actors are also particularly active in this market. They enter 
forward positions through FX swaps, which in many cases they also use to hedge the 
exchange rate risk of their forint assets. The FX swap market also deserves particular 
attention from a monetary policy perspective. Disruptions to the operation of this 
market may significantly reduce forint implied yields, making speculation against 
the forint cheaper.
The operation and role of the Hungarian currency swap market has been addressed 
by a number of studies. Páles et al. (2010) provide a highly detailed description of 
the role played by the market in Hungary’s economy. They show how different the 
motivations of various actors (domestic banks, foreign actors) are for entering the 
FX swap market. The authors also give an overview of the changes which occurred 
in the market during the crisis. In the aftermath of the turmoil, in many cases limits 
for domestic banks were reduced, accompanied by an increased role of margin calls, 
which further intensified the demand for swaps. Banai et al. (2010) also address 
the problems experienced in the FX swap market during the crisis. They find that, 
prior to the escalation of the crisis in Hungary, it was local banks in particular that 
had accumulated extremely large stocks of FX swaps. Stock renewal and increasing 
margining posed a major problem at certain stages of the crisis, which called for 
the use of the MNB’s instruments.
Analyses of the Hungarian FX swap market have mainly focused on the stock size 
and maturity, the development of implied yields, and the behaviours and strategies 
of the various actors. However, additional information about financial markets may 
be obtained through an exploration of the actors’ network relationships. Research 
on the network characteristics of financial markets has gained prominence in 
the past decade, especially since the onset of the crisis. One of the first studies 
of this kind was Lublóy (2006), which discussed the network structure of VIBER. 
According to the study, the network characteristics under review were stable in 
time. Additionally, the author identified the actors that were the most important 
for the stability of the network. Surprisingly, these institutions were not the largest 
banks of the banking system in terms of balance sheet total.
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In this paper, we rely heavily on our previous study on the short-term FX swap 
market (Banai et al. 2013). In our analysis, we demonstrated that the overnight 
FX swap market also shares the small-world property characteristic of financial 
networks (for details, see Chapter 4 on methodology). Additionally, an examination 
of the dynamics of network indicators highlighted the significant decrease in the 
size of the short-term FX swap market after the Lehman bankruptcy. That is, many 
institutions either cut down on their activity in the market, or left it entirely. 
However, the exiting institutions were predominantly those with less relevance 
to the market. This is definitely beneficial in terms of stability. In turn, there is 
a greater risk from the increased role of the remaining institutions, i.e. the fact 
that the market has become more sensitive to the behaviour of particular actors.
The tools of network theory are used even more frequently in international 
literature to examine financial markets. In their research, Iazzetta and Manna 
(2009) addressed the properties of the Italian interbank market. They explored 
the behaviour of a number of network characteristics. They found the connectivity 
of the network to be very low, similarly to real networks, and to be decreasing in 
time. Another key observation was that the entire network remained connected 
throughout the 222-month period under review. That is, with any pair of banks, it 
was possible to identify a path through which they could reach each other. Their 
third finding was that, although to a minor extent, the average shortest path 
increased within the network (for details, see Chapter 4 on methodology). They also 
found that the largest actors were dealing regularly and directly with counterparties 
playing smaller roles in the network. Finally, the authors demonstrated that the 
proportion of relatively large actors in the network had decreased, accompanied 
by an increase in the number of banks dealing only with a few counterparties. 
In their study, Iori et al. (2008) discussed the Italian overnight market. They 
demonstrated that banks that were large in terms of degree had a great number 
of small counterparties. The authors found this to increase the risks of contagion 
in the case of high-density networks (see details in Chapter 4 on methodology).
Soramäki et al. (2006) analysed the network properties of interbank payment 
data in the Fedwire Funds Service. They found this network also to be sharing the 
properties characteristic of real networks. Such features include scale-free degree 
distribution, a high clustering coefficient, and the small-world phenomenon, which 
was introduced by Watts and Strogatz (1998) and is generally characteristic of 
financial networks. They also found the properties of the networks under review 
to be stable in time.
The above list is sufficient to show that in finance, network tools have primarily been 
used to analyse payment and settlement systems as well as unsecured interbank 
markets (although Markose et al. (2010) discussed the US CDS market). In neither 
the Hungarian nor the international literature have we found any papers providing 
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a network analysis of the FX swap market. What follows is our attempt at such an 
analysis. As we previously discussed the processes of the short-term market in 
detail (Banai et al. 2013), in this study our primary focus will be on longer markets 
and their relationship to the short-term market. In Chapter 2, we provide a more 
detailed description of the main characteristics of the Hungarian currency swap 
market. In Chapter 3, we discuss the data used and in Chapter 4, we describe the 
network theory methodology applied. Then, in Chapter 5, we present our results 
on the topology of the network. Finally, in Chapter 6, we summarise our findings.
2. The currency swap market
2.1. The FX swap
A foreign exchange swap (hereinafter: FX swap) is a derivative financial 
transaction consisting of two legs. On the start (or spot) leg of the transaction, 
the counterparties swap two different currencies with each other, which they will 
swap back on the maturing (or forward) leg. When entering into the transaction, 
they agree on both the spot and the forward exchange rate. FX swaps are also 
commonly called simple currency swaps, since no transaction takes place between 
the counterparties other than swapping nominal values, as opposed to currency 
interest rate swaps (CIRS), where the parties (also) pay interest to each other during 
the term. With FX swaps against the forint, the market convention is that the same 
foreign currency amount is traded on the spot and forward legs, and the two forint 
amounts payable are obtained as the forint value of that amount taken at spot and 
forward rates (Figure 1). The current exposure to a counterparty resulting from an 
Figure 1. 
Starting (t=0) and maturing (t=1) cash flows of a EuR/HuF FX swap transaction with 
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FX swap transaction as a secured loan (the net present value of the transaction) is 
an order of magnitude lower than that resulting from an unsecured deposit or loan 
transaction of the same nominal value.
FX swaps are used for various purposes in financial markets.
1.  One widespread trading strategy involves an FX swap plus the purchase of 
a foreign currency asset (or the repayment of a foreign currency liability). In 
this case, the actor uses the liquidity acquired on the spot leg of the FX swap to 
purchase the foreign currency asset to be held (or to repay the foreign currency 
liability to be repaid), while the forward leg of the swap provides a hedge against 
the exchange rate risk of the foreign currency asset (or the foreign currency 
liability being repaid). Where the asset purchased and the swap mature at 
different times, the strategy also involves yield speculation. Foreign investors 
have a propensity to finance their forint government security purchases using 
FX swaps.
2.  Another popular trading strategy is an FX swap and a foreign exchange spot 
market transaction of the opposite direction. This is equivalent to taking a forward 
foreign exchange position, since the spot transaction neutralises the spot leg of 
the swap, leaving only the forward leg effective. An actor may follow this strategy 
for both speculative (carry trade) and hedging purposes.
3.  The third important strategy involves entry into two swaps of opposite directions, 
with the same spot value dates, but with different maturities. The strategy allows 
an actor to speculate on interest rate differentials. For instance, if they lend 
foreign currency in exchange for forints on the spot leg of the long swap, which 
is swapped back to foreign currency by a bank on the spot leg of a short swap of 
the opposite direction, then they may refinance the currency repayment upon 
maturity of the short swap through another short currency raising swap. In this 
case, profits will be generated for the bank if future short forint yields rise faster 
in relation to foreign currency yields than what is priced into long yields.
4.  Another important role of FX swaps is to revolve maturing forward and FX swap 
transactions: the foreign currency funds acquired on the spot leg of the swap can 
be used to repay the foreign currency liability due, while the forward leg can be 
used to renew the off-balance sheet foreign currency debt.
5.  Additionally, this type of transaction can be used solely to grant loans secured 
by the opposite currency.
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2.2. The domestic currency swap market
Due to the limited data available, we will only analyse the segment of the domestic 
currency swap market where at least one of the counterparties to the transaction is 
a domestic bank. We have nothing more than anecdotal evidence that in London, 
foreign actors also enter into foreign currency/forint swap transactions (Balogh–
Gábriel 2003). The FX swap market is a less strictly regulated OTC (over-the-
counter) market, where foreign currency/forint transactions are typically traded 
through brokers in London, which means that direct bilateral contacts and market 
making are not common (Csávás et al. 2006). At the same time, in the segment 
of less than one month, by virtue of exclusive access to the MNB’s forint market 
instruments, domestic banks may be considered to be market makers. Table 1 
provides a summary of the key properties of the market.
Table 1.
Key characteristics of the domestic currency swap* market
Indicator Value
swap turnover among CHF, EUR and USD relative to HUF/FX swap turnover (2005-Nov. 2014) 44%
daily average turnover of HUF/FX swap market (2005-Nov. 2014, HUF bn) 525
gross HUF/FX swap stock of Hungarian banking system against foreigners (both directions, 1 
Dec. 2014, HUF bn)
6006
ratio of interbank transactions to total turnover (2005-Nov. 2014) 95%
ratio of cross-border transactions to total turnover (2005-Nov. 2014) 84%
average transaction size (2005-Nov. 2014, HUF mn) 5474
*Currency swaps are understood in the broad sense, so we have taken into account FX swaps as well as 
CIRSs for our calculations. By default, we are describing the foreign currency/HUF market.
Source: Own calculations based on MNB data.
Given the very high ratio of the volume of swaps between cross-currencies and 
in the foreign currency/forint segment, which points to the possibility of free 
movement from one foreign currency to another through swaps, the swap markets 
of various currencies against the forint are treated collectively as a general foreign 
currency/forint in the rest of this paper, without making a distinction between the 
USD/HUF and the EUR/HUF segments, for example.
The annual volume of the foreign currency/forint swap market amounted to 
approximately 5 times the Hungarian GDP in the sample period between 1 January 
2005 and 1 December 2014. At the end of the period, the gross foreign currency/
forint swap stock of the Hungarian banking system against foreign actors, despite 
the continuous decrease of the stock of foreign currency loans, amounted to 18% 
of the balance sheet total of the banking system. These two figures also point to 
the significant role of the swap market in the domestic economy. Underlying this, in 
addition to the versatile applications of the transaction, there are macroeconomic 
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factors as well. Prior to the financial crisis starting on 15 September 2008 with the 
failure of Lehman Brothers, the country’s net external debt and simultaneously the 
reliance of the banking system on foreign funds had increased significantly. Net 
external debt equals the sum of the long open forint foreign exchange positions 
taken by each economic sector (Páles et al. 2010), which means that the open forint 
position had to be taken by one economic actor or another. Foreign actors were 
less willing to do so, and therefore, most of the position was undertaken by the 
domestic private sector through the balance sheet of the banking system, which 
opened banks’ on-balance sheet foreign exchange positions. Pursuant to an earlier 
government decree and the CRR, however, the banking system had to allocate 
capital to its entire foreign exchange position,1 which gave it incentives to close 
the open position off-balance sheet. Typically, banks close their open on-balance 
sheet foreign exchange positions through currency swaps, using strategies 2 and 4 
above (Páles et al. 2010).
2.3. The financial crisis and its effect on the currency swap market
Although the costs of funding in Hungarian markets had been increasing from 
mid-2007 as the subprime mortgage credit crisis unfolded, and a brief turbulence 
evolved in the government securities market in March 2008, the global financial 
crisis essentially escalated in Hungary following the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
on 15 September 2008. The most intensive phase of the crisis lasted from autumn 
2008 to spring 2009. In the autumn of 2008, the cost of liquidity skyrocketed first 
in foreign currencies and then in forint as market players restricted their partner 
limits vis-à-vis one another. The turnover of the currency swap market became 
rather volatile, and the share of intra-group transactions also became unstable. 
While previously the maturity of swaps had gradually increased, this trend came 
to a standstill during the crisis, and new swaps became perceivably shorter. 
Additionally, the euro also replaced the dollar, which had previously played the 
dominant role in the swap market (Páles et al. 2010).
The overnight market dried up, and the aggregate liquidity index measuring market 
liquidity fell to – 8 by the end of October 2008 (Figure 2). This means that market 
liquidity was 8 standard deviations below the long-term average of the period 
preceding the crisis.2 Meanwhile, swap spreads increased considerably. The spreads 
of around zero measured before the crisis widened to several hundred basis points. 
Consequently, in this period forint loans (secured by foreign currency) were available 
through swaps at rates several percentage points below the reference money 
market yield.
1  Where the entire foreign exchange position exceeds 2% of total own funds, the own funds requirement for 
foreign exchange risk is 8% of the open foreign exchange position.
2  For more details on the aggregate liquidity index, see Páles–Varga (2008).
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3. data
We calculated individual network indicators for longer segments (maturities of 
3 days to 1 month, 1 to 3 months, and above 3 months), as well as for the graph 
derived from the overall market. The study will focus on the development of 
these (Tables 2 and 3). Due to its significant volume weight, in our analysis we 
also consider the 1–2 day segment as defined above. We do so because the above 
definition is consistent with the segment, the development of which is described 
by the aggregate liquidity index. However, while the aggregate liquidity index is 
calculated by the central bank only for the segment comprised of USD/HUF and 
EUR/HUF transactions, we also considered CHF/HUF transactions.
Figure 2. 

























































































































































































































































































Note: The liquidity index for the HUF swap market contains data on the one-day USD/HUF and EUR/HUF 
segments, where the maximum difference between the trade date and maturity is two business days. In 
every case, the greater value indicates an improvement in the given aspect of liquidity. Specific sub-in-
dices are standardised by their pre-crisis long-term averages and standard deviations.
Source: Own calculations based on data of the MNB, Bloomberg and Reuters.
136 Studies
Ádám Banai – András Kollarik – András Szabó-Solticzky
Table 2.
Volume of the foreign currency/forint swap market by currency
uSd EuR cHF together
proportion in turnover (%) 83 15 2 100
proportion in turnover corrected by tenor (%) 38 49 13 100
Note: Based on the forint value of the spot leg of the transactions. In adjustments for maturity, we mul-
tiplied the transaction value by the maturity.
Source: Own calculations based on MNB data.
Table 3.
Volume of the foreign currency/forint swap market by maturity
1-2 days 3 days-1 
month
1-3 months >3 months together
proportion in turnover (%) 76 14 6 4 100
proportion in turnover 
corrected by tenor (%)
13 8 11 69 100
Note: Based on the forint value of the spot leg of the transactions. In adjustments for 
maturity, we multiplied the transaction value by the maturity.
Source: Own calculations based on MNB data.
We examined the transactions completed between 1 January 2005 and 1 December 
2014. The actors selected to represent the vertices of the graphs included both 
domestic and international actors, whereas the MNB was excluded. Our analysis 
concerned only credit institutions, as a result of which we ignored transactions with 
the non-financial corporate sector, for instance. Domestic banking groups were 
included in the graphs on a consolidated basis, i.e. members of banking groups were 
represented by a single vertex standing for the entire banking group. By contrast, 
we had no means to consolidate all of the foreign banking groups, neither did 
we intend to cleanse the database from transactions within cross-border banking 
groups; consequently, we included each member of foreign or cross-border banking 
groups separately in the database. The edges between the vertices were derived 
from the transactions between them (and not from existing stocks). For 1–2 day 
transactions and the entire network, we created the matrices to describe the graphs 
by aggregating transactions at intervals of 5 business days. Additionally, for the 
sake of comparability we also created the graphs at a monthly frequency. This was 
needed because with segments longer than 1–2 days, we only examined monthly 
graphs. The main reason for that was that the number of transactions is far lower 
in such segments, and the size of the networks obtained through 5-day aggregation 
proved to be too small. We examined transactions longer than overnight in three 
groups: 3 days to 1 month, 1 month to 3 months, and transactions exceeding 3 
months. We established each group by taking two important aspects into account. 
On the one hand, we needed a sufficient number of vertices for our analysis, while 
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we also needed to consider, to some extent, the different roles of the transactions 
with different maturities. We added up the signed forint values of the spot legs of 
the swaps among the individual actors, assigning a positive value to a transaction 
where the bank received currency on the spot leg, and a negative one in the 
opposite case.
4. Methodology
In this chapter, we briefly explain the network theory tools that we used in our 
analyses (the methodology is identical to that used in our previous paper (Banai 
et al. 2013)). Our aim is to provide a straightforward definition of the indicators 
characteristic of the network, occasionally at the expense of mathematical precision. 
Specific results concerning the FX market will be discussed in the next chapter.
4.1. Adjacency matrices and components
Let us assume N banks to be given, and W to be an NxN matrix wherein element 
Wi,j indicates the forint amount given by bank i to bank j on the spot leg. In fact, W 
is a matrix including bilateral exposures in forint. Each element of the matrix W is 
non-negative and it is not necessarily symmetric, and we assume every element 
along its main diagonal to be zero. The matrix thus obtained defines a weighted 
and directed graph without loops,3 where the weight of each edge determines the 
size of the claim, and the direction determines the direction of the cash flow. Note 
that where banks i and j have mutual claims on each other, we use a netted claim 
obtained as a signed sum of the claims. In analysing the network, the question is 
often simply whether two actors are connected or not, the size and direction of 
their connection is less important. This is because the formation of a connection 
in itself may provide relevant information, while facilitating the understanding and 
interpretation of the indicators. Additionally, it is important to consider the fact that 
FX swaps are secured transactions. Consequently, direction is less significant than 
with commonly analysed unsecured markets.
Let A be an adjacency matrix representing an undirected and unweighted network, 
i.e.  
 Ai , j =






      (1)
The inequality Wi , j +Wj , i > 0  in the above definition will be satisfied exactly when 
an edge leads from i to j or from j to i, i.e. matrix A truly represents an undirected 
network. For example, with the 1–2 day market, the matrices were created by 
3  Loop: an edge starting from and ending in the same vertex.
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aggregation at intervals of 5 business days, i.e. by obtaining a signed sum of the 
daily transactions. For aggregation purposes, we did not consider bank holidays in 
the USA, Switzerland and Europe to be business days because the volume of trade 
is significantly lower on such days. In calculating the network indicators discussed 
below, we generally require the network to be connected in some sense.
4. 2. network indicators
Network size
One of the most general characteristics of the network is its size, which indicates 
the number of banks participating in at least one transaction in a given period either 
as borrowers or lenders.
Degree
In a directed graph, the indegree (outdegree) of a vertex i is understood as the 
number of edges leading to (from) that vertex.
With undirected networks, the degree of i is the number of vertices connected to 
it. More precisely, if the degree of vertex i is indicated by f(i), then
 f i( )= Ai , j
J=1
N
∑       (2)
Degree is commonly included among centrality indicators, i.e. characteristic 
quantities which are supposed to describe the importance of the role that a given 
vertex plays in the network. Another key quantity is degree distribution. This 
function indicates the frequency of a given degree value. In networks occurring in 
reality, degree distribution often follows power law. More precisely, if the frequency 
of degree k is indicated by p(k), then
 p k( )= ck −γ       (3)
where c is a normalising constant and γ is a positive number, mostly in the interval of 
[2,3]. Such graphs are called scale-free networks (Barabási–Albert 1999). Networks 
occurring in reality mostly include a large number of low-degree vertices and few 
higher-degree vertices.
Average path length, diameter and mass function
The distance between vertices u and v is understood as the sum of the weights of 
the edges along the shortest path between them. In our analyses, we will always 
consider the largest connected component where we want to use the shortest 
distance or some of its functions. In the rest of this paper, let d(u,v) indicate 
distance. In an unweighted graph, d(u,v) will indicate the minimum number of 
steps required to be taken to get from u to v. Average path length is defined as the 
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average of such distances, and the diameter of the network as the maximum of 
such distances.
We also introduce a measure called mass function, which indicates the proportion, 
relative to all shortest paths, of the shortest distances that will be less than or 
equal to a given constant k (k=2, 3, 4, 5). Obviously, the function increases in the k 
parameter, and where k equals the diameter of the network, the result will be 1, 
since every shortest path is either less than or equal to the diameter.
Closeness4
The closeness of a vertex u is the inverse of the length of the path to vertex v, 
which is at the greatest distance from it. More precisely, if closeness is indicated 
by c(u), then 
 
c u( )= 1
maxv d u,v( )        (4)
The maxv d u,v( )  quantity itself illustrates the number of steps required to get from 
u to any vertex. Inversion is necessary because we want the closeness of a vertex 
to be the higher the more central the vertex is to the network, i.e. the fewer steps 
are required to get to any vertex from it. It is for this property that closeness is 
considered to be a centrality indicator as well.
Betweenness
Betweenness indicates the number of shortest paths that include a given vertex. 
We do not count the shortest paths starting from or ending in the vertex concerned. 
In order to compare betweenness indicators across networks of different sizes, we 
need to divide the indicator by the maximum number of shortest paths, which for 
N vertices will give
 
N−1( ) N−2( )
2
      (5)
The above formula will determine the maximum number of shortest paths that may 
include a given vertex without starting or ending in that vertex.
Density
Density indicates the ratio of the number of edges to the number of all possible edges. 
The number of all possible edges in an undirected network of N vertices is
 N N−1( )
2
      (6)
4  We also calculated another version of the average closeness indicator. In that indicator, we inverted the 
average of the shortest paths rather than their maximum. However, we obtained similar results in both cases.
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as every vertex may be connected to a maximum of N-1 vertices, but that would 
include all edges twice. Note that in the case of a directed network, the above 
formula is modified to N N−1( ) .
Clustering coefficient
The clustering coefficient of a given vertex shows the ratio of the number of edges 
between its neighbours to the possible number of edges between its neighbours. 
In other words, the average clustering coefficient determines the probability of the 
neighbours of any vertex being connected with one another as well.
Affinity function
The affinity function indicates the average degree of the vertices connected to 
vertices of a given degree. That is, the function assigns a number to every degree 
occurring in the network. If the function increases monotonically, vertices of 
a higher degree will also be connected to vertices of a higher degree, i.e. the key 
actors will be directly connected to one another. Otherwise vertices of a higher 
degree will only be connected to vertices of a lower degree, i.e. larger actors will 
only deal directly with smaller banks.
The small world property
In networks exhibiting the small world property, the average shortest path between 
vertices is low relative to the size of the network. Additionally, the average shortest 
path is proportional to the logarithm of network size, i.e.
Average shortest path = c ⋅log N( )
where c is constant.
4.3. Random graphs
One of the longest established and most studied random network models is the so-
called Erdős–Rényi graph (Erdős–Rényi 1959). The scheme involves a fixed N number 
of vertices, where two different vertices will be connected with a probability of 
p and will not be connected through an edge with a probability of 1-p. Primarily, 
we would like to use the Erdős–Rényi network to compare its average clustering 
coefficient with that of the graph obtained by us. If the two indicators are close, 
i.e. their ratio ≈1, we may conclude that our network has no meaningful structure. 
The question arises how we should construct an appropriate Erdős–Rényi model for 
a given graph. Obviously, the number of vertices must be identical, and the value 
of p should be selected as follows: 
 p = average degree
N−1
      (7)
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Since our database only includes transactions reported by Hungarian actors, we 
will slightly adjust the above model because in our network the probability of 
an edge between two foreign counterparties is zero. Let us consider the sub-
graph that only includes domestic actors and the edges between them. Let GDD 
indicate the Erdős–Rényi graph belonging to this network. Additionally, let us create 
another Erdős–Rényi model for a bipartite graph representing domestic–foreign 
relationships. A bipartite graph includes two disjoint sets of vertices (domestic and 
foreign actors), where the edges may only connect domestic and foreign vertices, 
but neither two domestic nor two foreign vertices. The random graph scheme is 
modified in that we will only try to connect i and j vertices with a probability of p 
where i is a domestic actor and j is a foreign actor. Finally, let us unite the network so 
obtained and graph GDD. In the rest of this paper, we will refer to the graph created 
this way as a modified Erdős–Rényi network.
5. Results
In the analysis of the overnight market, several findings raised the possibility that 
the dynamics observed may be caused by the increased prominence of using longer 
markets (Banai et al. 2013). Further analyses suggested that probably this was not 
Figure 3. 



















3 days to 1 month
1 month to 3 months













































































































































Source: Own calculations based on MNB data.
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the case, but in the following we explore the specific features of the overall market 
in detail. In the previous chapter, we described the mathematical tools that we used 
to map the network structure of the currency swap market. The set of indicators 
enable us to gain an understanding of the key properties of our network and their 
development over time. In our calculations, we also examined each indicator 
separately for segments of various maturities. Additionally, our results include the 
development of network statistics that ignore maturities and thus describe the 
overall market.
Our analysis of short markets showed that network size, i.e. the number of banks 
trading in the given period, is far from being constant (Figure 3). For a while, size 
was perceivably growing as foreign currency lending took off. From summer 2007 
onwards, a series of crisis events could be read from size dynamics. The bankruptcy 
of Northern Rock caused a break, the so-called decoupling period brought growth, 
and then the Lehman failure led to a fall. From the second half of 2010, another 
downward trend emerged, which continued to the end of the period observed. 
In the networks of segments of longer maturities, the number of vertices fell 
significantly short of the 1–2 day segment, despite the longer frequency. At the 
beginning of the period, size exceeded 100 in the 1-2 day network and was still 
at 70 at the end of the period at a weekly frequency. At a monthly frequency we 
obtained even higher values, with a maximum at 140 and a size approximating 100 
even at the end of the period. This is consistent with the need for actors to renew 
shorter transactions significantly more frequently. It is seen that in autumn 2008, 
the number of vertices suddenly dropped in all three long segments. Late 2009 and 
early 2010 marked the beginning of a more spectacular downward trend. That is, 
in periods when the size of the short market contracted, a similar trend emerged in 
longer markets as well. This disproves the possibility that the increased prominence 
of transactions with longer maturity may have caused the size of the short market 
to contract. At the same time, it supports the position that many actors were forced 
to exit the foreign currency/forint FX swap market by an increase in risks, despite 
credit risk remaining low. It is worth noting that the transactions entered into with 
the MNB in accordance with the forint conversion announced in November 2014 
did not result in any significant changes in the number of actors in November. Only 
the 1 to 3-month market showed some increase. This may be due to the fact that 
counterparties will receive currency from the MNB, which they can use to close 
their market swaps among other things, with a delay, between 2015 and 2017. 
Consequently, the size of the market is expected to contract only later.
In terms of our research, the first and most striking network property of the FX 
swap market is that the graph obtained is often not connected. When we consider 
the network formed on a single trade day, the network is found to be disintegrating 
into several (in some cases more than 10) separate parts. For our analysis, it is 
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important to obtain a connected network, since the calculation of certain centrality 
indicators only makes sense if we do. It was an important question in the case 
of the 1–2 day market as well to find the sufficiently short frequency where 
a connected network is formed. Due to the small size, this problem becomes even 
more significant with longer segments. We decided to use a monthly frequency 
in such cases. A lower frequency would already “conceal” many events, and as 
such would not be a suitable choice. However, it is apparent that, especially 
with transactions exceeding 3 months, in extreme cases the largest connected 
component is comprised of only 20 to 30 percent of the actors. That is why a higher 
frequency is not recommended either (Figure 4).
A key question is what causes this disintegration. In the literature, we have found 
several references to examples of markets which were not completely connected as 
networks (e.g. Berlinger et al. 2011; Bech–Atalay 2008). Such a level of disintegration 
may be explained by the fact that a major part of the actors are foreign banks. In 
many cases, foreign actors mostly trade with their own local subsidiary banks. When 
the relationship is mutually exclusive, the two vertices will break away from the rest 
of the network. A further obvious explanation may be the fact that we are unable 
Figure 4. 
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to see a part of the network (transactions between foreign actors). Naturally, at 
progressively higher frequencies, the decrease in the number of transactions in 
itself increases the probability of separate bank pairs, triangles, etc. being formed. 
It is important to note that from the beginning of the crisis and particularly from 
autumn 2008 onwards, the absence of connectivity became increasingly prominent. 
With the exception of the 1–2 days market, the ratio of the largest connected 
components to the entire network gradually diminished in every segment. This 
points to increasing mutual distrust, which motivated participants to enter into 
longer transactions only with a small group of counterparties. Transactions of 
longer maturities also involve increased risk, which is why it is reasonable to select 
counterparties even more rigorously in longer markets.
Although it is possible to calculate some of the indicators even with the network 
disintegrating, the calculation of most centrality indicators requires at least weak 
connectivity. For that reason, we will consider the largest connected component 
throughout the rest of our investigation. As seen above, in some exceptional cases, 
the greater part of the network falls outside of the greatest connected component. 
Consequently, with the longest markets the conclusions that can be drawn from 
the network indicators are limited. In the rest of this paper, such conclusions will 
primarily be used to support the conclusions drawn in the short market.
Figure 5. 
Average clustering coefficient of the entire swap market graph and the random 
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We examined the extent to which the graph can be considered random. For this 
purpose, we compared the graph of the swap market to random graphs generated 
using two methods. On the one hand, we compared it to a random Erdős–Rényi 
graph, the average degree of which was identical to that of the swap market graph. 
On the other hand, we also considered a modified random Erdős–Rényi graph, 
where we assigned varying probabilities to the edges between domestic–domestic, 
domestic–foreign and foreign–foreign vertex pairs. In the modified random graph, 
a connection is established between two foreign vertices with a probability of 0.
We calculated the average clustering coefficient for all four graphs. We found that 
the level of clustering in the swap market graph significantly exceeded the level 
of clustering in both random graphs for all maturity segments (overall market: 
Figure 5, short market: 3 times larger clustering on average; 3 days to 1 month: 3 
times larger clustering; 1 month to 3 months: 2 times; above 3 months: 2 times). 
Consequently, the swap market network cannot be considered to be random 
(although the clustering coefficient approximates that of the random graph as 
maturity increases), and as such it is worth examining in more detail.
Figure 6. 
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Banai et al. (2013) have demonstrated that the network of the 1–2 day market 
may be referred to as a scale-free network. Accordingly, the degree of individual 
vertices approximately follows power law. If k denotes individual degrees, then the 
power function 53*k-2 will give a fairly good approximation of degree frequency. 
As a result of the distribution following a power function, the graph includes many 
low-degree and few high-degree vertices. The small world property may also be 
captured through the development of specific network indicators. One of them is 
the ratio of average shortest path length to network size. A low ratio will indicate 
the small world property. The small world property is also indicated by a clustering 
coefficient exceeding that of the random graph, or an average shortest path length 
proportional to the logarithm of network size (Pető–Békési 2009; Newman, 2003). 
Clearly, the first indicator shows significant differences with segments of various 
maturities (Figure 6). In the case of the 1–2 day market, the average shortest path 
length amounts to a mere 3% of the network size in general. However, the indicator 
significantly increases with longer maturities (3 days to 1 month: 4.5% on average; 
1 month to 3 months: 7.5%, above 3 months: 8%), showing an approximation to 
so-called lattices (Pető–Békési 2009). This is confirmed by the ratio of the average 
shortest path length to the logarithm of network size. The longer the segment being 
considered, the less constant the indicator became. Overall, it appears that the 
Figure 7. 
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longer the maturities, the less the network can be considered to satisfy the small 
world property. In networks, the small world property poses a stability risk. Namely, 
such networks respond drastically to shocks affecting the largest actors, although 
shocks to small actors have no significant effect (Albert et al. 1999; Newman 2003). 
In times of crisis, central actors tend to amplify and accelerate contagion (Markose 
et al. 2010). Conversely, with random graphs shocks to the largest actors have 
a smaller effect. The longer the markets, the smaller the chance of contagion. This 
also follows from the gradually decreasing ratio of elements that are part of the 
largest component. An analysis of the entire swap market as a single network shows 
that the two indicators behave similarly to the 1–2 day segment, i.e. the small world 
property is also satisfied in this respect. This is explained by the fact that within 
the overall market, 76% of all transactions were made in the overnight segment.
Throughout the period under review, the average degree of the network varied 
significantly across segments in terms of both trends and levels (Figure 7). In the 
shortest market at a weekly frequency, a change in the indicator could be observed 
at both turning points of the financial crisis, i.e. in summer 2007 and autumn 2008 
as well. In mid-2007, for a brief period there was a significant decrease in the 
average degree of the network, and then the indicator moved at previous levels right 
up to the Lehman bankruptcy. In turn, after the Lehman bankruptcy, the indicator 
remained below previous levels for an extended period, which was followed by 
a continuous increase from autumn 2010 (Banai et al. 2013). At a frequency of 
one month, the change in the 1–2 day segment was also striking at the time of 
the Lehman bankruptcy and from the second half of 2010. However, the picture 
is different with the rest of the segments. On the one hand, as we expected, the 
level of average degree is significantly lower due to differences in size. On the other 
hand, we also found differences in trends. While the segment of 3 days to 1 month 
behaved similarly to the shortest market, the graphs derived from transactions 
exceeding 1 month moved in the opposite direction. With the former, the average 
degree reached its peak by the end of the period, which means that the weight of 
relatively important banks increased across the network. With the latter, however, 
the average degree decreased. This may also indicate banks’ increased tendency 
in the aftermath of the crisis to select the counterparties with which to enter into 
longer transactions.
Not surprisingly, average shortest path length moved in the opposite direction 
to average degree. This was also observed for the 1–2 day market (Banai et al. 
2013), but also applied to the graph including all of the transactions regardless 
of maturity. Due to the fact that individual actors enter into transactions with an 
increasing number of counterparties, new edges allow the formation of additional 
and shorter paths between two vertices. Obviously, the opposite is also true. Fewer 
counterparties mean fewer variations of possible paths, causing the average shortest 
path to increase (Figure 8). With segments longer than 2 days, average shortest path 
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length was around 3 in the period under review. The obvious trends and turning-
points seen in the overall market were increasingly less prominent there. It was 
apparent particularly in the longest segment that although the indicator was highly 
volatile, no trends could be established in its movements.
An important question relating to the development of degrees is the degree which 
the neighbours of vertices with various degrees have themselves (Figure 9). In 
financial networks, banks with a high degree typically deal with counterparties 
that have a low degree (the phenomenon has been described in Iori et al., 2008; 
Iazzetta et al. 2009). This was so in the case of the Hungarian 1–2 day FX swap 
market (Banai et al. 2013), and is also observed in the graph derived from the 
overall market (Figure 9). One reason for this is the high number of small actors in 
the network, which drives the most active actor to also become connected to actors 
with few counterparties. On the other hand, account should be taken of the fact 
that the actors considered small in terms of the domestic currency swap market 
include many banks that are prominent internationally as well. This disassortativity 
is also characteristic of longer markets (Newman 2003), but to a smaller extent. 
The downward sloping affinity function is still clearly visible in the segment shorter 
than 1 month; however, in longer segments counterparties have much more 
homogeneous average degrees. This may indicate that a central role is played by 
a few actors to a smaller extent.
Figure 8. 
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Source: Own calculations based on MNB data.
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The size of network diameter may be dominant in the spread of shocks. As a rule 
of thumb, in social networks the small world property means a maximum diameter 
of 6 (Newman 2003). In the 1–2 day FX swap market, diameter was found to be 
rather stable in time. Throughout the period under review, average diameter was 
5.2 at a weekly frequency and 4.4 at a monthly frequency. Moreover, at a monthly 
frequency the lowest value was 4 and the highest was 5, i.e. the indicator hardly 
changed over time. In longer segments, diameters averaged around 6 and increased 
as maturities became longer (3 days to 1 month: 5.9 on average, 1 month to 3 
months: 6.1, above 3 months: 6.1). Apart from this, longer maturities also involved 
higher volatility. In such turbulent times as autumn 2008, the diameter of certain 
graphs exceeded 10 (Figure 10). In other words, fewer and fewer connections 
were formed between banks. While this obviously reduces the risk of contagion, 
it also means that certain banks would not be able to enter into transactions with 
a sufficient number of counterparties. As a result, they may have been forced to 
rely excessively on a single counterparty in longer markets.
In the case of the unsecured forint interbank market, the indicator of average 
closeness was the quickest to respond to the crisis. Although from a rather high level 
Figure 9. 
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Note: Axis x shows the degrees of individual vertices, whereas axis y shows the average degrees of neigh-
bouring vertices. For example: in the overall market the vertices neighbouring vertices with a degree of 
1 had an average degree of around 37.
Source: Own calculations based on MNB data.
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Figure 11. 











































































































































Source: Own calculations based on MNB data.
Figure 10. 
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of 0.5, it started to decline as early as in 2006, and already moved around 0.4 in early 
2009 (Berlinger et al. 2011). All of the networks in our analysis deviated from this 
in terms of both trends and levels. In the graph of the overall market, the network 
indicator perceivably changes as problems develop. We could see an increase from 
late 2006 to spring 2008, followed by a decrease, which was intensified by the 
Lehman bankruptcy. Therefore, in this case the trend changed earlier than in the 
1–2 day market. The sharp decline around the Lehman bankruptcy coincided with 
that seen in the 1–2 day market, just as the continuous increase from 2010. The 
two graphs differ primarily in terms of levels. In the network of the overall market, 
the highest average exceeds 0.4, which is significantly higher than the maximum 
of around 0.3 measured for the 1–2 day segment (Figure 11).
In longer segments, a decrease in average closeness was also felt in autumn 2008 
(3 days to 1 month: 0.29 on average, 1 month to 3 months: 0.2, above 3 months: 
0.2). On aggregate, however, the time series appeared stable without any significant 
changes. This suggests that the periphery of the network exited the market mostly 
in shorter segments (Banai et al. 2013). In the rest of the segments, it is not clear 
how important exiting actors had been for the network concerned.
The clustering coefficient is a key indicator in terms of stability both at systemic 
and individual levels. Its movements aptly describe the extent to which cliques are 
formed in the given market, and how typical it is for the partners of specific banks 
to enter into transactions with one another. In the period under review, major crisis 
events led to significant drops in the indicator. For most of the period, the indicator 
moved between 0.1 and 0.2 in the 1–2 day market, hitting a low of 0.05 at the time 
of the Lehman bankruptcy (Banai et al. 2013).
Not surprisingly, with longer segments the level of clustering decreased (Figure 
12). This is also indicative of institutions being more rigorous in the selection of 
their counterparties as maturities become longer. Transactions below 1 month 
still showed the tendency seen in the 1–2 day segment that clustering increased 
from mid-2010; however, longer segments behaved differently. Apparently, above 
1 month and in particular with maturities exceeding 3 months, values around 0 
are not uncommon. In other words, triangles or cliques are not formed in the 
graph. The clustering coefficient also indicates that the longer the maturities, the 
less the graphs are characterised by the small world property. The average of the 
average clustering coefficient in longer segments was as follows: 0.11 for 3 days to 
1 month, 0.09 for 1 month to 3 months, and 0.07 above 3 months. In this regard, 
longer markets are more similar to the random graph. In autumn 2008, a decline 
in clustering was observed in all maturity segments.
Changes in network structure are also well characterised by the dynamics of the 
density function. In the 1–2 day segment, at a weekly frequency the indicator 
remained relatively stable right until summer 2010. As with the other indicators 
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examined so far, the second half of 2010 also marked a turning point here. The 
significant increase in density may be attributed primarily to the loss of vertices with 
low degrees. This is because in such cases, while there is hardly any change in the 
number of connections formed (the numerator), the number of possible connections 
(the denominator) decreases significantly. The same result is obtained from an 
analysis of the 1–2 day market at a monthly frequency (Figure 13). The indicator is 
relatively low at around 4%, which is not uncommon with financial networks. The 
densities of the networks with various maturities hit their respective lows at the time 
of the Lehman bankruptcy, which means that the smallest number of connections 
relative to the possibilities were formed at that time. Subsequently, however, longer 
segments show significant differences versus the 1–2 day market in terms of both 
levels and appearance. Most strikingly, the level of density increases as maturities 
get longer. This is attributable to the fact that as a result of a decrease in size, the 
number of potential connections, i.e. the nominator will be significantly smaller. 
Although transactions within 1 month still show some stability, the indicator moves 
on an upward trend from 2010 in this segment as well. Moreover, the indicator is 
much more volatile than with the shortest transactions. A gradual increase was 
also observed for the two longest segments towards the end of the period under 
review, but the level reached by the end of the period is not outstandingly high in 
a historical comparison. In other words, the ratio of the connections formed was not 
Figure 12. 
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particularly high even with the contraction in network size, despite the fact that the 
number of possible connections increases at a rate of the size squared. This may be 
another indication that trust weakened in longer segments as well.
6.  conclusion
During the economic crisis that started in 2007, serious disruptions occurred 
several times in the operation of various financial markets. Certain markets 
dried up completely, and central bank intervention was needed to ensure that 
the consequences of their loss caused a minimum amount of damage for the 
banking system. One particular feature of the crisis was that serious disruptions 
occurred worldwide even in the secured FX swap market. For that reason, central 
banks entered into a series of bilateral agreements with one another, temporarily 
assuming the role of the market. As Banai et al. (2013) demonstrated in the context 
of the short-term FX swap market, in Hungary the disruptions were clearly shown by 
the network structure of the market in addition to commonly used market indicators 
such as implied yield, liquidity indices, and turnover. The particular structural 
characteristics of the graph of the short-term market occasionally exhibited strong 
volatility during the crisis. In their analysis of the largest connected component, the 
authors found that the properties generally satisfied for financial markets were also 
Figure 13. 
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characteristic of this market. Like other markets, the one-day FX swap market exhibits 
the small world property, i.e. it is possible to reach any vertex from any vertex in 
a relatively small number of steps. We have seen that the degree distribution of 
the network follows power law. Most participants have a relative small number of 
connections, and there are only few large actors with outstandingly high degrees.
In this study, we aimed to develop an understanding of the properties of networks 
derived from FX swaps of longer maturities (see the Appendix for a comparative 
table), and to obtain a picture of the overall market. This also provided us with a more 
complete picture of the short-term market. Regarding the short market, one of our 
findings was that the number of participants decreased significantly, with a particular 
decline in the activity of marginal actors. Through an analysis of the overall market, 
we confirmed that this was not attributable to longer transaction maturities, 
since graph sizes decreased following the start of the crisis in longer markets as 
well. With the longest markets, however, the type of exiting actors is not certain.
In the one-day market, we have seen that the network was not connected at a daily 
frequency, and that there were isolated parts even at a weekly frequency. This 
property was intensified with longer transactions despite the monthly frequency 
used. At a monthly frequency, often only 60–70% of the vertices formed a connected 
component. With the longest transactions exceeding 3 months, occasionally 
only 30% of the actors were connected. During the crisis, this property became 
particularly pronounced in the case of the longest transactions, which indicates 
that certain banks had the confidence to enter into long transactions only with 
a very small group of institutions.
In the case of the short-term market, we have seen the network to exhibit the small 
world property that is characteristic of financial networks. This also means that the 
market is especially sensitive to the behaviour of a few actors, which presents a stability 
risk (Albert et al. 1999; Newman 2003). The analysis of longer networks showed this 
small world property to be less prominent. It definitely applied to networks derived 
from transactions between 3 days and 1 month; however, the graph of transactions 
above 3 months increasingly approximated a random graph as the crisis developed. 
As the number of actors decreased, the network became less and less clustered, and 
groups gradually disappeared. This may indicate increasing distrust among the actors.
In our study, we paid particular attention to the network derived from the overall 
market regardless of maturities. Although a distinction between maturities was 
required due to differences in functions, we were also curious to see the behaviour 
of the graph of the overall market. As expected, the trends observed here followed 
those of the one-day market, since a vast majority of the transaction volume is 
associated with that market. This confirmed our assumption that a segmentation 
of the overall market was reasonable. This enabled us to identify different trends 
for transactions of different maturities.
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Appendix: comparative table of the graphs for specific segments
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Bounded rationality and altruism: 
behaviourism in economics
József Golovics
This essay is intended to respond to the criticism of economic science that it builds 
its models on unrealistic assumptions from the start. Perfect rationality and the 
axiom of self-interest are indeed two of the main tenets of neoclassical economics. 
In this paper, however, we argue that the application of these doctrines is far 
from exclusive. Indeed, with the achievements of the behaviourist approach and 
behavioural economics, the theory of bounded rationality was accepted as early 
as the last century in this scientific area, along with the recognition of altruistic 
behaviour. Many of these achievements have been more or less integrated into 
mainstream thinking by now, and once applied, by relying on more psychologically 
realistic assumptions they may significantly contribute to improving the forecasting 
power of economic models. 
1. introduction
The 2008 crisis had massive repercussions, not only on the real economy but also on 
economic thinking,1 and triggered profound changes in the approach to economic 
science and the public’s view of the discipline. It has become commonplace to 
“blame” economics for its failure to either forecast or adequately cope with the 
recession. At times, this attitude prompts the lay public to call into question the 
justification for the very existence of economics, claiming that the models and 
conclusions of the discipline are rooted in axioms that are false even in their basic 
assumptions.
Providing an exhaustive response to these criticism – including a description of 
the specificities of modelling and a detailed account of the “trade-off” relationship 
between the models in terms of manageability – is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Accordingly, this paper focuses solely on the two main premises of economic 
science: the topics of perfect rationality and self-interest. As a response to the 
criticism of the science of economics, we argue that the application of these axioms 
József Golovics is a PhD student at Corvinus University of Budapest and a research fellow at the Pallas Athena 
Domus Scientiae Foundation of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. E-mail: jozsef.golovics@uni-corvinus.hu.
A previous version of this essay was written as a course paper within the framework of studies at the Pallas 
Athena Domus Scientiae Foundation.
1  Compare, for example, writings, lectures and statements by Nobel Laureates Joseph Stiglitz and Paul 
Krugman before and after the crisis.
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is not exclusive, even within mainstream economics. Indeed, the acknowledgement 
of altruism and the assumption of bounded rationality were not unknown to 
economics – at least to some of its schools – even in the previous century.
In this paper we attempt to confirm our propositions by outlining the succession of 
the relevant paradigms. Reflecting on the criticism that the core subject of economic 
analysis is an idolised person rather than a real individual, we open our essay with 
an overview of behaviourism, an approach that places human behaviour at the 
centre of interest, and summarise the main achievements of behavioural economics. 
We then proceed to the topics of bounded rationality and altruism, concepts that 
present certain traits of human behaviour within the theoretical framework of 
positivism, based on empirical behaviour patterns. Undoubtedly, these concepts 
have called into question the two most basic tenets of neoclassical economics. 
However, they did so not by a complete rejection of the previous theory, but by 
resolving certain simplistic assumptions; in other words, instead of destroying 
the neoclassical framework, they merely intended to supplement and enhance it 
further.
Obviously, this does not imply that the classical human model of homo oeconomicus 
is no longer considered the cornerstone of economic science. However, in contrast 
to the frequently voiced lay criticism, economic science is undeniably familiar with 
and uses the concepts of bounded rationality and altruism. It is also a fact that 
several achievements of behavioural economics have now been unquestionably 
integrated into mainstream theory, which, in many cases, may improve the 
forecasting power of models and contribute to capturing reality with more precision.
2. Behaviourism in social sciences
Social studies, by nature, have never been entirely separable from the human being 
– the performer of actions – or human behaviour. Human behaviour has therefore 
always been considered in all social disciplines. The approach of behaviourism, 
however, has done so with far more emphasis: it attempted to understand social 
trends by placing the systematic study of human behaviour at the centre of focus, 
and demanded behavioural evidence for the verification of any hypothesis as 
a matter of course (Graham 2010).
Behaviourism first appeared in political science between the world wars. As 
opposed to the prevailing institutionalist approach which focused on the political 
establishment, its novelty was in its endeavour to analyse the political behaviour 
of the individual. In this particular form, behaviourism in political science 
represented a non-judgemental, positivist, descriptive trend, seeking to study 
various phenomena, as all other natural sciences, by relying on general theories 
(Tóth–Török 2003).
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In psychology, instead of cerebral processes and the conscious mind, behaviourism 
put behaviour under scientific scrutiny. The rationale behind this approach was 
the fact that, while the former is open to subjective interpretation in many 
regards, behaviour is a “public” and visible phenomenon, with the required 
data and information readily available. According to behaviourist psychology, 
human behaviour depends largely on environmental conditions and stimulations; 
consequently, it attempts to capture different phenomena by the stimulus-response 
model (Atkinson et al. 2005; Csépe et al. 2007).
Similar trends began to evolve in economic science as well. Although the 
appearance of the positivist approach in economics is traditionally attributed to 
John Neville Keynes (1890/1999) and the detailed description of its methodology is 
associated with Milton Friedman (1953), even the classical school was committed 
to observing human behaviour, and the methodological impact of natural sciences 
left its mark on marginalists. A behaviour-oriented approach manifests itself in the 
work of Marshall (1920) as well, who defined political economy and economics as 
“a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life” in the introduction to his book. 
Although from a different perspective, the two Nobel Laureates, Stigler and Becker 
(1989:111) had a similar approach to the issue. In their opinion, “the economist 
continues to search for differences in prices or incomes to explain any differences 
or changes in behaviour”. Simon (1959: 253–254) – another Nobel Prize winner 
who unquestionably belongs to the behaviourist school based on his work – in 
turn, defines economics as “the science that describes and predicts the behaviour 
of several kinds of economic man”.
On the whole then, it is indisputable that even though different schools of 
economics place different phenomena at the centre of their studies (e.g. exchange, 
institutions, macroeconomic trends), they cannot disassociate their work from 
human behaviour. The significance of this thought is underpinned in Becker (1976): 
“What most distinguishes economics as a discipline from other disciplines in the 
social sciences is not its subject matter but its approach. […] I contend that the 
economic approach is uniquely powerful because it can integrate a wide range 
of human behaviour, […] the economic approach is a comprehensive one that is 
applicable to all human behaviour” (quoted in Hámori 2003a:8). It is this general 
approach to human behaviour that has inspired, in recent decades, references 
to “economics imperialism”; in other words, the application of the approach and 
methodology of economics to a broad range of social sciences (Hirshleifer 1985).
3. Behavioural economics
Beyond a fundamentally positivistic and behaviour-centred attitude, behaviourism 
proceeded on a unique path within the realm of economic science and, to a certain 
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degree, bypassed the concepts described above. This led to the evolution of 
behavioural economics. Although it initially came into being as a heterodox school, it 
has now increasingly been integrated into the mainstream to become an extension 
of traditional economic analysis (Koltay–Vincze 2009). One of the novelties of 
behavioural economics is that it is based on a human model distinctly different from 
that of the neoclassical school: it dispenses with some of the characteristic features 
of the traditional homo oeconomicus. Some of them are basic premises constituting 
the backbone of neoclassical economics, while others are “less cardinal”; most 
of them, however, simply consider the natural constraints of the individual. The 
intention is to increase the realism of the psychological underpinnings of economic 
analysis in order to generate theoretical insights that are verifiable in practical terms, 
improving the quality and reliability of predictions and policy recommendations 
(Camerer–Loewenstein 2004). Thus, as regards its subject, behavioural economics 
point beyond Stigler and Becker’s (1989) aforementioned definition by observing 
human behaviour not only in terms of prices and incomes, but also in relation 
to other, “more human” factors. As such, behavioural economics is not a radical 
challenger of traditional theories; it is more like an amendment to them that helps 
expand the horizons opened up by its predecessors and hence, allows even the 
mainstream to integrate some of its results.2
We can state overall that in examining the behaviour of individuals and the drivers of 
their decisions, the trend relies heavily on the premises of neoclassical economics; 
however, it often supplements them with psychological insights, psychologically 
grounded features and emotional motives (Camerer–Loewenstein 2004; Mérő 2010; 
Rabin 2002). Thus, behavioural economics can be viewed, in certain regards, as the 
borderline between economics and psychology.
In respect of its methodology, behavioural economics draws heavily on empirical 
studies, including experiments. In contrast to natural sciences, however, economics 
cannot be regarded as an experimental science, as many economic phenomena 
(e.g. a crisis or decision on the base rate) cannot be exactly reproduced multiple 
times under controlled conditions. In recent decades, however, parallel to – or, to 
a certain degree, overlapping – behavioural economics, experimental economics 
(Smith 1989, 1994) has also gained significant ground in academic circles. Designed 
to model certain decision-making situations, these experiments pointed out that 
in certain situations people tend to systematically deviate from behaviour patterns 
considered rational by economics (Hámori 2003a; Mérő 2010). To a large degree, 
therefore, both experimental and behavioural economists base their assertions 
on empirical results (Sontheimer 2006). However, while experimental economists 
2  It follows from this that behavioural economics does not form a uniform school; in many cases, the 
authors express fundamentally different opinions. This is precisely why it is so difficult to provide a fully 
comprehensive overview of the trend.
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define themselves explicitly along the lines of this method, behavioural economists 
are not committed exclusively to experiments; they merely use experiments as 
a research tool (Camerer–Loewenstein 2004).
In addition to psychological considerations and empirical results, the findings of 
neuroeconomics also provide assistance to behavioural economists. This area 
seeks to understand human decisions and make behavioural predictions from the 
workings of the brain, using neuroscience (Camerer 2007; Camerer et al. 2005).
All of this demonstrates that the “toolset” and “subject pool” of behavioural 
economics is broader than those available to the neoclassical approach, and 
behavioural economists explicitly seek to replace unrealistic assumptions with better 
grounded premises. As a result, researchers in this area have arrived at results such 
as the description of benchmarks, sunk costs, commitment, packaging and validity 
bias, representativeness bias, alternative cost or the certainty effect (Camerer–
Loewenstein 2004; Hámori 2003a, 2003b). A common trait of these results is that 
they dispense with such neoclassical axioms as the theory of perfect rationality 
or the assumption of exclusive self-interest (Vanberg 2006). In the next part of 
the paper we focus on these two topics, examining their presence in neoclassical 
economics and taking account of the alterations introduced by the behavioural 
school.
4. Rationality in neoclassical and behavioural economics
One of the core assumptions of the neoclassical tradition is the rationality of 
economic agents (Vanberg 2006). This cannot be separated from the maximisation 
paradigm, a concept already present in the classical school. At that point, however, 
it was merely interpreted as “preferring more rather than less”, and even this 
assumption was primarily used to capture the production side. The next full 
step forward – the application of this theory to consumers – was taken by the 
marginalists: their rationality hypothesis was manifested in utility maximisation 
subject to budget constraints. And this approach, due to the anatomy of the 
demand curve, demanded the knowledge of the prices of all products on the market 
(Arrow 1986).
Subsequently, several versions and definitions of the rationality assumption were 
formulated; however, elaborating on them is beyond the scope of this essay (for 
more details, see Rubinstein 1998; Schiliró 2012; Simon 1955). Overall, it can be said 
that they mainly identify requirements in relation to consumer preferences, such as 
the criteria of completeness, transitivity, reflexivity and comparability (Hirshleifer 
et al. 2009; Varian 1991). Without their detailed overview, this paper is limited to 
the presentation of the main elements of more general definitions.
163
Bounded rationality and altruism: behaviourism in economics
Stigler (1987) identified three criteria of rationality: (i) consumers have stable 
preferences; (ii) they perform the correct cost calculations; and (iii) they make 
utility-maximising decisions. Koltay and Vincze (2009) set similar requirements for 
rational consumers: (i) they have intrinsic, consistent and complete preferences; (ii) 
they select the most beneficial option subject to their own physical and information 
constraints; and (iii) the assessment of their opportunities is only limited by their 
own lack of information. These criteria are profoundly reflected in the premise 
of instrumental rationality (rational tool selection). In essence, the concept of 
instrumental rationality asserts that – regardless of their objectives – decision-
makers are assumed to choose the best tools to achieve their goals (Kolodny–
Brunero 2013).
This rationality assumption of neoclassical economics has received much criticism. 
An example is related to the work of one of the most acclaimed pioneers of 
behavioural economics, Herbert Simon (1947, 1955, 1959, 1972, 1986, 1991) and 
his bounded rationality theory. This may be because Simon’s (1959) approach 
to economics was behaviouristic in the first place: he criticised normative 
microeconomics for wanting to know how economic agents “ought to behave, not 
how they do behave”. In addition, even his personal experiences motivated him to 
develop the theory of bounded rationality. As a fresh graduate, he landed his first 
job at the local public administration. He was astonished to find that none of his 
economics training was put to use at the workplace: rather than comparing the 
marginal benefit of a proposed expenditure with its marginal cost, decisions were 
made on the basis of entirely different considerations (Simon 1999).
The approach that recognised that economic agents were bound to face 
uncertainties and risks in their decisions did a great deal to soften the model of 
perfect rationality in itself (Jones 1999; Simon 1972). Thus, since the actor has 
incomplete information about the consequences, in order to maximise the expected 
return, he must make a choice by assigning probabilities to individual options 
(according to the “hard” approach, this is still performed completely rationally).
The theory of bounded rationality moves beyond this approach by asserting that the 
individual faces a number of constraints in making practical decisions (Simon 1972). 
The lack of individuals’ information on the alternatives, the cognitive limitations 
of their minds and the finite amount of time they have to make decisions are 
examples of such constraints (Schiliró 2012). These factors are also interrelated. The 
premise of neoclassical microeconomics, which presumes the presence of “search 
goods” in the economy (commodities on which all information is readily available 
with no additional cost), fails to work in practice (Weimer–Vining 2011). In reality, 
gathering information is an expensive and potentially time-consuming process; 
consumers therefore are not tempted to collect all relevant information in support 
of their decision. They would not have a chance to do so in any case, given the time 
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constraints and the natural cognitive limitations of the human mind. Thus, according 
to Simon (1955), the theory of bounded rationality underpins the practical, rather 
than the logical impossibility of perfect rationality.
The strength of the theory is demonstrated by the fact that its statements raise 
serious questions even in the most basic situations of neoclassical microeconomics. 
An example for that is the case of the pure monopoly which, in practice, would have 
to amass an enormous amount of complex information in order to understand the 
demand curve for its product and hence maximise its profit. It further complicates 
the monopoly’s predicament that any new pricing decision on its part will 
prompt other companies to follow suit. This in turn will have a repeated impact 
on the demand for the monopoly’s product, and the monopoly will have to start 
gathering information again (Arrow 1986). It is easy to see that this would be rather 
cumbersome in practice, if possible at all.
Due to its empirical orientation, the theory of bounded rationality has found ready 
acceptance in political science, whereas the theoretical discipline of economics 
largely ignored it (Jones 1999; Simon 1999). It has become clear, however, that 
economics cannot afford to ignore the notion of bounded rationality for long. 
Indeed, it is not only embraced by the behavioural school today, but it has also 
proven itself in the mainstream.
The theory of bounded rationality is accepted even by authors who do not use it as 
a point of reference. They often cite the “as if” argument (see for example, Friedman 
1953); namely, they profess to focus on the behaviour of decision-makers (and the 
results thereof), and are not concerned about how agents make their decisions. 
From this perspective, it is enough if the individual acts “as if” his decisions were 
perfectly rational, even though it is not the case in reality (Conlisk 1996; Rubinstein 
1998).
In addition to the above, the theory of bounded rationality was an excellent starting 
point for studying human behaviour and decision-making, enhancing academic 
thinking and connecting the insights with other topics. Noteworthy topics include, 
for example, the “Two Systems” theory (Kahneman 2003), which is closely related 
to cognitive sciences and describes the two modes of decision-making, and the 
rational ignorance theory, which models the political votes of voters (Downs 1990). 
The theory of March (1991; 1994) and March and Olsen (2004) about the “logic of 
appropriateness” i.e. rule-following modelling human decision-making is also worth 
mentioning. As opposed to the model of rational decision-making, in their paper the 
authors propose a framework where, faced with the complexity of the problems to 
be solved, instead considering a rational cost-benefit analysis the individual makes 
his decision by trying to answer the following question: “What does a person such as 
I do in a situation such as this?” In addition to this, the theory of bounded rationality 
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– or more precisely, Simon (1991) himself – largely contributed to the understanding 
of organisational behaviour and the decision-making processes of organisations 
by laying the foundations of procedural rationality. Indeed, the limited cognitive 
abilities of individuals may explain why, rather than maximising, organisations tend 
to adopt task performance rules, which give rise to complex role structures and 
routinise the decision-making mechanisms of the organisation (Jones 1999).
It is apparent that the workings of human decision-making are far more complicated 
than the rationality model of neoclassical economics envisaged. This, however, does 
not imply the inevitable rejection of the classical rationality postulate, nor does 
it suggest that we should surmise the irrationality of economic agents from the 
deterioration of rationality. Quite the contrary: the theory of bounded rationality 
underscores that, while economic agents intend to be rational in their decisions, 
they fail to do so in practice (achieve perfect rationality) because of their cognitive 
limitations (Jones 1999).
The recognition of the limitation of rationality benefited mainstream economics 
itself, while providing a basis for extensive research in behavioural economics as 
well. Its gradual integration into mainstream thinking facilitates a more realistic 
approach to the problems arising, encouraging the use of multiple perspectives and 
potentially less simplification. Thus, although the behavioural school has questioned 
a core assumption of neoclassical economics, by developing the bounded rationality 
model it complemented, rather than destroyed its results and opened up new 
avenues for exploration.
5. Self-interest in neoclassical and behavioural economics
Besides rationality, another basic premise of economics is self-interest. The concept 
appeared initially in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776) and subsequently 
crystallised in Edgeworth3 (1881). The assumption of an economic agent’s self-seeking 
– which initially served as a countervailing force to passion (Hirschman 1998) – 
did an excellent service to economics. It can be used to capture different economic 
trends by means of “well behaved” and easy to calibrate models. However, the 
empirical results of behavioural and experimental economics demonstrated that 
people are far from being self-seekers in all situations.
Before presenting an overview of the criticism, it is important to stress that self-
interest is a neutral attitude, far from being identical with resentment, jealousy or 
malevolence (Hámori 2003a). Of course, this does not mean that these categories 
are unknown to behavioural economics. Their inclusion in the theory, however, 
3  Although Edgeworth (1881:16) asserts that “The first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated 
only by self-interest”, some of his models may well be considered the forerunners of the use of social 
incomes, to be outlined below in the context of Becker.
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is made possible precisely by a broadening of perspective which paved the way 
for studying – in addition to neutral self-interest – goodwill, altruism or any other 
emotional motivation.
Initially, the economic school that presumes strict self-interest could not interpret 
altruism at all, even though its existence had been proved time and time again by 
everyday observations and by the research of experimental economics (see for 
example, Rose-Ackerman 1996; Gächter et al. 2012). The economists who presumed 
the existence of some benevolence, considered it to be a part of human nature 
(Becker 1976), and associated it with given preferences (Stigler–Becker 1989). 
That notwithstanding, the phenomenon of altruism has now been examined by 
several authors, based on various approaches and interpretations. Since their full 
presentation is beyond the scope of this paper, we limit our comments to a few 
general characteristics and two more profound interpretations of altruism.
Although the literature does not offer a precise definition of altruism, its different 
manifestations can be classified into the following three categories: selfish altruism, 
reciprocal altruism and pure altruism (Hámori 2003a).
We talk about selfish altruism when a person behaves as if he was acting unselfishly, 
while in reality he is driven by his own interests. In practice, this type of altruism 
is not very different from pure self-interest, and the ostensibly altruistic action is 
all but a tool to maximise profit. Reciprocal altruism can be best described by the 
concept of “gift-exchange” (Gächter et al. 2012). In essence, the person exercises 
altruism because some day he expects to be rewarded in kind. This differs from 
selfish altruism in the sense that the reciprocal altruist does not expect reciprocity 
in the same transaction, from the same person he benefited. He merely counts 
on receiving the same generosity in a similar situation from another member of 
society. In this regard, reciprocal altruism does not represent a mutually beneficial 
transaction between two persons, as is the case in market exchange; it merely 
expects good deeds to be reciprocated over the long run at the level of society. 
Beyond all this, pure altruism is the phenomenon when a person exercises altruism 
toward others truly unselfishly, without hope for some future reward4 (Hámori 
2003a).
From the perspective of evolution, the dominance of self-interest was a notion 
broadly advocated by natural sciences as well; at the same time, similar to their 
peers in economics, some biologists and geneticists asked themselves the following 
4  Critics of the category often argue that even pure altruism can be traced back to a form of self-love (Hámori 
2003a). They claim that good deeds done for others by an altruist imply a utility increment benefiting 
the altruist himself; ergo, his behaviour can be practically attributed to self-seeking utility maximisation. 
Although below we will touch upon an interpretation where the usefulness of other persons is also included 
in the utility function, for the purposes of this paper, we will not attempt to provide justification for the 
existence of this category.
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question: if self-interest has the highest survival value, why can we observe altruistic 
behaviour among animals as well as human beings? In other words: why should 
altruistic behaviour – which, by definition, reduces the individual’s chances of 
survival – also survive? Sociobiology sought an answer to this question by building 
models with group selection. They propose that altruism can be observed between 
kin, i.e. individuals sharing the same gene pool. According to this approach, although 
the altruistic deed reduces the chances of survival for the altruist himself, it 
improves the genetic fitness of his kin. At the group level, then, altruism is a rational 
behaviour (Becker 1976; Hirshleifer 1978).
According to Becker (1976), this altruism interpretation can be also applied to 
economics. He built a two-person model in which he introduced, as a new category, 
the altruist’s social income which, besides his own income, also includes the income 
of the beneficiary partner. As a result, an altruistic attitude can be reconciled 
with the features of the self-seeking homo oeconomicus by inserting the utility 
(or income) of the beneficiary partner into the utility function maximised by the 
altruist. Thus, the positive effects deriving from connecting different utilities may 
be sufficient to dominate the direct disadvantages of being altruistic.
Besides incorporating altruism into his theory by relying on the orthodox tools of 
economics and describing altruism as a rational activity, Becker’s model yielded 
additional positive results. Most importantly, by using his model involving an altruist 
and a related egoist, he pointed out that, due to the linkage between their utility 
functions, the behaviour of the altruist may be an incentive for the egoist to act 
as if he himself were an altruist. Thus, in some cases, even the egoist will refrain 
from steps that would reduce the income of the altruist or, in other cases, may even 
tolerate the reduction of his own income if it sufficiently increases the altruist’s. 
Becker (1974) described the practical manifestation of this theory using a multi-
player family model as an example and by outlining the “rotten-kid theorem”. Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) used a similar method – inserting relative income distribution 
into the utility function – to provide evidence that economic agents do not 
necessarily prefer inequality; in some cases they tend to have a preference for 
altruism even to the detriment of their own utility. Similarly, Charness and Rabin 
(2002) build their model along the lines of social preferences (consideration for 
others’ social welfare) demonstrating that subjects are more willing to take sacrifices 
to increase the payoffs for low-payoff recipients.
Despite these positive results, the approach presented above is also open to 
theoretical criticism: the application of interdependent utility functions may be 
challenged. While the existence of group-level rationality might be acceptable 
in sociobiological arguments, it is not necessarily true from the perspective 
of economics, a science firmly rooted in individual-level rationality. Indeed, 
the application of interdependent preferences (Pollak 1976) violates the core 
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assumption of the discipline, the principle of methodological individualism (Frey–
Stutzer 2000), rendering the preferences of players instable (Hámori 2003a). That 
notwithstanding, the method is undeniably good: in certain situations, it captures 
the behaviour of individuals better than the neoclassical approach; thus, subject 
to methodological reservations, its existence within the discipline can be justified.
In contrast to the above, Simon (1990, 1991, 1993) relied on the theory of bounded 
rationality to derive the operating logic of altruism. He maintained that, instead 
of perpetually performing cost-benefit calculations, in certain decision situations 
individuals are inclined to act on the basis of learned patterns (cf. March 1991, 
1994; March–Olsen 2004). According to Simon, these patterns may derive from 
other members of the society and, given that altruism – as sociobiologists found – 
benefits the entire society at group level, society itself may be inclined to encourage 
easily influenced (docile) individuals for altruism.
In summary, it is apparent that altruism has numerous interpretations and 
methodological approaches, even within the behavioural paradigm. This 
suggests that we are faced with an existing phenomenon. We may not be able to 
explain altruism with one hundred per cent precision, but we cannot ignore the 
phenomenon, especially in view of its capability of improving the predictive power 
of economic models and the accuracy of forecasts.
6. Summary
This essay was intended to demonstrate that, as early as the previous century, 
the science of economics was aware of and to a certain degree acknowledged 
the theories of bounded rationality and altruism. This is all the more true in light 
of the heterogeneous nature of economics: outside of the realm of the uniform 
mainstream, there are numerous heterodox schools, different in approach, 
methodology and assertions alike. This paper has focused on one of them, 
behavioural economics, and responded to the criticism of “economics as a whole”.
As we pointed out, one of the main aspirations of the behavioural school was to 
use the approach of behaviourism to build its theories on more realistic benchmark 
assumptions. Important building blocks in this endeavour included the recognition 
of the individual’s cognitive limitations and altruistic attitudes towards others, and 
the insertion of these elements into the modelling of human nature. Since most 
of these results have now been accepted into mainstream economics, it would be 
a mistake to assume that the science of economics (whether in general, or limited 
to certain schools) is unaware of these categories.
Nevertheless, the science of economics – including its conclusions – should always 
be open to criticism, all the more so as this is a good incentive for researchers 
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to capture reality better. Such challenges may have ultimately led to the results 
presented above and integration of most of the achievements into the mainstream. 
Thus, as we pointed out, critiques asserting that the discipline only recognises the 
rigorous human model of homo oeconomicus can be refuted. In this paper we 
provided evidence to the contrary by demonstrating that a far more extensive range 
of tools is available to researchers, modellers and forecasters, and henceforth, the 
utilisation of these tools hinges only upon their responsible decisions and available 
resources.
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The leaven of growth
Tamás Rózsás 
David Ricardo, a prominent economist at the turn of the 19th century, argued for 
free trade against mercantilists by pointing out the possible gain arising from the 
comparative advantages of countries through the international division of labour 
and specialisation. In addition, this comparative advantage contributes to narrowing 
the formidable income gap between rich and poor countries. Indeed, if these under-
developed countries export products that can be produced by low-skilled labour 
force, demand for low-skilled workers will rise, reducing income inequality in the 
given country.
This model worked fairly smoothly during the first wave of 18th century globalisation 
both in Europe and in America. Recent events, however, appear to challenge the 
validity of the model. World Bank data indicate that global inequality, as measured 
by the distribution of income between rich and poor countries, declined in the 
period of 1988–2008. However, the picture is far less rosy when we look at inequality 
within individual countries: inequality has widened in many poor economies. The 
widening gap observed in developing countries suggests that Ricardo’s theory 
needs updating. Harvard University Professor and Nobel laureate (2007) Eric Maskin 
attempted to do so at the Lindau Meeting on Economic Sciences.
According to his theory, unskilled workers can be more productive when matched 
with skilled ones. Assigning a manager to a group of workers can improve the 
group’s performance better than just adding another worker. Maskin classifies 
workers into four categories: high-skilled workers in rich countries (A); low-skilled 
workers in rich countries (B); high-skilled workers in poor countries (C); and low-
skilled workers in poor countries (D). Importantly, Maskin claims that the Bs are 
likely to be more productive than the Cs.
Before the current wave of globalisation started in the 1980s, high-skilled and low-
skilled employees worked together in developing countries, which improved the 
productivity of unskilled workers (Ds) and thus, narrowed the income gap. However, 
the latest bout of globalisation has put a spanner in the works: high-skilled workers 
in developing economies can now work more easily with low-skilled workers in rich 
countries. As a result, the Cs working with Ds end up earning more, while the Ds 
are left on the sidelines with shrinking income.
Tamás Rózsás is an analyst at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. E-mail: rozsast@mnb.hu. 
This review is based on the article entitled “Revisiting Ricardo”, published in the 23 August 2014 issue of The 
Economist and summarized in the first issue of the Global Monetary Observer of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
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The booming trade in intermediate goods heightens the demand for skilled workers 
in developing countries. In Mexico, for instance, wages offered by export-oriented 
firms are 60 per cent higher than those paid by non-exporting companies. In 
Indonesia, white-collar workers of foreign-owned companies earned 70 per cent 
more than their peers working for locally owned firms.
The weakness of Maskin’s argument is the lack of data to back up his theory 
that skilled workers indeed benefit from the process. If he is right, however, the 
advocates of globalisation will have to figure out how to reap the rewards without 
leaving the poor employees of poor countries behind.
There is a lesson to be learned in Hungary from Maskin’s propositions, as well. On 
the one hand, incentives should be found to keep high-skilled employees in Hungary, 
because this would improve the chances of the Hungarian unskilled labour force to 
increase its productivity and income. On the other hand, efforts should be made 
to ensure that high-skilled Hungarian workers work together with their low-skilled 
Hungarian peers rather than with the low-skilled employees of countries more 
developed than Hungary. Domestic industrial projects – which can engage low-
skilled Hungarian workers easily – offer a good opportunity in this regard. Finally, 
with Maskin’s results in mind, it might be rewarding to consider the reinforcement 
or renewal of Hungarian management training as well: if assigning a manager does 
more for the performance of a group than the mere adding of another worker, then 
Hungary will be in need of well-trained managers. Their presence in the workforce 
may well be the leaven of growth.
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Response to the comment of András 
Simonovits
József Banyár  
First of all, I would like to express my pleasure that one of the greatest figure of the 
Hungarian pension insurance profession reacted to my study (Banyár, 2014) within 
such a short time. Below, following the order of sequence and numbering of the 
exposition by András Simonovits, I try to react to each of his statements. 
1. child-rearing and pension in the OLG model
In two short paragraphs, Mr Simonovits formulated the following statements with 
regard to my writing: 
a)  “it can really be argued for that families with children should receive higher 
pensions or pay less for social security contributions than those with no children.”
b)  “he ignored the fact that the model mentioned as his own work also appeared 
in writings of Gale (1974) and Augusztinovics (1983, 1992).”
With regard to statement a), I think it is important to note that in my writing I do 
not argue that households with children should pay less contributions or receive 
higher pensions. On the contrary, I say that every person should pay the same 
amount of contribution, but for this amount nobody can have a claim to any pension 
because this is only the settlement of their debt. A pension is only payable to 
those who reared children and thereby contributed to the maintenance of the 
contribution payment capacity. Everything that is attributed to me has been said 
by other persons with regard to the issue rather than by me.
As regards b), I really use the term “my model” in two places, but only in order to 
make difference between the original model of Samuelson and the way in which I 
had supplemented his model. This can really be misunderstood and I apologise for 
that; now I say it more precisely: I do not think that I have created an independent 
model; the model remains the ownership of Samuelson, and I only supplemented it 
in a point, namely: I added another simple, linear equation to Samuelson’s simple, 
linear equations. I myself do not call it a modelling performance. The performance 
of the article is the conclusions that had been drawn by me and this is a novelty; 
neither Gale nor Augusztinovics go in this direction. However, I myself also discuss 
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in the summary at large (but not expansively at all), how many people had already 
tried to explicitly include child-rearing in the OLG model. Of course, the excellent 
articles cited by Simonovits should also have been included in this study (together 
with many other articles); I need to apologise for that as well.
2. The tax on childlessness and its problems
Here, Simonovits objected that I do not study how the costs of child-rearing can 
be compensated outside of the pension system. He is right in the respect that I did 
not analyse this aspect in this article, but I reviewed all of the problems he raised 
in this point in one of my other articles (Banyár 2012).
There is a simple reason why I do not discuss here what he missed: it was not 
a preconception on my side that the problem of child-rearing must be solved within 
the pension system and I did not want to find arguments for that. Instead, I checked 
what the problem was in the pension systems built on Samuelson’s principles and 
I faced the problem of child-rearing and I explained that in my article. However, 
I admit (as I did both in my article written in 2012 and in another article under 
publication) that the problem of child-rearing costs can theoretically be solved 
outside the pension system as well. It is another question that if we try to do so, 
we find such problems which are mentioned by Simonovits (and are also discussed 
by me) and the tax level should be increased in general very significantly, while, if 
it is solved within the pension system, the pensions should be reduced for certain 
segments; consequently, the solution within the pension system seems to be much 
more feasible.
3. The role of child-rearing and pension in my writings
According to Mr Simonovits, in my article I placed his earlier writing in a false 
light (Simonovits 2002). I wrote the following: “Samuelson’s article influenced 
the modelling of pension in another way as well. Based on his model it became 
a common view that, in relation to the pension, the human career starts in the 
active age and they entirely disregarded the upbringing of people and its costs (this 
approach is followed in the Hungarian pension theory, for example, by the works 
of Simonovits – see, for example (Simonovits 2002).” Namely:
1.  I mentioned the book written in 2002 as an example of a common phenomenon 
and Simonovits also admits that basically this was the guideline followed by the 
book.
2.  On the other hand, I mentioned him as the person who had already taken into 
consideration these problems in his recent writings.
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Despite these facts, I could have formulated my text in relation to the book even in 
a more differentiated way. In a more differentiated approach I would have had to 
emphasise that everyone, including both of the works of Simonovits cited by me 
in the article, takes Samuelson’s AI history as a basis.
4. which is the better: the Pay-as-you-go or the capitalised pension 
system?
In this point, Simonovits largely agrees with me. On the other hand, he makes an 
allusion in the last paragraph that can be understood as if I proposed that the work-
based pension systems should be liquidated and instead a funded system should be 
introduced. Indeed, I have some writings of this type (e.g. Banyár–Mészáros 2003) 
where I propose that solution in the last resort. However, my article analysed by 
Mr Simonovits is not of this ilk; here, I propose the introduction of the pay-as-you 
go pension system based on another history than that described by Samuelson, 
i.e. not a funded or only a partially funded one (for childless persons). Basic state 
pension is not mentioned in my article at all.
Thus, in my article I do not propose that work-based systems be terminated (even 
though after the proposed change, the application of the word “work” will not be 
justified any more) or reduced to the basic state pension and I do not propose either 
that it should be funded. Instead, I propose that we should declare: contributions 
are due to the previous generation for having reared us and nothing is due to us for 
paying the contributions; i.e. if we want to have pension in the future, we should 
either rear children or set aside the money saved on not having reared children 
and this will be the source of our pension.
It is also important to emphasise that I do not disregard migration and immigration; 
what is more, I worry that, for this reason, the situation will be still worse in our 
country than currently because people will mainly migrate (I held an exposé on 
this issue in the autumn of 2014). On the other hand, I much prefer the flexible 
retirement age; it is absolutely necessary (I have already written that in several 
works) even in the system proposed in this article, simply because it makes any 
pension system unsustainable that the continuous increase in life expectancy 
appears only in the increase of the years spent as a pensioner and the active 





Augusztinovics, M. (1983): Emberek és gazdaságok, Közgazdasági Szemle, Vol. 30, pp. 385–402. 
Augusztinovics, M. (1992): Towards a Theory of Stationary Populations, manuscript, KTI, Budapest 
(earlier version: IEHAS, Discussion Paper, 1991).
Augusztinovics, M. (1993): Egy értelmes nyugdíjrendszer, Közgazdasági Szemle, Vol. 40, pp. 
415–431. 
Banyár, J. – Mészáros, J. (2003): Egy lehetséges és kívánatos nyugdíjrendszer, Budapest, Gondolat.
Banyár, J. (2012): Gyereknevelés és nyugdíj – összekapcsolható, vagy sem? 
(In: Kovács, E. (Ed.) (2012): Nyugdíj és gyermekvállalás. Tanulmánykötet. Gondolat Kiadó, 
Budapest, 180 p.
Banyár, J. (2014): A modern nyugdíjrendszer kialakulásának két története, Hitelintézeti Szemle, 
Vol. 13. Issue 4. http://www.hitelintezetiszemle.hu/Root/MNBSzemle/tartalom/cikkenkent/7_
Banyar.pdf Downloaded: 17 December 2014.
Gale, D. (1973): Pure Exchange Equilibrium of DynamicEconomicModels, Journal of Economic 
Theory, Vol. 6, pp. 12–36. 
Kovács, E. (Ed.) (2012): Nyugdíj és gyermekvállalás tanulmánykötet – 2012, Gondolat Kiadó, 
Budapest, 180 p.
Simonovits, A. (2002): Nyugdíjrendszerek: tények és modellek, Budapest, Typotex.
179
why and how we cheat? 
György Dávid Csikós
Dan Ariely:
The (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty (How we lie to everyone – especially ourselves)
USA: Harper Perennial, Reprint edition, 2013, p. 336 
ISBN-10: 0062183613 (paperback)
Dan Ariely is a professor of psychology and behavioural economics at Duke 
University in the United States. In his book “The (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty” 
published in 2013, he wants to find an answer to the question why and when 
we cheat, how we lie even to ourselves and how our motivations can influence 
our judgement. The author also lists practical tools that can help us to restrain 
dishonesty. In order to support his arguments, Ariely presents a number of 
experiments, and for the purpose of deeper understanding, he provides anecdotes 
from his own life as examples, of which I only highlight a few. 
Immediately at the beginning of the book, the author refutes the model entitled 
‘Simple Model of Rational Crime (SMORC)’ from the Nobel laureate economist, 
Gary Becker. According to Becker’s theory, only rational factors drive our actions, 
i.e. when making decisions, we only compare benefits and costs. It follows from 
the theory that the number of crimes can be reduced if the potential cost of 
perpetrators is increased (stricter punishment is anticipated). According to his 
experiments,1 Ariely claims that, as against the model and the intuition, neither 
the expected benefit nor the probability of getting caught determines the quantity 
of fraud. In his opinion, a much more complex thing is the case here as compared 
to what is supposed by a standard economist.
According to Ariely’s theory, when considering their decision, the people are 
balancing between two contrasting motivations: on the one hand, they would like 
to see themselves as sincere and honest persons and, on the other hand, they 
would like to benefit from the advantages provided by dishonesty. However, both 
György Dávid Csikós is an employee at Magyar Nemzeti Bank. E-mail: csikosgy@mnb.hu.
Allegedly, Becker’s theory was inspired by a personal event. One day, he was in delay from a meeting and he 
was only able to park illegally. When making his decision, he only took into consideration the fact whether 
the benefit (arrive at the meeting in time) exceeds his cost or not (he might be fined). He did not consider 
what “the right or wrong behaviour” would have been.
1  To quantify the dishonesty, the persons participating in the experiment had to solve simple mathematical 
tasks under different conditions (participants were allowed to cheat in various ways).
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of these contradictory desires may be fulfilled at the same time if we are able to 
exculpate our acts or to explain our wrong action to ourselves. The interpretation of 
the experiments performed by Ariely was that every participant cheated practically 
to the same extent, but always just a little and the number of persons who had 
cheated to a great extent was only minimal. According to the statement by the 
author, as long as people cheat only “a little bit”,2 they can enjoy its advantages 
while they can retain a positive image for themselves.
A second important finding by Ariely is that people cheat or steal more easily if it 
is not money that is involved, but, let’s say, copy paper, a pen or a can if cola left 
in the common refrigerator of the residential college. The editor draws attention 
to the fact that the more we move to the cash-free world, the more we can expect 
the spread of dishonesty.
On the basis of his research, Ariely states that similarly to viruses dishonesty 
can also be contagious. A finding of his experiment carried out at the Carnegie 
Mellon University (CMU) was that the participants cheated more when they saw 
that a student belonging to their group (a CMU student) cheated, as compared 
to the case in which the cheating was by a student outside of their group, i.e. by 
a student from a rival university. In the editor’s opinion, minor offences must not 
be overlooked because they may easily become contagious and can lead to more 
serious transgressions.
In his book, the editor also presents how favours influence our decisions. In the 
experiment he presents, the participants were divided into two groups: one part 
was told that the experiment was sponsored by the “Third Moon” Gallery and 
the other part that it was sponsored by the “Lone Wolf”. Afterwards, they had to 
evaluate 60 paintings and the logo of the gallery where the picture can be purchased 
was indicated in the corner of each picture. The participants evaluated the pictures 
of the gallery with a better mark in the case when they saw the gallery’s logo and 
thought that this gallery sponsored the experiment. Another interesting discovery 
by the researchers was that preference for the pictures of the “sponsor” increased 
proportionally with the payment due for participation in the experiment. The editor 
stated that, in case someone makes a favour or gives a gift to us, then it influences 
our decision without noticing it. Otherwise, the large pharmaceutical companies 
understood and successfully apply these techniques. Frequently, they attempt 
to encourage doctors to recommend or prescribe the products of the relevant 
company to their patients by giving smaller gifts or an invitation to dinner.
On the other hand, lies have not only shady side but have also positive role for the 
purpose of the operation of the society. Ariely brings forward his own history as an 
2  On the other hand, it is important to note that the “aggregate” value of a lot of little cases of dishonesty 
exceeded that of a few large ones.
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example. In his young age, he suffered third degree burns affecting 70% of his body 
and therefore, he had to undergo a number of operations. Nurses encouraged him 
saying that the operations would not cause pain (which proved to be a lie later) and 
in this way, he spent at least the period remaining to the operation calmly.
At the same time, based on the experiments, Ariely proposes solutions as well for 
the “prevention” of dishonesty as well as for hindering non-ethical behaviour. If 
we are, directly or indirectly, reminded of the rules of ethics, then we will cheat 
less. This reminder may even be the Ten Commandments (the recalling of which 
was sufficient for the participants in the experiment not to cheat) or the signing 
of a declaration (Honour Code), in which the participants agreed not to cheat in 
the future.
In his book, Ariely listed a number of factors about which we would think that they 
influence our decisions, which, however, do not affect us decisively in reality, while 
there are many circumstances and impacts, about which we would not think that 
they influence us but they still do.
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Zsolt Kovalszky  
Jim Rickards:
The Death of Money – The coming collapse of the international monetary system
USA: Portfolio/Penguin, 2014, p. 368
ISBN: 978-1-59184-670-3 (paperback)
According to financial expert James Rickards, the collapse of the global monetary 
system is imminent. “Don’t look for snowflakes,” warns Rickards. “Watch out for the 
avalanche.” In his book “The Death of Money”, Rickards forecasts that events worse 
than the 2008 financial crisis will surely materialise. Russia’s and China’s efforts to 
shed the US dollar as reserve currency are just one indicator of this inevitable event. 
Rickards’s book on the fall of the dollar was published in April with an apocalyptic 
title. The author is surprised that a lot of the things he talks about in the book are 
happening much faster than he would have expected. Rickards claims that the fall 
of the dollar may trigger the collapse, as the greenback is the foundation of the 
entire system. Countries wielding real power such as Russia, China, Iran, and India 
do not base their national security on the US, and therefore the weakening of the 
US economy would be to their advantage, so they are trying to shed the dollar-
based system.
Rickards deems that the collapse seems increasingly likely, and there are three 
major international players putting great pressure on the dollar: Russia, China, and 
Saudi Arabia. The threats to the dollar come from multiple directions. The only 
chance to repay the USD 1.7 trillion government debt would be inflation, which 
would, however, put off all other protagonists from the dollar. At the same time, 
the substantial increase in Russia’s and China’s gold reserves suggest a shift towards 
a new reserve asset.
Although the book is riveting and offers several arguments worth considering, it 
often takes on the form of an overly apocalyptic vision and most of the solutions 
proposed seem extreme. In terms of its structure, the book progresses rather slowly 
along its logical course. The first part interprets the events of September 11. The 
author then discusses the current state of the world and the global economy, and 
how the 2008 financial system crisis emerged. The book focuses mainly on a China, 
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Europe, emerging economies, and the US. The author holds outdated models 
responsible for the crisis and the slow recovery, which are no longer suitable for 
addressing economic developments. Rickards asserts that economists and decision-
makers are turning a blind eye to reality, which puts markets in a perilous position 
and may ultimately lead to the collapse of the financial system.
In the author’s judgement, the world is currently based on fiat money (currency 
that is not backed by a physical commodity besides a government guarantee), 
which is only as good as confidence in the dollar. The current financial system is 
based on the global supremacy of the dollar, with the dollar acting as the de facto 
central currency. Rickards’s basic theory holds that because the Fed, the American 
central bank, and government administration are managing the dollar’s global 
market position poorly, the dollar, which had functioned as the global currency 
in the past, will lose this status. The collapse of the dollar may result in collapsing 
confidence in the purchasing power of the global currency, which could sweep 
across the central banks of the world and the business players using the dollar. The 
loss of confidence in the dollar could then inevitably lead either to the inflationary 
environment that prevailed in the 1970s, causing the depreciation of capital stock, 
or trigger a deflationary spiral as seen in the US in the 1930s or faced by the 
Japanese economy for the past decades. According to the scenario presented by 
the author, the dollar will have become irrelevant by around 2020 and our notion 
of money will have radically changed. Thus, the book addresses the demise of 
the current financial system and consequently, the dollar, rather than the death 
of money. Needless to say, Rickards cannot predict the future with certainty, and 
therefore he leaves unanswered the question of whether it will be deflation or 
hyperinflation that causes the demise of the current financial system.
As a real historian, Rickards’s book presents modern economic history in a flowing 
narrative style focusing on facts. As a result, the book is free of any factual errors. 
Rickards argues that as a result of the US government’s poor management of the 
dollar and increasing financial imperialism, many countries have started searching 
for a way to cut their reliance on the dollar. China, Russia, and the states of the 
Persian Gulf have starting forming alliances sharing economic, military, foreign 
policy, and financial interests. One of the key areas facing significant structural 
challenges is currently the European Union. Rickards deems that – under the 
strict supervision of the Bundesbank – the euro area functions as a synthetic gold 
standard regime, as the monetary union strips member states of their capacity 
to generate new fiat money, and therefore a possible solution to the issue raised 
by the author could be the fiscal centralisation of European countries. Of course, 
there remains one solution for the US and thus for the maintenance of the current 
financial system (that the author does not see as unrealistic): a drastic cut in and 
regulation of public sector spending, which the author regards as a politically 
unfathomable scenario.
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is uS dominance threatened?
Attila Méhes 
Glenn Hubbard – Tim Kane:
Balance – The economics of great powers from ancient Rome to modern America
Simon & Schuster, 2013, p. 368
ISBN: 1476700265 
Glenn Hubbard and Tim Kane’s book published in 2013 by Simon & Schuster, entitled 
“Balance: The Economics of Great Powers from Ancient Rome to Modern America” 
examines the great empires of the past that have risen and then fallen into decline 
from a purely economic perspective.
The authors analyse the economic and institutional drivers behind the rise and 
subsequent fall of ancient Rome, the Chinese, Spanish, and Ottoman empires, Japan, 
the UK, the European Union and California. At the end of the book, the authors 
address the current situation of the United States and formulate recommendations 
for the US on how to avoid meeting the same fate, that is, inevitable collapse.
Although the rise and fall of great powers has been discussed by many and in 
many ways in the past, for instance in Paul Kennedy’s 1986 book “The rise and fall 
of the Great Powers”, the great powers have not been analysed from an economic 
perspective, giving rise to many flawed conclusions about their demise.
The authors argue that the fall of every great power was triggered by internal 
economic and institutional imbalance, as the weight of great powers stems primarily 
from their economic dominance and only indirectly from their military force or 
geographic size, which is more apparent to the world at large. For instance, the 
demise of the Roman Empire was far more attributable to its economic faltering 
than its excessive geographic expansion, which was long considered by many as 
the reason for its fall. The decline that unfolded in the 3rd century resulted from 
a flawed economic policy that weakened the military and rendered it unable to 
face Barbarian invasions.
The flawed economic policies of great powers always stemmed from the institutional 
systems that enabled their rise, but were incapable of accommodating change or 
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reacted inadequately to such change. Late or flawed reforms generally resulted 
from a lack of knowledge or pressure from groups interested in maintaining the 
prevailing institutional system. Staying on the topic of the Roman Empire, policy-
makers had no means of foreseeing the negative impact of a depreciating currency 
on the economy, chiefly on the all-important field of commerce, as economics 
had not yet emerged as a discipline at the time, and inflation or mechanisms of 
monetary policy were simply unknown. At the time, continuously depreciating the 
currency seemed entirely logical and rational, generating increasingly larger volumes 
of tax revenue for rulers, which they used to attempt to fund the growing state and 
military expenditures. However, they did not (and could not) predict the long-term 
adverse impacts.
The aforementioned great powers all followed a similar path, encountering 
difficulties in reforming the institutional system that had fostered their rise, either 
due to a lack of knowledge or action by interest groups.
The solutions to the current issues facing the United States due to its indebtedness 
are not unbeknownst to politicians, but the political institutional system chooses 
to short-change the future to focus on short-term success, i.e. securing re-election. 
This institutional system will not allow political decision-makers to take steps in the 
near future that could lead to long-term success at the price of short-term political 
sacrifices.
The book asserts that the demise of the US is not imminent, as its productivity and 
capacity for innovation will continue to support its leading position, its economic 
institutions remain the best in the world, and rivals can only hope to approach its 
level of development. History has proven that a bout of political stagnation may 
render smoothly functioning institutions outdated, which could give rise to serious 
risk. The great powers of the past show that the US cannot eternally stay on a path 
of political polarisation and budget imbalance. Congress will have to make difficult 
decisions in the face of fiscal challenges to prevent them from becoming an even 
bigger issue in future.
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Rékási Róbert  
David Shambaugh:
China Goes Global-Partial Power
Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 432
ISBN: 9780199860142 (hardcover)
In his book “China Goes Global-Partial Power”, David Shambaugh, professor at 
George Washington University, addresses a topic and related matter that appears 
to warrant a straightforward “yes” in reply, namely whether China can be regarded 
as a global power (the author answers the question in the title).
The author dissects the global role and presence of China from multiple 
perspectives, from the economy to security policy and culture through diplomacy, 
and examines China’s image of itself and its own global role.
Over the past decades, China has gone from a peripheral nation to one of the 
leading global powers thanks to its carefully governed process, the Reform and 
Opening-up policy. It is China’s firm objective to not only be strong in one, but 
several dimensions of power, including technology, the economy and education, 
fostering its effort to become a total power. Shambaugh deems that China’s global 
presence is superficial, in that although it is ubiquitous, its presence is characterised 
by a passive and reactive attitude rather than the attitude of leader that would be 
necessary for it to attain its desired status.
Its own identity is also contentious for China, which is facing a sort of identity crisis. 
There is no homogenous identity, but rather several parallel or rival identities. The 
supporters of certain beliefs favour the maintenance of national autonomy and are 
suspicious towards the outside world, particularly Western countries and regard 
the above-mentioned Reform and Opening-up policy as a stain on China and its 
culture. Today, the predominant current aims to shore up China (its economy and 
military) and protect its interests, but some proponents of this approach stress 
the importance of diplomacy and culture, while others would emphasise focus on 
the great global powers and are calling for involvement only in matters relevant 
to China.
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China has emerged from total isolation four decades ago to become a global 
diplomatic factor. However, diplomacy is an area where China remains only a partial 
power. For one, China, as a global power, is a permanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council and a participant at all key diplomatic summits. However, 
China is mainly driven by its strict national interests (economic development, 
geographic integrity) and is less active in terms of global issues. Chinese diplomacy is 
characterised by behaviour fluctuating between extremes, being at times pragmatic, 
cooperative, proactive and globally oriented, while being at other times assertive 
or even aggressive.
As China continues to gain strength as a great power and see its global impact 
increase, Western democracies are increasingly demanding that it play its part in 
international matters. However the term “global governance” has only recently 
been added the Chinese vocabulary. The Chinese regard this demand for greater 
international responsibility by Western countries with suspicion, and see it as 
a potential ensnarement or trap. China fears that after colonisation, this is just 
another way to restrict China’s opportunities by diverting resources from its 
domestic economic development. The majority of China’s citizens focus on local 
issues and fail to see the necessity and importance of taking part in the resolution 
of global issues. In addition, the Chinese consider the current international system 
unfair, and therefore China is unlikely to become a committed participant in 
international matters.
The economy is where China’s power and international presence is the most 
conspicuous. The Chinese economy is the second largest economy in the world 
after the US and is likely to become the largest one in the upcoming decade. But 
despite what is suggested by numerous statistics of this kind, China’s international 
position is not as strong as it appears. Although China is a great power in terms 
of commerce, bottom-shelf manufactured goods comprise the lion’s share of its 
exports, while the proportion of financial services and knowledge-intensive goods 
is very low. In addition, only a handful of Chinese firms have risen to the status of 
industry leaders on a global scale, and the international perception of the quality 
of Chinese goods is also poor. These factors attest to the fact that China is also 
a partial power in the economic domain.
After accumulating global power, China realised the importance of its own image 
and of cultural power, but there is no unified opinion on what elements it can 
use to achieve this. Some propose values rooted in ancient Chinese culture, also 
regarded as universal values: peace and harmony, morality, etiquette and good faith. 
Others support the capacity and legitimacy of the Chinese political system as the 
foundations of cultural power. The third approach proposes basing China’s cultural 
power on its development and economic convergence. In a nutshell, China’s cultural 
power and cultural attractiveness is currently very low and is not set to change in 
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the near future until China realises that it must concentrate on earning cultural 
power using the opportunities available rather than buying it.
It may first come as a surprise that China, which has the world’s largest army, is 
not a global military power, but much rather a regional power. Despite having the 
largest army (with a strength of 2.3 million), its level of technical equipment falls 
short of the US army. In addition, China is not a member of alliance systems and has 
no foreign military bases, which means that its army can only implement military 
operations in areas located close to China. The Chinese military is expected to catch 
up with the US by the 2020s, but its involvement in global security policy is likely to 
remain shaped by national interests (economic interests and irredentist efforts), in 






A Wall Street Revolt
USA: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014, p. 274
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When we try to find samples for real, intensive market competition in relation to 
the economy, the stock markets come to our mind as one of the first things. On 
stock markets everything is public, the information flow is fast, everybody has the 
same information at the same time, and consequently the chances are balanced. 
Here indeed, those win who are better, since equal conditions are provided by strict 
regulation and the evenness of competition is also proven by the lively rhythm of 
the stock exchange as the need for being quick arises from the fact that competitors 
are always very close to each other in tight competition.
However, there is a world hidden for simple investors where quickness and, through 
it, the public information flow providing the same guidance for everyone also 
receive different interpretation. The book of Michael Lewis presents this world, 
the world of high frequency trading.
In this world the largest investors, professional investment funds, huge pension 
funds and, in a certain sense, even the large banks of Wall Street are vulnerable 
to small but very fast, new type predators who are mostly invisible to the others 
and who mainly came from mathematics, computer technology, atomic physics or 
other sciences rather than the financial world. In this world, time is measured in 
millionth of seconds and in the interest of that, astronomical amounts are spent 
on technology. Paradoxically, this world was established as a result of a regulation 
aimed at the equality and balanced character of the conditions of electronic trading 
that just began at the stock markets in the 1980s and became exclusive since that 
time.
Learning from the experiences of earlier abuses, in order to eliminate them, the 
US Securities and Exchange Commission tightened the rules of electronic trading in 
2005. The regulation on the National Market System made the acceptance of the 
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best priced offers compulsory and ordered to build a central system for collecting, 
processing and publishing all buy and sale bids of the different stock exchanges. 
However, it has not specified how fast this central system must be. Thereby, building 
faster information processing systems, it facilitated high frequency traders in reaping 
the benefits from the speed to come before the other operators of the market in 
the manner that, making use of the requirement of compulsory acceptance of the 
best offers, they receive information on their intentions as well. Thanks to this 
deadly mixture created by the otherwise good-intentioned regulation, the new type 
operators who build faster and faster systems, increase the volatility and risk of the 
markets by their abstruse strategies, who meanwhile basically do not assume any 
own risk pick billions of dollar from investors’ pockets.
However, the book of Michael Lewis shows not only the establishment, operation 
and special internal rules as well as the harmful effects of this world, but also the 
work of a small but enthusiastic team of Wall Street professionals acting against 
them and, through it, also the possible solution. The group organised around 
Brad Katsuyama who left his well-paid executive job at the Royal Bank of Canada, 
a Canadian bank considered to be a small player on Wall Street, and composed of 
professionals who, similarly to Brad Katsuyama, had left the safety of their well-paid 
Wall Street jobs confront the predators who dominate the market and also have 
strong political relations. Initially, searching the causes of phenomena disturbing 
their own trading or just their technical work, they gradually explore the world of 
high frequency trading and finally, they decide to confront it. They seek allies in 
the investors injured by the system that has evolved and, assuming serious risks, 
they establish their own stock exchange that allow investors and brokers to avoid 
the system contaminated by the high frequency trade. For this purpose, they partly 
apply their own weapon, speed, against them, and partly they create conditions 
under which extraordinary fastness cannot become a source of an unfair advantage.
The story ends with the establishment and the first successes of the new stock 
exchange, however, the fight for restoration of the fairness of the competition on 
the stock markets and for change does not end.
The book of Michael Lewis is an interesting and exciting reading for those who are 
interested in the backstages of stock exchanges, the possibilities of technology, or 
the difficulties of regulating the capital markets. Despite the exciting and maybe 
unsettling topic, the book is also an enjoyable read; the bestselling author does 
his best in it.
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Adam Burakowski – Aleksander Gubrynowicz – Pawel Ukielski:
1989 – The Final Days of the Communist Regime in East-Central Europe
Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2014, p. 455
ISBN: 978-615-5475-03-0 (Hardback)
Former Chinese premier Zhou Enlai famously replied to the enquiry of a foreign 
journalist that it was “too early” to assess the implications of the French revolution 
of 1789. This unique Eastern wisdom helps shed some light on the dilemma of 
whether the quarter of a century that has elapsed since the collapse of communism, 
which was astoundingly rapid according to many, can be regarded as a historical 
perspective.
The three authors of the book, highly erudite historians, political scientists and 
lawyers of nearly the same age, experienced themselves during their early teens 
how time, sluggish until then, suddenly sped up and gave way to many changes that 
occurred during a single year. A world system believed to be sound fell apart, pulling 
down the communist ideology along with it. The ideological fundamentals upheld 
for decades crumbled and red-clad party member books ended up in the wastebin.
The flowingly written and excellently edited book, featuring notes and 
commentaries, was first published in Polish six years ago and addresses the history 
of the transition from state socialism to capitalism in each affected country – Poland, 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria – 
without any trace of nostalgic tones and in great depth. The political changeovers of 
Albania, Yugoslavia, and the USSR, the leader of the Eastern Bloc, are not discussed 
in the book due to their different form compared to the aforementioned countries. 
The expanded and updated Hungarian version of the book follows events until the 
2010s with great professionalism, while still remaining accessible.
The triumvirate of authors asserts that the crisis of the communist world system 
accelerated unstoppably from the mid-1970s and Western loans – over and above 
the exploitation of the USSR’s rich raw material resources – contributed significantly 
to the protraction of the agony caused by economic unviability. The authors 
identified the following as drivers of the inevitable collapse of the totalitarian 
Zoltán Siklósi-Dutkay is a chief expert at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. E-mail: siklosiz@mnb.hu.
Financial and Economic Review, Vol. 14 Issue 2., June 2015, pp. 191–193.
192 Book reviews
Zoltán Siklósi-Dutkay 
regimes covered in the book: the chronically unviable centrally controlled economy, 
the low level of innovative capacity holding back technical development, the arms 
race between the two world systems, the growing social crisis coupled with growing 
economic woes and the resulting demoralisation of the population, and the spread 
of crime, alcoholism, and apathy.
The key strength of the book, showcasing a unique perspective, is that it refrains 
from the platitudes typical of studies of this topic. It does not treat the Central 
and Eastern European region as a uniform entity and presents the situation of the 
various countries at the time of the political changeover in a nuanced manner, 
discussing the idiosyncratic events in each country. The book also features rich 
descriptions, for instance the passage about the disgraceful fall of the Genius of 
the Carpathians, Nicolae Ceausescu.
The most relevant chapter for Hungarian readers will be the analysis of the events 
that unfolded in Hungary, written by co-author Gubrynowicz and entitled “From 
a soft dictatorship to a protracted political changeover”. The chapter paints an 
accurate picture of the trend so typical of the region, characterised by timid reforms 
that only managed to delay the coming to light of the internal contradictions of the 
regime, but were entirely incapable of stopping the collapse. Kadarism longed for 
subjects different from those of other socialist countries. It withdrew politics from 
people’s day-to-day lives, did not impose communist ideology, was less patriotic and 
wary of nationalism, while attempting to improve the welfare of ordinary people, 
pitiful by Western standards, who were not interested in the past or the future. 
Thanks to the relative welfare fuelled by loans, Hungary did not experience strikes 
even in the 1980s, and the launch of the second economy, i.e. economic activities 
outside state employment, alleviated the social tensions, which were on the rise 
in other states within the Eastern Bloc, for some time.
While we map the path that led to the demise of the Eastern Bloc with the help 
of the authors, many questions come to mind. Did the former countries of the 
Eastern Bloc manage to definitively eradicate the heavy heritage of communism 
or is this process nowhere near over? Are we taking nationalism, Central and 
Eastern Europe’s century-old curse, repressed for decades and now rearing its 
head, seriously enough? Was the political changeover a success or a failure? These 
are the unanswered questions that render the political changeover, often seen as 
a hypocritical, a weighty heritage for more than 100 million Eastern Europeans.
The fact that three general secretaries of the USSR passed away over the course 
of a short period in the early 1980s can be regarded as symbolic. The funeral 
ceremonies were broadcast in the satellite countries and some suspected that the 
actual funeral of the communist leaders will shortly be followed by the allegoric 
funeral of the communist regime.
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It is an undeniable fact that 1989 represents the end of an era, a milestone, 
a psychological turning point or, as some recall with some pathos, an annus mirabilis, 
or year of wonders. The region shed not only communism, but also a foreign power, 
artificially created states fell apart, geopolitical power relations definitively changed, 
deep reforms started to unfold in the post-Soviet states, and most importantly, 
despite all arguments: 1989 brought freedom, making the year similar to 1848.
In 1989, the unfathomable occurred.
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Zsigmond Pálvölgyi 
Andrea Tornielli – Giacomo Galeazzi:
Pope Francis: This Economy Kills
(Transl. by Csaba Török)
Jezsuita Kiadó, Budapest, 2015, p. 231
ISBN-13: 978-9638014771
The authors, two renowned Vatican experts, compile the thoughts of Pope Francis 
about today’s economic and social situation as well as the relevant criticism, thereby 
explaining the comments of the Pope that might often seem too radical. The Bishop 
of Rome has been severely criticised for the remarks he made in his encyclical, The 
Joy of the Gospel (Evangelii Gaudium) published in the year of his election: phrases 
such as “the new tyranny of capitalism” or the “idolatry of money” have received 
considerable attention not only among economic actors but also within the Catholic 
Church. Some have labelled the Pope a Marxist, others have called him incompetent 
or a man looking for a third way between capitalism and socialism. The authors 
reflect on these designations, and present Pope Francis’ thoughts on the economic 
and social situation through interviews and his speeches.
The book, just like the Pope’s views, centre on the need for the church to turn 
towards the poor: Pope Francis’ goal is to build a “poor Church for the poor”. This is 
reflected by his choice of name that he adopted in honour of Saint Francis of Assisi, 
the patron saint of the poor, as well as his first apostolic journey, during which he 
visited refugees on Lampedusa, an island between Africa and Europe. The authors 
frequently assert that the Pope’s focus on the poor was heavily influenced by his 
experiences in Buenos Aires, where he was repeatedly faced with the hopelessness 
of those living in the slums. Based on the poverty and the widening income gap 
he encountered in Argentina, Pope Francis has criticised the present system of 
capitalism and the trickle-down theory, which has been strongly denounced in the 
English-speaking press, especially in the United States.
The authors give a detailed overview of these opinions that mainly lambast the 
Pope’s incompetence and his flawed generalisation. According to the extensively 
quoted criticism of Michael Novak, an American Catholic philosopher, Pope Francis 
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only met a disfigured form of capitalism in Argentina, whereas in the United States, 
free markets and the protection of private property were the very reasons that 
enabled the masses of immigrants to rise. Novak, just like other critics of the 
Pope, believe that the social teachings of John Paul II lend legitimacy to capitalism, 
and, according to Novak, denouncing capitalism is tantamount to questioning 
the thoughts of the former Pope. The authors underline that the universality of 
capitalism had already been called into question by the predecessor of Pope Francis, 
Benedict XVI, in his encyclical, Caritas in veritate, published immediately after the 
eruption of the economic crisis in 2008. That work received similar criticism from 
the followers of American conservative Catholicism.
A separate chapter is dedicated to the financial sector that, according to the Pope, 
has departed from its original function due to the belief in the absolute autonomy 
of the markets; speculation does not serve the interest of the people, which was 
clearly demonstrated by the spike in global food prices at the onset of the crisis. 
Back then, in search of greater yields, capital flowed from the bond and equity 
markets to commodities markets. This, without any true reason that could be 
explained in terms of the real economy, resulted in the doubling of wheat and maize 
prices between 2008 and 2009, which later returned to their original levels. Guided 
by similar events depicted in the book that directly affect the poor, Pope Francis 
has taken a stand against the autonomy of the market and financial speculation, 
which he considers directly responsible for preserving poverty.
A recurring phrase in the book, the “idolatry of money”, best exemplifies the Pope’s 
criticism against the money-centred economic system. Pope Francis argues that 
people in today’s societies focus too much on gaining material goods, which results 
in major distortions both at the social and at the individual level. The Pope pays 
special attention to work, which should provide a decent, fair income if poverty is 
to be tackled. However, economic decision-makers have moved a sizeable share 
of the production of developed countries to developing countries in order to 
ensure the continuous increase in profits. As a result, masses of low-skilled, low-
income workers have been made redundant, while often the new jobs created in 
developing countries do not provide the income levels securing livelihoods. Due 
to globalisation and the swift mobilisation of liquid assets, capital has increasingly 
grown in importance, which should be addressed by political decision-makers by 
(instead of constantly increasing production) guaranteeing appropriate working 
conditions and state-regulated, fair wages.
At the personal level, the “idolatry of money” is displayed by the single-minded 
pursuit of financial assets; the priority of providing material comfort leads to the 
alienation of the individual from the community, and the emergence of social 
indifference. The latter is illustrated by the Pope’s oft-repeated adage that if the 
stock market drops by two points, it makes the news, but nobody cares about the 
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homeless person in the neighbouring street freezing to death. Social indifference 
increases with income inequality, even though decreasing individuality and boosting 
solidarity might well be the solution to reducing the current social disparities. Pope 
Francis suggests that the endless pursuit of self-interests and banning morals from 
economic life has produced a “throw-away” culture: our society is centred too 
much on competition, and those in power not only suppress the weak but also 
force them out of society. Because of the decline in solidarity, less attention is paid 
to the unemployed, the poor and the old who are increasingly stripped of their 
human dignity due to the unchanging circumstances.
The book repeatedly mentions that the Catholic Church does not intend to analyse 
the current economic system or to provide alternatives: the Pope has merely voiced 
his concern about the present deficiencies of capitalism, in line with the social 
teachings of the Church. In an interview at the end of the book, Pope Francis 
stresses that he does not make his comments as an economic expert, and that his 
thoughts, apart from the one concerning trickle-down theory, had already formed 
part of the Church’s teachings. The book often quotes from the encyclical of Pope 
Pius XI issued after the 1929 global economic crisis, in which the “international 
imperialism of money” is condemned, and frequently mentions the teachings of 
the ancient fathers of the church, whose thoughts about putting an end to poverty 
seem radical today.
In view of the above, the book should not be read as a damning criticism of 
capitalism but rather as a guideline. The thoughts of Pope Francis do not provide 
specific solutions for easing social tensions, but promote a more liveable, human-
centred world by pointing out problems. According to the main message of the 
book, in order to tackle social injustice, morals should play an increasingly dominant 
role in economic governance so that economic life is again centred on people 
instead of money.
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Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2013, p. 151
ISBN: 978-94-6138-330-3
As a former member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, Lorenzo 
Bini Smaghi1 was able to closely follow the impacts of the global financial crisis on 
euro-area Member States and its transformation into a sovereign debt crisis in 
the euro area. Ten years after the establishment of the Economic and Monetary 
Union, the euro area was shaken by a crisis that jeopardised the future of the single 
currency and the European Union as a whole. In spite of the reinforcement of the 
European institutional framework (mainly the economic framework), a number of 
EU summits and crisis meetings as well as the conventional and unconventional 
interventions by the European Central Bank, the crisis is still unresolved. A complete 
recovery from the crisis is expected to take years for the euro-area countries, which 
suffered a serious downturn.
The crisis had a dramatic impact on the economic and social structure of Europe: 
the increase in unemployment and youth unemployment, the growing number of 
people living in poverty and the decline in families’ income are only a few social 
and economic consequences of the crisis. In some countries, incomes fell to levels 
of 20 years ago as a result of the protracted crisis. In Bini Smaghi’s opinion, the 
negative economic phenomena are only the symptoms of a much more serious 
problem. First of all, the crisis is of a political nature. It reflects that Western 
societies were unable to solve the problems which accumulated in the past 20 
years, and thus drastic steps were necessary during the euro-area crisis to reform 
the economic and social structures. In view of their future re-election, during their 
time in office, democratically elected politicians are not willing to take measures 
that would endanger their re-election. Deeper structural changes and reforms have 
to be waited for until external economic conditions deteriorate to a level where 
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the financial markets are not willing to finance a country any longer. Then the 
emergency enforces unpopular economic decisions, which most often mean strict 
austerity measures. This, in turn, hinders economic activity, and threatens political 
and social cohesion.
In spite of the fact that the global financial crisis did not start from Europe, it still 
had the greatest impact on Europe due to the complexity of the decision-making 
mechanism of the European Union. The European Union cannot be considered 
a complete economic entity similar to the United States. On the whole, power (the 
co-ordination of individual policies) has not yet moved to the federal level from the 
local level; decentralisation will take long years, or even decades and will probably 
be coupled with a serious political crisis.
In the introductory chapter, the author raises six questions, which characterise 
the decision-making mechanisms of European states.2 The first question examines 
the understanding of the global financial crisis and the euro crisis. The most 
frequently arising and most focussed-on problem during crisis management is 
the accumulation of debt (whether government or private). Why was the debt 
level as a proportion of GDP allowed to become so high? This is the result of the 
imprudent behaviour of banks, households, corporations and the public sector. 
However, blaming other actors or factors (financial sector, governments, the rich, 
China, the World Trade Organisation or the euro) may divert attention from the real 
problems and their efficient management. We also have to ask the questions why 
financial deregulation was able to create an environment that provided loans too 
easily, even for non-returning investment or consumption, why public expenditures 
financed from debt were able to grow faster than incomes, why interest rates were 
left at a low level for so long, or why the financial supervisory authorities of certain 
countries were so short-sighted and tolerated high risks. The answer may be that 
individuals, relying upon past trends, overestimate their future income. However, 
overestimation of economic growth is more deeply rooted, mostly in the trends 
in global economy in the past 20 years (i.e. the change in the structure of trade 
and technological progress), which questioned the growth models of developed 
industrialised countries and made their social structure unsustainable. Accordingly, 
the crisis may be understood as a structural crisis, to which there is one possible 
answer: deeper integration into the global economic system. Therefore, it is no 
wonder that the downturn suffered during the crisis was smaller for euro-area 
Member States which had become more deeply integrated into the international 
system as a result of structural reforms in the labour market and education, coupled 
with support for research and development as well as investment in infrastructure. 
By contrast, countries that kept postponing the implementation of structural 
2  The first five topics are typical of each developed industrialised state, but most seriously apply to EU 
countries.
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reforms and whose respective economies were based mainly on the internal market 
suffered greater losses.
The second problem is the aforementioned continued postponement of politically 
costly reforms, which is typical of democratic systems. Reforms in certain countries 
are implemented only when they become necessary in order to avoid a much deeper 
financial and real economy crisis. A typical example for this is the transformation 
of pension systems: productivity in developed countries has declined in parallel 
with the increase in life expectancy. This does not cause a problem as long as 
the financial markets finance the given state, and the necessary pension reforms 
are not implemented until then. With a decline in propensity to invest, the risk 
premium on government securities starts to increase, and as insolvency approaches, 
the disbursement of pensions also encounters obstacles. And only then does it 
become clear for the government that the pension system is in need of reform. 
The third issue is partly the continuation of the previous one. In emergency cases, 
governments are ready to implement reforms, but due to the short time available 
they are unable to realise the whole complexity of a problem, and therefore often 
adopt solutions that are not comprehensive.
The fourth problem lies in the nature of crisis management. Short-term solutions 
focus on fast recovery from the crisis, whereas long-term solutions aim at preventing 
the evolution of similar crises in the future. There are serious tensions between 
the two solutions. The dilemma mainly arises during the treatment of the financial 
system: to shift the responsibility upon the credit institutions, and the banks that 
apply a proper lending system will continue to work, while imprudent banks will go 
bankrupt, or to stabilise the whole financial system and keep lending alive during 
the period of the crisis as well through government support. In the United States, 
the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008 (the lack of government 
support) triggered a process that resulted in the collapse of the market, and the 
Congress supported the financial rescue package only after that. The US Treasury 
recapitalised the major banks in order to avoid a deeper recession. No major bank 
collapsed in Europe during the global financial crisis; on the other hand, most of 
the European countries were averse to the recapitalisation of the European banking 
sector from state funds. This resulted in a gradual weakening of the European 
financial system and an increase in the risk premia of sovereign states in parallel 
with bank risks, which prolonged the crisis and terminated lending to the private 
sector.
The fifth subject matter is a scrutiny of the role of central banks. Central banks 
face a serious dilemma in the time of a crisis. On the one hand, if they intervene in 
order to prevent financial turmoil, they reduce market pressure and give time for 
politicians to implement unpopular reforms, but by that they generate inflation, i.e. 
they add to the burdens of taxpayers. On the other hand, if they do not intervene, 
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they jeopardise financial stability and price stability as well. This problem is even 
more complex in the case of the euro area as the debt crisis of certain Member 
States endangers the functioning of monetary policy and the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. Therefore, the ECB decided to purchase government 
securities of countries in distress, thus preventing sovereign default and giving time 
for governments to improve their respective financial positions.
The last topic deals with the problem of the incomplete nature of the euro area, 
foreshadowing the necessity of deeper integration. ‘To overcome the crisis we 
need more Europe’, as it has often been mentioned. However, more Europe or 
deeper European integration requires the delegation of all important components 
of economic policy to the community level. Of course, this is not supported in EU 
countries, which is clearly reflected in the strengthening of nationalist parties in 
European countries, which proclaim less Europe. The problem exists not only at the 
national, but at the EU level as well, because according to subsidiarity, one of the 
most important EU principles, a policy may be delegated to community level only 
if they are unable to exercise it better at national level. In Bini Smaghi’s opinion, 
one or more further crises are needed to convince people that wielding power at 
the local level is unsatisfactory, and deeper integration is needed.3
The author divided the book into 20 smaller chapters, where the aforementioned 
six problems are discussed in more detail, embedded in the current economic 
developments in the euro area. The chapters do not present the history of the 
Economic and Monetary Union in chronological order from its outset to the 
crisis of the euro area, but describe certain problems that arise. In the individual 
chapters, the historical presentation is complemented by economic and political 
considerations.
Alternatives to the Economic and Monetary Union have not proven or could not 
prove successful. Bini Smaghi presents three possible options that could have been 
alternatives to the European monetary integration, but their application would also 
have caused serious economic problems. The first one could have been the further 
application of the European Monetary System, which followed the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, but the widening of the fluctuation bands with the crisis 
of the European Monetary System would have caused serious tensions in trade. 
Moreover, it would have jeopardised the functioning of the single internal market. 
The second option would have been the strengthening of monetary stability around 
the German mark, but the Bundesbank was responsible only for the stability of 
the German mark and not for other currencies. The third option could have been 
the establishment of an ‘exclusive’ monetary union, which would have torn the 
3  This thought of Bini Smaghi coincides with the idea according to which European economic integration is 
reactive, and deepening only takes place if a response to some crisis is needed. The lack of proactive attitude 
is negligible in crisis-free periods, in the case of economic prosperity.
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then European Union into two. Consequently, there remained no other solution 
but to establish the Economic and Monetary Union on the basis of the Delors 
Report, which is the clear consequence of creating the single internal market 
(with guaranteeing the condition of free movement of capital). Markets cannot 
become completely integrated until there are different currencies, but without the 
integration of the markets the monetary union cannot be considered an optimum 
currency area. The only remaining question is whether it would have been better 
to postpone the launching of the monetary union. 
The launch of EMU has made it clear that this is a one-way process; it is not possible 
to step back from a deeper stage of integration to a lower stage. Greece’s exit 
from the euro area has been on the agenda in political and academic circles for 
years, but it does not even have any legal basis.4 As a result of an exit either a dual 
currency system should be applied or a new currency should be introduced (return 
to the earlier one), but both steps would have serious economic consequences: the 
exiting country would be unable to finance itself from the international markets, 
euro-denominated government debt would increase considerably, and the country 
– Greece in this case – would have to face a much more serious economic recession.
In the presentation of the crisis, Bini Smaghi mentions that (when the book was 
written) three countries in a crisis (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) became insolvent 
due to completely different circumstances. Spain and Italy also faced serious 
economic difficulties, which were alleviated only by the OMT announcement. 
However, during this time, ‘Northern’ or core states did not suffer any strong 
economic downturn. This was mainly attributable to the fact that for example 
Germany in the 2000s, although with difficulties, but implemented the structural 
reforms that significantly improved its international competitiveness. In the author’s 
opinion it was of crucial importance. Competitiveness as a key factor is mentioned 
several times in both the Introduction and some chapters. Firstly, the countries that 
implemented the necessary reforms did not suffer any material downturn. Secondly, 
their labour cost based competitiveness improved considerably, contributing 
(through exports) to these countries’ recovery from the crisis.
Bini Smaghi devotes several short chapters to the foundation of new institutions. 
The European Stability Mechanism, aka the European Monetary Fund, was an 
important factor to calm down financial markets. The establishing of the Banking 
Union is a necessary condition for a deeper European monetary integration, as 
excessive lending by banks and their insufficiently strict regulation constituted 
one of the underlying reasons of the crisis. With their community regulation the 
European banking sector may become more integrated, and it may also handle the 




relationship between bank risks and sovereign risks. In addition, he emphasises 
the crisis management by the European Central Bank as well as its unconventional 
instruments that have allowed and may allow time for individual governments to 
implement the necessary adjustments and reforms. 
In the Summary, he presents his own comments on the future of European economic 
integration in four points. The first one outlines the incompatibility of European 
economic models. He states that the current economic models are inadequate in 
the new global context, and structural changes are necessary. The second one is 
about the independence and supervision of institutions, which may provide basic 
input on formulating individual national economic policies. The purpose of this is 
to avoid an overestimation of future economic growth to an extent typical before. 
The third one underlines the national fiscal framework, supports the idea of the 
fiscal pact, in which the planning of national fiscal policies is carried out for the 
medium term, and the reduction of government debts is an essential objective. 
Finally, demographic problems are focussed on. Economic decisions related to the 
issue of ageing should not be postponed, and temporary or incomplete short-term 
adjustments should not be made.
Lastly, the difficulties ahead of us might seem insoluble, but the past 60 years of 
European history have shown that any problem can be overcome. There is still 
a long way to go, but even the United States was not created in a day; not even in 
a century.
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